

The Geographical and Spatial Imaginings
of Islamist Extremism/Terrorism

by

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Author's Declaration for Electronic Submission of Thesis

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Abstract

The contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon has emerged as one of the most significant threats to both regional and international peace, security, and stability. As the international community struggles to develop a comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon in its present context, the academic community should respond and discuss this subject from all relevant disciplinary backgrounds and perspectives. If effective and successful policies, strategies, and tactics are to be developed in order to adequately confront these transnational actors, all dimensions of the subject need to be explored. This thesis examines certain aspects of the under-theorized geographical dimension of Islamist extremist/terrorism. Focusing on Al Qaeda and other members of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, this thesis explores the geographical and spatial imagination of the Islamist terrorist subject and deconstructs the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism through critically analyzing the diffuse international structure of Islamist terrorism and its related groups, the cultural “space” Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy, and the function of landscape in the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremist/terrorism.

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"Once the concept of 'otherness' takes root, the unimaginable becomes possible. Not in some mythological country but to ordinary citizens. War is happening not only at the front, but everywhere and to us all."

--Drakulic--

"The World is a Will to Power and nothing more."

--Nietzsche--

Introduction

On the morning of September 11, 2001, when the planes hit the World Trade Centres at 8:48 a.m. and 9:06 a.m., and a third plane crashed into the Pentagon at 9:40, the most spectacular, tragic, and devastating terrorist attack in US history permanently changed the physical and psychological landscape of the United States. Within minutes of the first attack, television, radio, and various internet news agencies quickly began transmitting surreal horror to Americans and to others around the world. By the early afternoon, President Bush had declared to a bewildered and paralyzed nation that "America was at war with terror." Moreover, soon thereafter, the United States identified its enemy as Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.

After September 11, 2001 the media inundated the populace with a deluge of characterizations, interpretations, and explanations of Islam; Middle-Eastern geography, politics, and culture; and the motivations and activities of terrorists in general, and Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network in particular. Many "experts" proffered testimonies and explanations as to what had happened and why and what the response of the United States should be. Furthermore, the media continuously replayed the litany of presidential addresses that attempted to reaffirm the strength, courage, and innocence of the American people and which vehemently assured the US populace that the evil perpetrators of these atrocities and the nations believed to be harboring terrorists or supporting terrorism

would not go unpunished: “I don’t care what the international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass” (Clarke, 2004, pg. 24).¹ Consequently, the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq ensued.

However, the current campaign being waged by the United States, and the “Coalition of the Willing”—nations who have pledged support in the War on Terror—have proven to be relatively ineffective in preventing global Islamist extremist/terrorist activity. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11) there have been many terrorist attacks either directly or indirectly associated with Osama bin Laden, the al Qaeda network, and other groups that subscribe and adhere to Islamist extremist doctrine and teachings. Some examples are the bombings of foreign compounds in Saudi Arabia; the bombing of the British Embassy in Turkey; the Bali Bombings in October, 2002; the myriad suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the devastating commuter train bombings in Madrid, Spain; and the recent epiphenomena of beheadings of foreigners captured in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Although these actions may or may not be directly connected to one another and the groups involved may have different grievances, ethnic backgrounds, political partisanship, and religious affiliations, the traditional divisions are not important. What is important is the fact that these groups share a perceived common enemy and follow an extremist ideology that advocates the use of violence and terrorist tactics to achieve particular political, social, and/or religious objectives:

Islamism is a self-consciously pan-Muslim phenomenon. It is a waste of time and effort to try to distinguish Islamist terror groups from one another according to their alleged differences along a series of traditional religious, ethnic, or political divides (Shi’ite versus Sunni, Persian versus Arab, and so

¹ This quote, made by President George W. Bush, was cited by Richard Clarke in his text *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror*.

on). The reason is simple: In the eyes of the Islamist groups themselves, their common effort to strike at the West while seizing control of the Muslim world is immeasurably more important than whatever differences might be seen as “dividing” one another.² (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2002, pg. 8)

Therefore, to reach an understanding of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual actors it is not imperative to investigate their differences (although this is interesting and certainly warrants academic investigation) but to investigate their commonalities and similarities.

What is terrorism? What is a terrorist/extremist group? Who are terrorists? Where does their power, conviction, and resolve come from? Why are they willing to sacrifice themselves and kill innocent people for what they believe? How do they understand themselves and their actions? Why do they believe violence is necessary? What is the identity and subjectivity of Islamist terrorist groups and individual actors? These questions are fundamental, but, as Andrew Silke suggests, satisfactory answers to these basic questions continue to elude the field because of pervasive conceptual confusion (2001, pg. 2-3). As Ladan Boroumand and Roya Bouramound assert, “this is worrisome, for however necessary an armed response might seem in the near term, it is undeniable that a successful long-term strategy for battling Islam[ists] and its terrorists will require a clearer understanding of who these foes are, what they think, and how they understand their own motives” (2002, pg. 5).

The objective of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the geographical and spatial dimensions of Islamist extremism/terrorism, and to help generate a theoretical and practical discussion as to how these organizations and

² However, it is important to note that Islamist extremist groups will attack other Muslims based upon ideological differences, as was the case with the attack of Muslims in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If Muslims are perceived to be too moderate or Western sympathizers, they too are subject to attack.

individual actors geographically and spatially operate and “imagine” themselves. The particular question that I seek to answer is: “What are the geographical and spatial imaginings of non-state sponsored Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual actors?”³ Throughout this paper, I intend to deconstruct the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism by examining the diffuse transnational structure of Islamist extremism/terrorism, the cultural “space” that Islamist extremism/terrorism occupies, and the symbolic relationship that exists between Islamist extremism/terrorism and landscapes.

Before continuing into the main body of my analysis, it is important to define and establish an operational/conceptual understanding of *Islamist* extremism/terrorism. I use the term *Islamist* opposed to *Islamic* because the term *Islamist* more accurately codifies the ideological architecture of the phenomenon I am examining. As Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand state, “these beliefs are properly called “Islamist” rather than “Islamic” because they are actually in conflict with Islam—a conflict that we must not allow to be obscured by the ‘terrorists’ habit of commandeering Islamic religious terminology and injecting it with their own distorted content” (2002, pg. 9). The term “Islamist” refers to a marginal, insular, and myopic political and cultural discourse that has appropriated Islamic theology in order to situate itself within a broader theological context and ideological framework. The term “Islamist” allows one to analyse and

³ In the article “Defining International terrorism: A Pragmatic Approach,” Thomas Badey indicates that “two thirds of incidents classified as international terrorism are directly attributed to, and are carried out by, non-state actors” (1998, pg. 102). Although this article refers to incidents within the time period of 1992-1996, the statistic, in my opinion, is accurate as many of terrorist attacks that have been perpetrated since then have been carried out by non-state sponsored terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda and related groups and individuals.

discuss these marginal groups and individuals without erroneously demonizing and vilifying the whole of Islam and the people that practice the Islamic faith:

some Muslim activists would interpret verses of the Qur'an or traditions of the Prophet Mohammed to serve their own political ends, however they conceive them. Nevertheless, just as no one in his or her right mind would charge all Protestants or Catholics of being terrorists because certain Protestant or Catholic groups in Northern Ireland resort to armed action, by the same logic, the presence of certain terrorist groups that call themselves Islamic does not make Islam and all its adherents potential terrorists and a threat to the rest of humanity. (Al Sayyid, 2002, pg. 178)

Now that the term "Islamist" has been defined, it is necessary to define the term "terrorism."

The conceptual confusion and controversy surrounding extremism/terrorism is compounded by what has now become a cliché: one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter. As Robert Kennedy suggests:

The question of whether one person's terrorist is simply another's freedom fighter is perhaps nowhere more starkly perceived than in the ongoing struggles in the Middle East, [South Asia, and Southeast Asia], where those branded as terrorists by many are frequently viewed as martyrs by others. Their pictures hang on local barber shop walls along with those of movie stars. Their faces adorn key chains and the local equivalent of baseball cards. They are immortalized in songs. Children skip down alleyways shouting their names. (1999, pg. 2)

Consequently, if one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, "terrorism" is a matter of perspective and interpretation: a perspective and interpretation that is informed by the political, cultural, socioeconomic, and quasi-religious mores, dogma, and provenance of a particular country, region, or group(s) of people. Therefore, any definition of "terrorism" is tenuous; however, nonetheless, an operational/functional definition must be established in order to construct a conceptual and referential understanding of this phenomenon.

For the purpose of my argument, I use Alex P. Schmid's academic consensus definition of terrorism. The following definition, which I quote at length, is the "product of the synthesis of 109 definitions" (Badey, 1998, pg. 91) of terrorism:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action [against non-combatants], employed by (semi-) clandestine individual group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.⁴
(Schmid cited in Badey, 1998, pg. 91)

Although this definition could be construed as excessive and convoluted, it accurately identifies and encapsulates many of the elements and characteristics unique to extremism/terrorism and its related strategies and tactics. However, this definition fails to explicitly identify one key element and feature of extremism/terrorism: the targeting of *civilians*. Certainly the term "non-combatants" implicitly refers to civilian targets, but without explicitly identifying *civilians* as targets of extremism/terrorism, a certain degree of ambiguity may exist surrounding what constitutes extremism/terrorism. If a successful political and legal normative framework for combating extremism/terrorism is going to be established, the definition used to codify acts of extremism/terrorism must explicitly identify all of the defining characteristics of this phenomenon. As a result of the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), a definition of terrorism was proposed that would strengthen the role and ability of the UN to combat terrorism. The most noteworthy element of the definition is the explicit reference to civilian targets. The

⁴ See pg. 28 in Schmid, Alex & Jongman, Albert. (1988). *Political Terrorism*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books., for original appearance of definition.

proposed UN consensus definition of terrorism for the General Assembly is as follows: “any action [...] that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Counter-Terrorism Committee—UN, 2004). In my opinion, together the academic consensus definition and the proposed consensus definition for the UN General Assembly formulate a comprehensive and robust conceptual framework for interpreting and understanding the contemporary extremism/terrorism phenomenon. Now that a conceptual framework and operational/functional understanding of Islamist extremism/terrorism has been established, I will proceed to an overview of my analysis and then continue into the body of my argument.

In the first movement of my analysis, I use an Andersonian and a Canettian theoretical framework to examine the diffuse organizational structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and the geographical and spatial imaginings that make it possible. Furthermore, I argue that the forces of globalization have enabled Islamist extremist/terrorist groups to develop a transnational structure, which enables the group and individual actors to spread globally while remaining ideologically united in an imagined community.

In the second movement, using a Bhabhabian post-colonial theoretical trajectory and Soja's "Third space" paradigm, I explore how the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist actor occupies a *liminal* cultural third space, resulting in a hybridized identity and subjectivity that resists and subverts traditional forms of codification and identification through the process of cultural mimicry. Furthermore,

using the Butlerian concept of performativity, I analyse how the hybrid identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is a cultural performance, and that the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist manifests and is realized through an actual violent act. I then go on to argue that suicide/martyr operations are the absolute and ultimate expression of the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist actor.

Finally, in the third movement, I analyse the symbolic relationship that exists between landscape and the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist group and individual actor. I then argue that the landscape, serving as a canvass on which the group or actor inscribe their 'language' of political and ideological dissent, symbolically becomes an extension of the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist group and individual actor by producing a permanent landscape of terror.

Although many geographical and spatial arguments rely on empirical evidence and quantitative methods of analysis, my approach relies upon theoretical modes of analysis in order to bring my argument into force. Structurally my argument exists in three parts and moves from the macro scale to the micro scale. First, I examine the transnational organizational structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist movement. Second, I move to an analysis of the “space” Islamist extremist/terrorist actors occupy after penetrating and infiltrating a particular country, society, and/or population. Finally, I examine the symbolic significance of specific places and spaces (landscapes) that have been impacted and shaped by Islamist extremist/terrorist violence and/or the threat of violence.

My research draws upon a variety of perspectives representative of a multitude of academic disciplines and sub-disciplines. The majority of my research has focused on information and arguments contained within recent academic journals, academic texts, government documents, and media e.g. newspapers, magazines, etc. My research is limited to “open source” material and information readily available through the internet, university libraries, and book stores. Certainly, access to “classified” government documentation regarding some of the issues I engage would be invaluable for understanding the capabilities and capacities of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individuals, and I am sure would add new dimensions to my argument. However, again, the majority of my research reflects the most current and up-to-date information available to students at a “Western” university and/or to individuals who have an express interest in this area of inquiry.

1st Movement:
**The Transnational Geographical and Spatial Imaginings of Islamist
Extremism/Terrorism**

In the post-9/11 era, religious or “sacred” (Islamist) terrorism has become more prominent and pronounced as a political threat and international destabilizing force (Cronin, 2003, pg. 35). Although certain forms of terrorism and the groups and individuals associated with this phenomenon have been the subject of a long history of debate and analysis, the prevailing discourse situates these groups and individuals in regions and places and spaces that are over “there,” in countries and cultures that are located far from the once believed invulnerable West (Occident) and, in particular, the impenetrable United States. However, “as if from the ether, violent and brutal attacks exploded into the consciousness of Western (United States, my focus) nations” (Segaller, 1986, pg. 7). The moment the airplanes collided with the World Trade buildings and the Pentagon, the United States and Western society became instantaneously aware that “they” were no longer over “there”, but were “here”—paradise lost.

As Alex P. Schmid asserts, “due to globalization, the permeability of borders and state interdependence, the internationalization of terrorism (Islamist terrorism) and other forms of political violence is a fact” (2004, pg. 201). Certainly the Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks on 9/11, the train bombings in Madrid, the Bali night club bombings, the bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen, the bombing of a US housing complex in Saudi Arabia, and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate the international reach of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the various groups whom subscribe to this extremist/terrorist ideology. Consequently, the internationalization of

the Islamist extremism/terrorism phenomenon and its *transnational*⁵ character and network poses a significant and unpredictable threat to global security and stability in general and to the United States and its perceived allies in particular. Although regional and state-centered threats and conflicts are still significant security concerns, the most pressing security challenges facing the international community, such as Islamist extremism/terrorism, are deterritorialized, effectively borderless, and global in reach (Tuathail, 1999, pg. 119). As an internationalized and transnational phenomenon, it is important, if not imperative, to attempt to penetrate the Islamist extremist/terrorist geographical and spatial imagination and develop an understanding of how groups like Al Qaeda construct and conceptualize their world view and the internationalized spaces they inhabit, both real and imagined.

Using an Andersonian and a Canettian theoretical framework, I examine how the organizational structure of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and the modern extremist/terrorist ideology that function as the foundation of their imagined and constructed communities serve a catalytic function in the erosion of the borders of sovereignty and nationalism and support and sustain the emergence of a borderless, transnational geographical and spatial imagination. I then argue that the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology has enabled Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist/extremist groups to develop a diffuse transnational organizational structure while remaining ideologically committed and united in an internationalized imagined community.

Furthermore, I argue that the processes inherent in globalization facilitate and support the

⁵ The international connections and interactions between Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and individual actors can be characterized as *transnational*. In her article "Terrorists as Transnational Actors," Louise Richardson defines transnationalism as "interactions between non-state actors. That is, international interactions that are not directed by states" (Richardson, 1999, pg. 209).

internationalization and transnationalization of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon.

Transnationalizing the Spaces of Islamist Extremism/Terrorism

The protracted “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates the predilection of the United States to conceptualize conflict and develop strategies in conventional state-centric terms: “the combined focus of the United States on state-centric threats and its attempt to cast twenty-first century terrorism into familiar strategic terms avoids and often undermines effective responses to this non-state phenomenon” (Cronin, 2003, pg. 30). Indeed, the ambiguous euphemism “War on Terror,” which the United States used to characterize and justify its current, and undoubtedly its future, political and military activities, is laden with anachronistic and atavistic Westphalian and Cold War-esque rhetoric. The “War on Terror,” however unclear the actual referent, is an ideological mechanism that “helps mobilize the populace against an enemy” (Chomsky, 1988, pg. 29), whether real or imagined, readily identifiable or not, and, because of its ambiguity, can be used against any state, group, or individual that the United States consider to be a threat to their domestic and/or foreign interests.

The War on Terror and its accompanying rhetoric—embodied in phrases like “axis of evil” and “with us or against us”—seeks to (re)establish a Manichean division of space and place into “good” and “evil”, “our” place and “their” place; its political [and cultural] function is to incorporate and regulate “us” from “them,” the same from “the other” (Sidaway, 1993, pg. 364). This division and (re)presentation of space serves to establish both real and imagined physical and psychological boundaries that, for the purpose of political and military prudence and expediency, demarcate an enemy that is

locatable and identifiable through specific geopolitical and national/state-centric political, cultural, economic, and geographical/spatial characteristics and limits. However, the rhetoric of the “War on Terror” and geopolitical/state-centric discourse represent a flawed calculus because the confrontation is with a non-state phenomenon that exceeds its immediate terms and boundaries (Passavant & Dean, 2002, pg. 2).

Although specific regions and countries—Middle East, North Africa and the horn of Africa, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Chechnya, and Indonesia, to name a few—may serve as epicentres where Islamist extremists/terrorists receive their training and indoctrination, strategically plan international operations and attacks, and may serve as provisional havens, Islamist extremists/terrorists do not pledge allegiance to a specific country and/or geopolitical unit/sovereign territory. Rather, they pledge allegiance to the Islamist ideology in general and the group/organization they are apart of in particular. Obviously, Islamist extremists/terrorists originate from particular regions and countries from around the world and may predominantly operate in a particular country or region e.g. Chechnya or Pakistan, depending on the objectives of the individual actor and that of the group he is a member of. Irrespective of the national origins, varying political, cultural, and socio-economic objectives and grievances, and their specific geographical presence, the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency is ideologically unified in a transnational imagined community that is simultaneously heterogeneous and homogeneous in nature. Consequently, the Islamist extremist/terrorist groups’ geographical and spatial identity and subjectivity and world view are not informed by and constructed through nationalism and its accompanying narratives and discourses on the national imagi-nation, “nation-space, nation-time” (Tuathail & Dalby,

1998, pg. 3), and an essentialist and reductionist fixed national identity. Rather, the geographical and spatial imaginings of the Islamist extremist/terrorist are developed through and fashioned by a particular theological/ideological (Islamist) imagi-nation and counter-hegemonic consciousness that resists the singularity of nationalism and the sovereign nation-state and espouses the supranational conception and character of the Islamist *Umma*. (Although the term *Umma* refers to the world wide community of Muslims in general, my emphasis is on the Islamist *Umma*.) As Bhabha (1994) states, “counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries—both actual and conceptual—disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities” (pg. 149).

By conceptualizing a supranational Islamist extremist/terrorist *Umma* that disturbs and transcends the boundaries of nationalism and the sovereign nation-state, Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and the ideologues whom propagate and promulgate this particular theological/ideological dogma, engage in a critical geopolitics that “bears witness to the irredeemable plurality of space and the multiplicity of possible political constructions of space” (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, pg. 3). In effect, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001) assert, “in the context where the nation is familiar, those who propose alternative self-categories and alternative constructions of interest must, of necessity, seek to problematize ‘the nation’ at the same time as advancing this preferred alternative” (pg. 68). Therefore, in order to “problematize the nation” and advance an alternate construction of space, the alternative possibilities of space and spatiality, both real and imagined, must be brought into being: “there is no human grouping and no attendant set

of practices that exist automatically without being brought into being” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, pg. 69).

So, how are the political, cultural, pluralized, fragmented, and internationalized/globalized/transnational spaces of Islamist extremist/terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda and its affiliates, imagined, constructed, and brought into being? In order to answer this question, I use Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* as an interpretive template to assist my argument and analysis. However, before continuing, an understanding of the theoretical precepts of *Imagined Communities* must be established.

According to Anderson, “the end of the era of nationalism, so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (1991, pg. 3). However, although “nationalism” and “nation-ness” are very important political and cultural concepts, Anderson continues: “Nation, nationality, nationalism—all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse. In contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre” (1991, pg. 3). In reaction to the “meagre” and relatively small corpus of theories regarding nationalism and nation-ness, Anderson proposes his own theory of the nation, nationalism, and/or nation-ness.

Anderson defines the nation as: “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991, pg. 6). Anderson goes on to state that “communities are not to be distinguished by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (1991, pg. 6). How

nations are imagined and subsequently constructed becomes the central theme to Anderson's understanding and theory of the nation, nationalism, and nation-ness.

As stated previously, Anderson's imagined community is conceptualized as spatially and psychologically "limited": "the nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations" (1991, pg. 7). Furthermore, as Anderson maintains, the nation "is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (1991, pg. 7). There are several historical factors and processes that Anderson contributes to the formation and construction of the 'nation' as an imagined community, including an imagined community's geographical and spatial limits. However, for the purpose of my argument, I primarily focus on three of Anderson's lenses of analysis, which he terms: Cultural Roots; The Origins of National Consciousness; and Old Languages, New Models (Anderson, 1991).

An important dimension in the development and construction of the imagined community and its physical and psychological geography and spatiality is the cultural system in which the imaginings occur. In the section Cultural Roots, Anderson describes two cultural systems which he believes are relevant to his argument: "the Religious Community" (my focus) and "The Dynastic Realm."

The nation, nationalism, and nation-ness serve an important ontological function in the development of a collective unifying identity and subjectivity, similar to the historical role religion played, and for many still plays:

Like the great transcendental religions in earlier historical periods, nationalism also forms the framework of today's characteristic identity [and subjectivity]—national identity [and subjectivity]. This identity [and subjectivity], which reflects the cognitive framework provided by nationalism and the image of social order implied in it, differs in several important respects from identities [and subjectivities] fostered by religious cultures. To begin with, nationalism is secular. It locates the sources of ultimate meaning, law, and authority, which religious consciousness identifies with transcendental forces, in this world, specifically, in social reality (Greenfeld, 2000, pg. 30).

Anderson asserts:

I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the eighteenth century was 'produced' by the erosion of religious certainties, or that this erosion does not itself require a complex explanation. Nor am I suggesting that somehow nationalism historically 'supersedes' religion. What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which—as well as against which—it came into being (Anderson, 1991, pg. 12).

As suggested above, Anderson partially locates the rise and development of nationalism, the nation, and nation-ness within the historicity of "the religious community" (1991, pg. 12).

From Anderson's perspective, "few things are more impressive than the vast territorial stretch of the Umma Islam [...] Christendom [...] and the Buddhist world [...]" (1991, pg. 12). Although certain regions of the world may be predominantly Islamic, Christian, or Buddhist, etc., the Islamic, Christian, and Buddhist religious communities, both in a historic frame and a contemporary frame, have transcended enormous geographical areas, penetrated political and cultural borders and barriers, and influenced

the world view and consciousness of billions of people whose provenance is as varied as the geographical, spatial, political, cultural, and socio-economic diversity of these immense religious communities. Despite the differences I have previously listed, Anderson argues that these immense communities were imaginable largely because of the unifying effect of sacred languages and written script (1991, pg. 13). For example, in the instance of Islam, “if Maguindanao met Berbers in Mecca, knowing nothing of each other’s languages, incapable of communicating orally, they nonetheless understood each other’s ideographs, *because* the sacred texts they shared only existed in classical Arabic. In this sense, written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out of signs, not sounds” (1991, pg. 13). Anderson goes on to state that “all the great classical communities conceived themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power. Accordingly, the stretch of written Latin, Pali, Arabic, or Chinese was, in theory, unlimited” (1991, pg. 13). In a sense, all literate and educated individuals i.e., clergy, had access to a pure world of signs—a unique sacred language—and the theological and ideological system and spatiality these signs created and constructed (1991, pg. 13).

However, as Anderson maintains, “if the sacred silent languages were the media through which the great global communities of the past were imagined, the reality of such apparitions depended on an idea largely foreign to the contemporary Western mind: the non-arbitrariness of the sign. The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, not randomly fabricated representations of it” (1991, pg. 14). For example, until recently “the Qur’an was literally untranslatable (and therefore untranslated), because Allah’s truth was accessible only through the unsubstitutable true

signs of written Arabic” (1991, pg. 14). Therefore, “in effect, ontological reality [was] apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation” (1991, pg. 14) and its related tenets. Consequently, in a historical context, sacred and privileged systems of re-presentation and absolutism served as the impetus not only for creating imagined communities—unified through a collective theological/ideological consciousness and world view—but for the territorialization and solidification of particular geographical and psychological spaces divided and differentiated by sacred languages and the political and cultural hegemonic systems these sacred languages and systems of re-presentation created and constructed i.e., Islam runs into Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc.—a powerful force in the emergence and development of nationalism, the nation, nation-ness, and individual and collective identities and subjectivities. Although the sacred religious communities, whether real or imagined, were gradually pluralized, fragmented, and decentred by the emergence of nationalism and national consciousness, the function and impact of a sacred language serving as a unifying ideological apparatus is exemplified by contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and organizations (Al Qaeda and their ideological affiliates).

The second factor Anderson attributes to the development of nationalism, the nation, and nation-ness, is the geographical and spatial imaginings precipitated by the rise of national consciousness. According to Anderson, the rise of national consciousness was facilitated by the development and emergence of print-capitalism: “print-capitalism made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways” (1991, pg. 36). Print-capitalism and its related technological advances made it possible not only to disseminate large

amounts of information to the masses, but also made it possible for the secularization and vernacularization of print languages: “nothing served to ‘assemble’ related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market” (1991, pg. 44). Subsequently, as Anderson argues, print-languages provided the foundation for a national consciousness in three ways: First, print-languages created a unified field of exchange and communication below the sacred languages and above the spoken/oral vernaculars and dialects. People who may have found it difficult to communicate with one another via the spoken word, because of the variability of vernaculars and dialects, were able to comprehend and understand one another through the written word—standardization of communication and language-field translates into the unification a collective consciousness. Consequently, people became aware that they were connected to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people whom belong to the same print/language-field: “these fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community” (1991, pg. 44).

Second, Anderson states that “print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (1991, pg. 44). The documentation of history into a fixed form enabled information, whether authorized or unauthorized, to assume permanence through virtual infinite reproduction, both temporally and spatially (1991, pg. 44).

Third, Anderson states that “print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the old administrative vernaculars. Certain dialectics were ‘closer’ to each

print-language and dominated their final forms” (1991, pg. 45). Therefore, certain dialects assumed a “politico-cultural eminence” (1991, pg. 45) and correspondingly were elevated to the official language of the state. Consequently, as Anderson maintains, particular subordinate and unofficial dialectics created sub-national groups who, using psychoanalytic terminology, felt effectively ‘castrated’ and ‘decapitated’ and broke away and formed their own regions and imagined communities dominated by their particular languages and associated linguistic manipulations. As Anderson outlines, “the fate of the Turkic-speaking peoples in the zones incorporated into today’s Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and the USSR is especially exemplary. A family of spoken languages, once everywhere assemblable, thus comprehensible, within an Arabic orthography, has lost that unity as a result of conscious manipulations” (1991, pg. 45). Furthermore, in a modern context, various sub-national and dissident groups, in an effort to change their subordinate status, attempt to penetrate print and radio medias giving their particular group official recognition and prominence—equanimity through linguistic (ideological) parity e.g., the Basque Separatists, the Taiwanese nationalists, the Chechnyan rebels, the Kurdish Workers Party, and Islamist groups attempting to depose regimes whom they believe to be apostate and/or infidel, whether on an international and/or national scale.

Print-capitalism and its impact on language “created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation” (1991, pg. 46). Although historically the geographical and spatial expansion of these communities was limited, imperialism and colonialism and advancements in communications technology significantly increased the expansion of specific imagined communities and their official and authorized print-languages.

The third factor Anderson attributes to the emergence of the nation and its associated imaginings is what he designates “Old Languages, New Models.” As Anderson states, “national ‘print-languages’ were of central ideological and political importance” (1991, pg. 67), and provided models and templates from which others could ostensibly imagine communities and forge physical and psychological boundaries for a nation, nationalism, and nation-ness. National print-languages and their associated histories provided geopolitical, political, cultural, and ideological references from which particular nations and communities could justify and substantiate their ontological and epistemological claims to a unique, homogeneous, and official national consciousness designated by the limited geographical and spatial boundaries of a particular region. As Anderson argues: “The nation became something capable of being consciously aspired to from early on, rather than a slowly sharpening frame of vision. Indeed [...] the ‘nation’ proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent. It became available for pirating by widely different, and sometimes unexpected hands” (1991, pg. 67). For instance, as we shall see, on the contemporary transnational stage, the Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined Umma has used this principle in an attempt to create a pan-Islamist ‘nation.’

National print-languages served an important mimetic function in the development, dissemination, promulgation, and ultimate solidification of the national consciousness particular to a nation and its resultant identity and subjectivity, which manifested in the imagined realities of: “nation-states, republican institutions, common citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags, anthems, etc., and the liquidation of their conceptual opposites: dynastic empires, monarchical institutions, absolutisms,

subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, serfdoms, ghettos, and so forth” (1991, pg. 81). Moreover, in order to support the mimesis of national consciousness and to enforce its various tenets enshrined in the national and official print-language, nation-states utilized, what Louis Althusser terms, ideological state apparatuses e.g. religious institutions, universities and schools, etc. These apparatuses not only inculcated the mass populace with the specific imaginings of the nation, nationalism, and nation-ness, these apparatuses were integral to educating the masses, regardless of class, and elevating literacy rates: “in fact, as literacy increased, it became easier to arouse popular support, with the masses discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along” (1991, pg. 86).

In effect, national print-languages operating in conjunction with ideological state apparatuses created a “model” for the development and propagation of a collective national consciousness and the independent national state. As previously stated, this ‘model’ could be pirated by other groups and communities and used to develop their own imagined communities, national identities and subjectivities, and independent political, cultural, economic, and spatial systems. The consequence of which, on a macro scale, led to the creation of other nations and nationalisms and, on a micro scale, lead to the circumstances where sub-national groups wanted to (re)assert their position as an independent group not only geographically and spatially but politically and culturally—autonomous imagined communities conceived of as an equal and/or as a superior system of (re)presentation. I argue that an important attribute of the pirating of this model was that the pirating occurred under the conditions of reaction: a reaction to the

popular/dominant national movements of particular ‘nations’, regions, locations, places, and spaces.

Now that an understanding of Anderson’s theoretical precepts that I utilize in my argument has been established, I will continue with my analysis and interpretation of the imagined and constructed community of Islamist extremists/terrorists. Although Anderson situates his argument of “imagined communities” and the emergence of the modern ‘nation’ in a historical context, the imaginings he expounds are indispensable for accessing the contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist geographical and spatial imagination and world view.

The historical cultural systems of Anderson’s limited imagined religious communities and the importance of a “sacred” language (Qur’an) as a powerful unifying mechanism has not diminished in relevance for the Muslim Umma in general and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency in particular. However, the limited imagined communities of the past are no longer limited geographically and spatially. The imagined religious communities in a contemporary context are unlimited in geographical and spatial character and have established a global presence, while remaining relatively unified. Indeed, the present day population of the Muslim diaspora—a population of approximately 1.1 billion followers: the world’s second largest religion (Williams, 2002, pg. 45)—which, geographically, stretches from North America—an estimated six million Muslims are dispersed throughout the United States (Haddad, 2001, pg. 91)—to Southeast Asia, is indicative of the relative growth, influence, and power of a “sacred” language and its ability to construct an imagined community (Umma) that is global in scope regardless of political, cultural, economic, and geographical barriers. Similarly, the

Islamist extremist/terrorist Umma (Al Qaeda and affiliated groups) and its constituents are equally as internationally diffuse and bound together by a particular “sacred” language and ideology. For Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, the imagined religious communities of yesterday have not passed, but remain in, what I term, a historicized present. However, perhaps ironically, “whatever their specific antecedents, these [Islamist] movements have emerged from modern economic, social, political, [cultural, spatial, and geographical] conjunctures” (Sidaway, 1993, pg. 361). This historicized present, which partially informs, albeit significantly, the world view of Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, serves as a powerful mobilizing force through which their particular geographical and spatial identity and subjectivity is framed, refracted, realized, and actualized.

According to Islamist dogma and its Qur’anic manipulations, the world was and is divided into two spheres: *dar al-islam* (the abode or sphere of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the abode or sphere of war (i.e non-Islamic lands) (Ruthven, 2002, pg. xvi). However, Al Qaeda and its affiliates not only perceive the non-Islamic world as *dar al-harb* and infidel, they perceive specific Islamic states to be apostate and, therefore, legitimate targets and enemies of their cause and objectives: “Al Qaeda’s position, and the position of other [Islamist] fundamentalists, purists, and militants, is that the enemy of true belief is not only *outside* the Islamic world, it is within it, that the majority of Muslim’s in today’s society have become *shirks*, or “faithless ones” (Williams, 2002, pg. 47). For example, Al Qaeda and its affiliates perceive the governments of Turkey, Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabia to be apostate regimes.

According to Islamists, “if Muslims return to faith in the infallible teachings of the Qur’an, the people of Allah can preserve, restore, and extend their power throughout the world” (Williams, 2002, pg. 47-48). Consequently, Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates are dedicated to the establishment of Islamist governance—strict adherence to the rule of *Shari’ah* law—throughout the Islamic world and beyond. As Knight, Murphy, and Mousseau (2003) assert in their article entitled “The Sources of Terrorism,” Osama bin Laden, his Al Qaeda associates, and other Islamist extremist/terrorist groups “are dedicated to the establishment of Islamic (Islamist) governance throughout the Muslim world, and their main activity has been training and deploying jihadist military (terrorist) cadre in direct support of this goal” (pg. 193). Therefore, the Islamist dichotomous world view and the expressed goals and objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency serve as the impetus for creating, nurturing, fostering, and sustaining “a distinctive collective self-definition” (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001, pg. 63) and a unified, transnational geographical and spatial identity and subjectivity.

The Islamist dichotomous world view creates a particular reality as much as it is a reaction and response to reality. For Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates, the political, cultural, geographical, and spatial reality they have created—*dar al-islam/dar al-har*—is the unifying and mobilizing force behind the development of a transnational imagined religious community of Islamist extremists/terrorists. However politically, culturally, economically, geographically, and spatially disparate and incongruent Al Qaeda, its ideological affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency may be, and even if they never formally interact, the Islamist doctrine unifies them in a collective supranational consciousness—a non-state centric Islamist imagined community—that is

unlimited in its geographical and spatial imaginings. This is evident in the transnational structure and network of Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist diaspora.

Before the War on Terror and Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan functioned as the base of operations for Al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, Al Qaeda was hierarchical and centralized, and could plan and execute regional and international terrorist operations with relative impunity. However, the post-9/11 security environment has caused Al Qaeda and its Islamist extremist/terrorist affiliates to assume a decentralized, amorphous, nebulous, and fluid network and structure that is transnational in character and is not limited to the geopolitical borders of sovereign states, the imaginings of their particular brand of nation, nationalism, and nation-ness, or the national and international laws governing the conduct of recognized and official nation-states.

It is estimated that the amorphous Al Qaeda network has a presence—dormant or active cells providing financial and/or logistical support to others in the network or are actively planning to carry out an attack—in approximately eighty countries around the world (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 23). Some of the countries where Al Qaeda has a presence and operates include: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Canada, Chechnya in Russia, Croatia, Egypt, England, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kashmir in India, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, the United States, Uruguay, and the Yemen (Bergen, 2001, pg. 196). Furthermore, it is estimated that the Al Qaeda network is comprised of a membership of

approximately 70, 000-110, 000⁶ trained operatives and fighters (Williams, 2002, pg. 6), but, because of the high-quality recruits it seeks, it is speculated that approximately 3, 000 operatives were invited to join Al-Qaeda's elite ranks⁷ (Byman, 2003, pg. 145). Obviously, given the clandestine, covert, and inconspicuous nature of Islamist extremism/terrorism, accurate numbers of the Islamist extremist/terrorist movement are very difficult to determine: "what makes numbers so elusive is that Al- Qaeda is simultaneously a small core group and a broader network linking various Islamist groups and causes. Al-Qaeda has spun a web of relationships with Islamist groups that espouse similar, though not always identical, goals" (Byman, 2003, pg. 145).

Islamist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda contribute to the transnational geographical and spatial diversity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist mosaic: "today, while there are numerous cells and informal Al Qaeda clusters working around the globe, Al-Qaeda's affiliates are thought to number between 30 and 40. The average affiliate has about five hundred fighters, which means that there are thousands of fighters in their ranks" (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 24). Some of the Islamist extremist/terrorist groups believed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda include: The Jihad Organization of Jordon; The Pakistani Al-Hadith Group; The Lebanese Partisans League; The Bayt al-Imam Group of Jordon; Asbat al Ansar (Lebanon); Harakat al-Ansar/Mujahadeen (Pakistan); Al-Badar (Pakistan); Talaa al Fath; The Groupe Roubaix (Canada/France); Harakat ul Jihad (Pakistan); Jaysh-e-Mohammed (Pakistan); Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI/Pakistan);

⁶ According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), it is estimated that approximately 100, 000 individuals from around the world passed through Al Qaeda training camps (Bell, 2005, pg. 110).

⁷ According to Mohammed Mansour Jabrah, a Canadian citizen and highly trained Al Qaeda operative who personally met with Osama bin Laden and other key individuals in the Al Qaeda organization, Al Qaeda has a membership of approximately 3, 000-4, 000 dedicated members who have pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and his extremist ideology (Bell, 2005, pg. 169).

Hizballah (Lebanon); Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; The Jihad Group of Bangladesh; The Jihad Group of Yemen; Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Pakistan); Lebanese Partisans Group; Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines); The Partisans Movement (Kashmir); Abu Sayyaf (Philippines); Al-Ittihad (Somalia); Ulema Union of Afghanistan; Takfir wal Hijra (Algeria, Egypt); Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia); the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria); Ansar al-Islam (Iraq); and the Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen) (Williams, 2002, pg. 81-82; Schanzer, 2004, pg. 25; Singh, 2004, pg. 47)⁸. As the geographically and spatially dispersed character and informal relationship of Al Qaeda and its affiliates conveys, Al Qaeda and its affiliates represents a heterogeneous, fragmented, “decentralized network structure” (Jordon and Boix, 2004, pg. 2) with a rather wide constellation of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations that exist in a transnational imagined community that is composed of individuals oriented on the same ideological trajectory and who respect no boundaries or frontiers—imagined religious (Islamist) community par excellence. In fact, “the peculiarity of this organizational scheme increases Al Qaeda’s [and its affiliates’] efficiency, makes it less vulnerable to being decapitated, and gives it a greater chance to [further] spread world wide” (Jordon & Boix, 2004, pg. 2).

The psychological architecture that supports Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency provides the ideological space necessary for the development of the Islamist imagined community. As Jordon and Boix suggest, unlike terrorist groups like Hamas, IRA, LTTE, ETA or FARC, for Al Qaeda nationality and ethnicity are not important factors in the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational network. Rather, Al Qaeda derives its ideology from a combination of elements:

⁷ Several of the groups identified in this list were designated Middle Eastern Al Qaeda affiliates as outlined in U.S. Executive Order 13224 (23 September 2001)—Blocking Property And Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.

Muslim traditions; radical Islamist writers such as Qutb and Faraj; the personal interpretations of Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members; and the special demands of different groups and individuals drawn into the network. It thus forms a generic ideology, which might be taken up by anyone from any country or ethnic group. (Jordon & Boix, 2004, pg. 2)

An important dimension in creating and sustaining the Islamist imagined community and the transnational and internationalized space they occupy is disseminating their particular ideology to the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency. Using Anderson's theoretical precepts regarding the imagined communities made possible by print-capitalism as an interpretive template, I argue that the imaginings generated by print-capitalism, the development of a language-of-power, and the pirating of the national print-language template model have made the emergence of the Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined community possible.

Print-capitalism, although significantly transformed because of various technological advancements e.g. World Wide Web, Satellite communications, and mass media, still serves an invaluable function in unifying and mobilizing people, and advancing a particular collective ideology and identity and subjectivity. Whereas previously the Qur'an was untranslatable from its original Arabic, and consequently limited who had access to its teachings, print-capitalism and its related technological advancements, have enabled translated copies of the Qur'an and its various Islamist interpretations to reach audiences of varying vernaculars, nationalisms, and political and cultural systems. Indeed, culture specific adaptations of the Qur'an and its interpretations

by various spiritual leaders and ideologues have positioned this ‘sacred’⁹ language-of-power as an international instrument, used to influence and consolidate people into an imagined community irrespective of geopolitical, political, cultural, and socio-economic boundaries. Advanced communication technologies have rendered territoriality and temporality relatively meaningless. Consequently, technological advancements have provided the foundation for a transnational space where the Islamist extremist/terrorist teachings of Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden, and other fervent and zealous ideologues can disseminate their ideologies and develop a collective imagined Islamist extremist/terrorist community/consciousness of like-minded followers and actors, united like a “nation,” but without the limitations of sovereignty, nationalism, and nation-ness. Although the delivery mechanism is instrumental and integral to the development and growth of the transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined community, more important is the actual message and information being delivered and communicated to this constituency. After all, the message and information being communicated informs the imagi-nation of the Islamist extremist/terrorist community and its understanding of itself and the world that it opposes.

As previously stated, Al Qaeda’s Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology, and by proxy the Islamist extremist/terrorist groups ideologically affiliated with Al Qaeda, are informed by and derive their ideology from two prominent ideologues: Sayyid Qutb (deceased member of the Egyptian Brotherhood) and Osama bin Laden (Leader of Al Qaeda). It may be obvious, but nevertheless worth stating, that there is a definite

⁹ Although the Qu’ran has been translated from its original ‘sacred’ Arabic, the teachings of the Qur’an, irrespective of the vernacular in which the teachings appear, are still held to be ‘sacred’ and remain a language-of-power. In effect, the Qur’an itself is the sacred language-of-power and the vernacular in which it is written only serves to transmit the sacred teachings of the Qur’an.

correlation and consonance between the ideologue and the constituency/community the ideologue is attempting to unite and mobilize (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, pg. 75). In this instance, Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden are purveyors of a particular normative ideology and identity and subjectivity that is strategically designed to mobilize en masse the Islamist Umma, appeal to their values and sensibilities, and ultimately determine the nature of the interactions with one another and their enemies.

Sayyid Qutb has been identified and acknowledged as the intellectual architect of the modern extremist/terrorist Islamist movements, including Al Qaeda. The French Arabist Gilles Kepel describes Qutb as ‘the greatest ideological influence on the contemporary Islamist movement’ (Zimmerman, 2004, pg. 222). Moreover, Saad al-Fagih, a prominent Saudi dissident, echoes Kepel’s sentiment as he describes Qutb’s discourse and writings as “‘the most important’ for the militant Islamist movement” (Bergen, 2001, pg. 200). However, prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Qutb was relatively unknown to the West (Zimmerman, 2004, pg. 222).

As Zimmerman (2002) suggests, Qutb serves three important functions for contemporary extremist/terrorist Islamist movements:

First, his writings provide an intellectual justification for extreme anti-Western sentiment on a cultural as well as political level. Second, he provides justification for establishing an Islamic society based on Sharia, Islamic Law [...] Third, he formulated a justification for overthrowing all world governments, including those governed by Muslims, by means of a worldwide holy war. (pg. 223)

It is important to mention that Qutb was significantly influenced by his experiences and observations during his visit and education in the United States from 1948-1951: “Qutb’s outlook on the West changed dramatically after his visit to America, where he was repulsed by Americans’ materialism, racism, promiscuity, and feminism” (Stern, 2004, pg. 264). Moreover, as Stern later continues, Qutb “saw the West as the historical enemy of Islam, citing the Crusades, European colonialism, and the Cold War as evidence” (2004, pg. 264-265). Therefore, in order to defend Islam, as he understood it, “Qutb emphasized the need to cleanse Islam from impurities resulting from its exposure to Western and capitalist influence” (2004, pg. 265). These cumulative experiences, observations, and beliefs fermented Qutb’s anti-Western fervour, and provided the foundation for his writings and Islamist activism.

Qutb returned to Egypt with “an uncompromising hatred of the West and all its works and promptly joined the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, which by the 1940s was already a significant mass movement with perhaps half a million members and which opposed the regime of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who took over in a 1952 coup” (Bergen, 2001, pg. 199). As Bergen (2001) later identifies, “the slogan of the brotherhood was resounding and unambiguous: ‘The Koran is our constitution, the Prophet is our Guide. Death for the Glory of Allah is our greatest Ambition’” (pg.199).

Within a very short period, Qutb emerged as one of the most radical and influential spiritual and intellectual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 33):

He taught that Islam was the only true religion; that all other religions and civilizations were barbarian, evil, and animal-like, and that any contact with them was to be shunned. The West was the enemy par excellence of the Muslims, afraid of Islam and aware of its spiritual superiority. As Qutb saw

it, there could never be peace with the West. The struggle was not about territory but about truth and which truth should prevail in the world. (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 33)

Between 1954 and 1966, Qutb, along with many other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, spent time in prison (Bergen, 2001, pg. 199); and, while there he produced two of his most influential works: *Fi zalal al-Quran* (In the Shade of the Qur'an) and the tract *Ma 'alim fi'l-tariq* ("Signposts on the Road")—a text that articulates the rage and revolutionary zeal of the Islamist movement (Ruthven, 2002, pg. 84). According to Ruthven, "'Signposts' has been usefully compared to Lenin's *What is to be Done?*, the tract which, in combination with the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) of Marx and Engels, stoked the fires of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia" (2002, pg. 85).

Qutb begins "Signposts" by outlining what he believes to be the crisis not only facing the Muslim world, but the entire world as a whole: "Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head—this being the symptom and not the real disease—but because humanity is devoid of those vital values for its healthy development and real progress" (Qutb quoted in Ruthven, 2002, pg. 85). Qutb believes his interpretation of Islam and the Qur'anic teachings to be the answer to humanities sordid demise and humanities ultimate and absolute source of salvation. As Qutb understood it, Islam is a complete and comprehensive system that should govern all aspects of life and anyone who does not subscribe to his interpretation of the Qur'an and his Islamist ideology, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, is considered to be in a state of *Jahiliyyah* (the period of ignorance or paganism prior to the revelation of Islam, which is used by Islamists as a term of abuse against contemporary rulers or other Muslims considered insufficiently pious or radical

(Ruthven, 2001, pg.xviii-xix)). For Qutb, the historical *Jahiliyyah* exists in the present—a historicized present—and generally defines the state of contemporary society:

Today too we are surrounded by *jahiliyya*. Its nature is the same as during the first period of Islam, and it is perhaps a little more deeply entrenched. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and law, is *jahiliyya*, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of *jahiliyya*! This is why the true Islamic values never enter our hearts. (Qutb quoted in Ruthven, 2001, pg. 87)

Therefore, in order to emancipate humanity from its depraved, corrupt, and un-Islamic/un-Islamist state of existence, Qutb advocates the development of an Islamist revolutionary vanguard that will lead humanity and eventually attain the position of world leadership. In order to achieve this lofty ideal, Qutb believes that “Signposts” will equip the vanguard with the tools and instruments necessary to develop and achieve worldwide pan-Islamist governance:

The Muslims in this vanguard must know the landmarks and the milestones on the road to this goal They ought to be aware of their position vis-à-vis this *jahiliyya*, which has struck its stakes throughout the earth. They must know when to cooperate with others and when to separate from them; what characteristics and qualities they should cultivate How to address the people of *jahiliyya* in the language of Islam; what topics and problems to discuss with them; and where and how to obtain guidance in all these matters. I have written Signposts for this vanguard which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialized. (Qutb quoted in Ruthven, 2001, pg. 87)

Moreover, Qutb believes that violence and conflict are justified instruments in this campaign against *jahiliyya* and the *dar al-harb* (these concepts are virtually synonymous with one another because they both refer to any space, either physical or psychological, that is un-Islamic/un-Islamist): “there can be no ground for dissension or dispute among believing people ...’. Islam allowed Muslims to fight ‘in order to propagate the oneness of God on earth and to put an end to the power of those, who by word or deed, challenge

his omnipotence'. There could be no peace 'by abstaining from war when there is oppression, corruption, despotism and denial of God's supremacy'" (Zimmerman, 2004, pg. 230). Through "Signposts" and his other works, Qutb created an ideological blueprint for Islamist extremist/terrorist movements.

After his execution in 1966, Qutb was revered and extolled as a martyr by Islamist extremists/terrorists. His writings were subsequently devoured by Islamists throughout the Muslim diaspora (Bergen, 2001, pg. 200); it is estimated that "hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of his works were printed throughout the Islamic world" (Laqueur, 2002, pg. 34). As previously mentioned, Qutb's works had a profound influence and impact on Al Qaeda in general and Osama bin Laden in particular.

Osama bin Laden, the personification of contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism, is a very important ideologue and contemporary architect of the transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist network and movement. Two of Osama bin Laden's most notable and influential *fatwas* (edicts) are: the 23 August 1996 *fatwa* (edict) "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Mosques"; and the 23 February 1998 *fatwa* (edict) "International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and the Crusaders" (Williams, 2002, pg. xv-xvi). These *fatwas* are instrumental in both mobilizing and unifying the Islamist extremist/terrorist diaspora in an imagined community that shares a collective consciousness and a common operational directive and objective.

In his "Declaration of War" *fatwa* (1996), Osama bin Laden proclaims that it is the duty of every Muslim, righteous (Sunni) and non-righteous (Shiite), to fight against all individuals (American, Jewish, or otherwise), military or civilian, who are occupying

the lands of the two holy mosques. This *fatwa* is significant as it justifies and legitimates the collective use of violence and force against their perceived enemy: the Zionists and the Crusaders. As this fatwa is of great importance for the development and deployment of contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism, I quote a portion of this *fatwa* at length:

“If there is more than one duty to be carried out, then the most important one should receive priority. Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land. No other priority, except Belief, could be considered before it; the people of knowledge, Ibn Taymiyyah, stated: "to fight in defence of religion and Belief is a collective duty; there is no other duty after Belief than fighting the enemy who is corrupting the life and the religion. There is no preconditions for this duty and the enemy should be fought with one's best abilities. (ref: supplement of Fatawa).

If it is not possible to push back the enemy except by the collective movement of the Muslim people, then there is a duty on the Muslims to ignore the minor differences among themselves; the ill effect of ignoring these differences, at a given period of time, is much less than the ill effect of the occupation of the Muslims' land by the main Kufr. Ibn Taymiyyah had explained this issue and emphasized the importance of dealing with the major threat on the expense of the minor one. He described the situation of the Muslims and the Mujahideen and stated that even the military personnel who are not practicing Islam are not exempted from the duty of Jihad against the enemy [....]

The ultimate aim of pleasing Allah, raising His word, instituting his religion and obeying and pleasing his messenger (Allah's blessings and salutations upon him) is to fight the enemy in every aspect and in a complete manner; if the danger to religion is greater than that of fighting, then it is a duty to fight them even if the intention of some of the fighters is not pure—i.e. fighting for the sake of leadership, [personal gain]—or if they do not observe some of the rules and commandments of Islam. To repel the greatest of these two dangers on the expense of the lesser one is an Islamic principle which should be observed. It was the tradition of the people of the Sunnah to join and invade—fight—with the righteous and the non-righteous men [....]

Today your brothers and sons, the sons of the two Holy Places, have started their Jihad in the cause of Allah, to expel the occupying enemy from of the country of the two Holy places. And there is no doubt you would like to carry out this mission too, in order to re-establish the greatness of this Umma and to liberate its' occupied sanctities. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted, i.e. using fast moving

light forces that work under complete secrecy. In other word to initiate guerrilla warfare, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it....

The Mujahideen, your brothers and sons, request that you support them in every possible way by supplying them with the necessary information, materials, and arms. Security men are especially asked to cover up for the Mujahideen and to assist them as much as possible against the occupying enemy; and to spread rumors, fear, and discouragement among the members of the enemy forces.

The regime is fully responsible for what has been incurred by the country and by the nation; however, the occupying American enemy is the principal and the main cause of the situation. Therefore efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting, and killing the enemy until, by the grace of Allah, it is completed defeated. The time will come—by the permission of Allah—when you'll perform your decisive role so that the word of Allah will be supreme and the word of the infidels will be the inferior. (Marlin, 2004, pg. 5-7, 9-10)

In a similar effort to unify Muslims in general and Islamist extremist/terrorist groups in specific into a real and imagined transnational community, Osama bin Laden issued a *fatwa* that was responsible for the creation and inauguration of the World (International) Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders—an umbrella organization designed to strategically amalgamate Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other previously excluded Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and position them in an ideological space constructed by a singular world view and extremist doctrine. According to Bergen (2001), “the World Islamic Front is the key text that set the stage for al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks” (pg. 95). Because of its significance in constructing the ideological space of Islamist extremists’/terrorists’ world view and subsequent transnational operations and activities, it is worth quoting at some length:

“The Arabian Peninsula has never – since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and encircled it with seas – been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food. In the light of the grave

situation and the lack of support, we and you are obliged to discuss current events, and we should all agree on how to settle the matter [...]

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah.”

We – with Allah’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson [...]

 (Marlin, 2004, pg. 19-21)

Osama bin Laden’s *fatwas*, like the works of Qutb, have been widely disseminated throughout the international Islamist diaspora. However, unlike Qutb, whose works were initially disseminated on a regional scale because of the limitations imposed by time, space, and the relative limited reach of print-media, Osama bin Laden has been able to exploit the effects of globalization, the advancements in telecommunications and information technology, and the relatively instantaneous flow of information provided by the mass media. Consequently, Osama bin Laden’s particular brand of Islamist extremism/terrorism and his works that detail his particular ideology have successfully breached the temporal and spatial boundaries his predecessor(s) were once, wittingly or unwittingly, confronted with. (However, obviously, Qutb’s works now can be circulated through the same channels Osama bin Laden exploits to deliver his message.)

Although print-capitalism has evolved, in my opinion, into information/communications capitalism, the “imaginings” made possible through print-

capitalism and print-languages and print-capitalism's effect on the development and emergence of Anderson's imagined communities and the modern nation have not, in theory, changed. Similar to print-capitalism, information/communications capitalism have enabled the rise of a collective consciousness given fixity through the extremist ideologies of Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden. Moreover, as with print-capitalism, information/communications capitalism have created a unified field of exchange and communication through which people of different political, cultural, and socio-economic backgrounds, and geographical locations and spatial positionings, can relate to one another and remain connected in an imagined community governed by a particular ideology—the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology propagated by ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and Osama bin Laden. However, whereas Anderson argues that print-capitalism provided the “imaginings” that enabled the emergence of a limited nation, nationalism, and nation-ness, I contend that print-capitalism and its corresponding information/communications capitalism have enabled the “imaginings” for the emergence and realization of an unlimited transnation, transnationalism, and transnation-ness, defined and/or shaped by a virtually borderless ideological geographical and spatial imagination.

The diffuse transnational space Islamist extremist/terrorist groups occupy and the imagined communities that unify and consolidate these groups under one ideological umbrella enables groups like Al Qaeda and their affiliates to export their collective *jihad* around the world. However, in addition to understanding the ‘unlimited’ geographical and spatial imaginings made possible through the Islamist extremist/terrorist imagined community and its ideological constructs, an important dimension in understanding their

transnational, decentralized, and diffuse network, is to examine how groups like Al Qaeda structure, organize, and interact in the transnational space they occupy.

Transnationalizing *Crowds* and the Constructions of Power

Although the ideological framework Islamist extremist/terrorist groups operate within is the primary vehicle for mobilizing these transnational actors and incites them to action, the organizational and structural forces of these groups serve an important strategic and tactical function in maintaining operational unity and focus, especially after various cells and groups have been dispersed and deployed to a selected theatre of operations. One of the most important characteristics about this type of terrorist activity and violence is its collective mentality: “war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval” (Byles, 2003, pg. 210). This co-operation, organization, and approval are required at the macro scale, including the entire network, and at the micro scale, including individual cells and groups. Indeed, the structural and organizational dynamics of groups like Al Qaeda and their ideological affiliates serve as a tremendous source of strength and power and are necessary for the success of their operations and objectives. In order to access the structural and organizational space of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network in general and Al Qaeda in particular, and to analyse the physical and psychological cell/group dynamics which serve as a significant source of strength and power, I use Elias Canetti’s text *Crowds and Power* as a theoretical framework and interpretive mechanism.

“There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown. He wants to see what is reaching toward him, and to be able to recognize or at least classify it” (Canetti, 1960, pg. 15). These two lines represent the ominous beginning of Canetti’s

incisive and illuminating exploration of the human condition and the human propensity to form groups and crowds as a means of controlling this fear and maintaining a sense of power, control, and superiority. According to Brill (2003), “[Canetti’s] experiences, research, and reflection led him to conclude that a foundation block of the human psyche rests on our impulse to come together into crowds and to extend them through time. A universal fear motivates that impulse: the terror of an unknown touch that threatens predatory seizing, tearing, dismembering, and incorporation” (pg. 87). As the Islamist extremist/terrorist movement continues to proliferate and political and cultural antagonisms and enmity intensify, Islamist groups and “crowds” will continue to grow and proliferate in an attempt to aggressively prevent an “unknown touch,” and the “predatory seizing,” “dismembering” and “incorporation” of the United States and the West.

The organization and structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, including individual cells and groups, represent and reveal a coterminous physical and psychological space that is constructed to create the effect of a unitary system of strength and power, both real and imagined. However, before an analysis of the organization and structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network can be initiated, it is necessary to establish an understanding of the physical and psychological qualities and dynamics associated with groups and cells (or what Canetti terms “crowds”) and how these qualities and dynamics relate to the transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist network.

According to Canetti, there are four fundamental attributes and qualities of a crowd.¹⁰ The first attribute and quality of a crowd is its desire to grow. As Canetti states, “there are no natural boundaries to its growth” (1960, pg. 29); the limits and boundaries of a crowd (cell and/or group) are always artificially constructed. Canetti characterizes the growth of crowds through, what he terms, the “open” crowd and the “closed” crowd. The open crowd can grow indefinitely and move in any direction; however, the open crowd’s existence is contingent upon its continued growth. The moment the open crowd ceases to grow and expand it eventually disintegrates and dissipates (1960, pg. 16) e.g., a riot, public protest, etc. In contrast, the “closed” crowd “renounces growth and places it emphasis on permanence” (1960, pg. 17). As Canetti continues, “the first thing to be noticed about it is that it has a boundary. It establishes itself by accepting its limitation. It creates a space for itself which it will fill. The entrances to this space are limited in number [.] The boundary prevents disorderly increase, but it also makes it more difficult for the crowd to disperse and so postpones its dissolution. In this way the crowd sacrifices its chance of growth, but gains in staying power” (1960, pg. 17). Furthermore, the controlled space, entry, and membership of the “closed” crowd prevents or significantly reduces the risk of outside influences and/or individuals that may seek to subvert the objectives of the crowd (cell or group) from infiltrating and penetrating the crowd. This is especially important if the aims, goals, and objectives of the crowd (cell or group) are counter-hegemonic in design and are intended to challenge and subvert a dominant system of political, cultural, socio-economic, and geographical and spatial order i.e. Islamist extremist/terrorist groups.

¹⁰ Although Canetti examines the physical and psychological attributes and qualities of a “crowd,” I believe that the same “crowd” attributes and dynamics can be used to describe Islamist terrorist groups and the cells or “packs” operating on behalf of these groups around the world.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist network and the various groups and individuals that comprise its membership represent the quintessential “closed” crowd Canetti describes. The extremist/terrorist network, which I conceptualize as a transnational/globalized crowd, engendered by the creation of the World Islamic Front, desires to grow and expand by admitting like-minded extremist/terrorist groups and individuals from around the world into its space. Like wise, individual groups like Al Qaeda tacitly desire growth through their recruitment of individuals into their elite ranks and appeals to the Muslim Umma to collectively join their *jihad*. However, access to and membership in the network and individual extremist/terrorist groups is limited and strictly controlled. For instance, “Al Qaeda is an organization composed of elites; few who are not capable of leadership are invited to join. Its membership of many nationalities¹¹ makes it far more able to engage in global operations, giving it the ability to blend in wherever its adherents find themselves” (Byman, 2003, pg. 153)—a diverse “closed” crowd. Although many Islamist extremist/terrorist groups may not exercise the same level of sophistication and discipline as Al Qaeda, entry to the groups is still limited to actors who are dedicated and committed to the Islamist extremist/terrorist cause, whether local, regional, or global in orientation.

¹¹ As stated by the Anonymous author of *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, “Bin Laden’s organization is larger, more ethnically diverse, more geographically dispersed, younger, richer, better educated, better led, an more military trained and combat experienced than any other terrorist groups in history (2002, pg. 18). According to Bell (2005), Al Qaeda is comprised of individuals from the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Western European and North American (Western) countries. Some of these nationalities include, but are not limited to: Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, United States, and the Yemen. Moreover, according to Bell, in a manual seized by police in Manchester, England, the necessary qualifications and characteristics for the Organization’s members include: must be Muslim; committed to the group ideology; mature and obedient; willing to undergo the work and become a martyr; trustworthy and honest; be in good health and patient; intelligent, cautious, and prudent; strong observation and critical analysis skills; must have the ability to act; and possess tranquility and unflappability (Bell, 2005).

A related quality and feature of the closed crowd is what Canetti terms the *crowd crystals*—the group within the group. Canetti defines crowd crystals as: “the small, rigid groups of men, strictly delimited and of great constancy, which serve to precipitate crowds. Their unity is more important than their size. Their role must be familiar; people must know what they are there for. Doubt about their function would render them meaningless” (Canetti, 1960, pg. 73). Canetti goes on to state that “the crowd crystal is constant; it never changes its size. Its members are trained in both action and faith. They must be allotted different parts, as in an orchestra, but they must appear as a unit [.] Their life outside the crystal does not count. Even where the unity is merely a professional one, as with orchestral players, no one thinks of their private existence; they are the orchestra” (1960, pg. 73-74). Although the closed crowd and the crowd crystals share similar qualities and features e.g. limited entry and controlled growth, Canetti delineates several differences between the two assemblages of people (I include ideologically related organizations and/or groups/cells in this rubric). Whereas the closed crowd is larger, more spontaneous, fluid, unexpected changes in behaviour amongst its members are always possible, and the allocation of specific and material functions is difficult to delegate, the crowd crystal is entirely constructed by limits and boundaries. Furthermore, the activities within crowd crystals are prescribed and “it remains precisely conscious of all of its utterances and movements” (1960, pg. 74). Al Qaeda and its functionaries are a prime example of the crowd crystal.

Not only is Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network responsible for precipitating the development of the World Islamic Front (a closed crowd), Al Qaeda is a highly structured organization whose activities are orchestrated through a rigid and

compartmentalized hierarchy. As outlined by Williams (2002, pg. 6) and Stern (2004, pg. 250), the organizational structure of Al Qaeda is as follows: Osama bin Laden (Emir or Leader); Chief Council to Osama bin Laden (Ayman al-Zawahiri); Consultation Council (Shura Council—consisting of approximately thirteen members who oversee various committees); The Islamic Study Committee (issues fatwas and other religious rulings); The Military Committee (responsible for establishing training camps and procuring weapons); The Finance Committee (responsible for funding operations and soliciting financial support through Osama bin Laden’s businesses, various international charities, and from individual supporters and donors); The Travel Committee (responsible for the procurement of travel documents and making travel arrangements); The Media Committee (responsible for publishing and publicizing newspapers, etc.); and the cells and groups dispersed internationally. Furthermore, within the various committees and the cells and groups deployed regionally and internationally, there exists a hierarchy of commanders, managers, and cadres. As this organizational structure illustrates, “Al Qaeda is remarkably bureaucratic, with myriad committees of specialists whose expertise ranges from military operations to publicity” (2003, pg. 147). Although a hierarchical organizational structure exists within Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda functions as an organic unit with collective goals and objectives. Indeed, this level of structural and organizational sophistication is a significant factor in Al Qaeda’s operational success, potency, virulence, and transnational presence.¹²

¹² The Post 9/11 War on Terror in Afghanistan significantly disrupted Al Qaeda’s ‘base’ of operations and forced Al Qaeda to disperse throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. However, because Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates already established a strong diffuse transnational network, the Post 9/11 War on Terror catalyzed Al Qaeda’s metamorphosis from a hierarchical organization and centralized network structure to a decentralized network structure characterized by “de-territorialization” (no definite territorial location) and “disappearance” (rather than institutional presence) (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005, pg. 280). Although some of Al Qaeda’s operational capabilities may have been lost due to the disruption of its

The second attribute and quality of the crowd is the feeling of equality generated from belonging to a specific crowd (cell or group). As Canetti states, “this absolute and indisputable and never questioned by the crowd (cell or group) itself” (Canetti, 1960, pg. 29). Canetti characterizes this crowd dynamic as the *discharge*: “before this the crowd does not actually exist; it is the discharge which creates it. This is the moment when all who belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal” (1960, pg. 17). However illusory, in effect, the individuality of the crowd (cell or group) members is jettisoned and the distinctions that previously defined them as individuals e.g. occupation, rank, socio-economic status, nationality and ethnicity, gender, etc., evaporate and condense into a collective organic whole with one unified identity and subjectivity.

The *discharge* of a crowd, the equanimity it portends, and the fusion of the individual actor with the body of a group/cell is a salient quality and dimension of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations and the individual groups and cells that constitute the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational constituency. As indicated in the article “The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” once a recruit is initiated into an organization there is a clear and irrefutable fusion of individual identity and subjectivity and group identity and subjectivity. This is particularly evident among the more extremist elements of each organization: “as an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making. As this occurs, individual measures of success become increasingly linked to the organization and stature and accomplishments within the organization” (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003, pg. 176).

institutional foundation in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda has become more diffuse and less visible since 9/11 (pg. 218) and has adapted to Post 9/11 security environment.

As the individual and the group fuse, personal goals and objectives become undistinguishable from the goals and objectives of the group. The success or failure of the group becomes the success or failure of the individual and the struggle of the group becomes a deeply personal struggle for the individual (2003, pg. 176). Moreover, the overwhelming sense of the collective that consumes the individual member serves an important function for the justification and substantiation of the group's actions and operations: "this fusion with the group seems to provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant loss of felt responsibility for the individual member—if the group says it is required and justified, then it is required and justified. If the authority figure orders an action, then the action is justified" (2003, pg. 176). As the Post, Sprinzak, and Denny continue, "guilt or remorse by the individual is not tolerated because the organization does not express it. Again this is intensified among Islamist groups who feel they have a religiously sanctioned justification—indeed obligation—for their actions" (2003, pg. 176). In effect, the *discharge* and the attendant fusion of the individual and the group represents a transgression of boundaries, a movement beyond the physical and psychological limits of the Self. A once inhibited and relatively powerless individual becomes an uninhibited and powerful member of an organization and/or a group/cell.

The third fundamental quality and feature of the crowd that Canetti identifies is *density*. As Canetti asserts, "the crowd loves density. It can never feel too dense. Nothing must stand between its parts or divide them; everything must be the crowd itself" (Canetti, 1960, pg. 29). Moreover, as Canetti continues, "the feeling of density is strongest in the moment of discharge" (1960, pg. 29). Although Canetti refers to density

in its physical sense—the crowd itself located in the same place and occupying the same space—density, as Brill suggests, “in an era of world-wide mass communications is easily achieved without actually needing to bring people physically together” (2003, pg. 88). Advanced communications technologies have enabled a sense of *density* to transcend the fixity and physicality of a particular place and space, allowing crowds (groups and cells) to maintain a sense of unity and closeness irrespective of geographical location and spatial proximity. This is especially important for groups like Al Qaeda, whose diffuse and decentralized network structure depends on advanced communications in order to successfully plan, implement, and execute attacks against designated targets.

Furthermore, I argue that a sense of *density* and the ability to preserve density, physically or psychologically, real or imagined, is also achieved through what Canetti terms the *double crowd*. As Canetti asserts, “the surest, and often only, way by which a crowd can preserve itself lies in the existence of a second crowd to which it is related. Whether the two crowds confront each other as rivals in a game, or as a serious threat to each other (my emphasis), the sight, or simply the powerful image of the second crowd, prevents the disintegration of the first” (1960, pg. 63). Canetti continues:

people are in physical [or psychological/ideological] proximity to their own kind and acting within a familiar and natural unit. All their curiosity and expectation, meanwhile, is directed towards a second body of men divided from them by a clearly defined distance (ideological, political, cultural, etc.). This sight fascinates them and, if they cannot see it, they can still hear it (the mass-media and advanced communications technology have virtually disintegrated the barriers of distance and time), and all their actions turn on its actions and intensions. The confrontation calls for a special kind of watchfulness, raising the specific density within each group. Neither can disband until the other does. The tension between the two groups exerts its pressure on everyone belonging to either [...]. [I]f the enemy threatens them (real or imagined), if it is really a matter of life and death (a matter of perception), then the pressure transforms itself into the armour of united and resolute defence. (1960, pg. 63)

Given the current international security and threat environment, the type of *double crowd* that is most relevant to my argument is the existence of the double crowd in war.

Canetti suggests that “the outbreak of war is primarily an eruption of two crowds” (1960, pg. 72). The declared “War on Terror” places in direct conflict and opposition the United States and its allies against Al Qaeda, its ideological affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency. However, indirectly, the War on Terror(ism) places in conflict and opposition two “crowds” constituted by much larger divisions and bi-partitionings:

there is a clear trend towards the formation of enormous double crowds, named after whole quarters of the globe—East and West. These contain so much within themselves that there is less and less remaining outside them; and what there is seems powerless. The rigidity of these opposed double crowds, the fascination each has for the other, the fact that they are both armed to the teeth and rivals for the moon, have awakened in the world an apocalyptic fear: war between them could be the end of [human]kind. (Canetti, 1960, pg. 466)

For the United States and its allies, the War on Terror(ism) is a battle between Us and Them, Civilization and Barbarity, Freedom and Oppression, the Just and the Unjust, and Good and Evil. Conversely, for Al Qaeda, its ideological affiliates, and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, the actions of the United States and its allies have been purposefully and cunningly been interpreted and construed as a War on Islam.

Consequently, the war Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates are fighting is at once a perceived defence of Islam in general and a conflict between the faithful and infidels and apostates that threaten Islam. The result, as I have mentioned previously, is a bi-partitioning of the world into two “crowds”: *dar al-islam* and *dar al-harb*. As Canetti suggests, these two entities, according to Islamist doctrine, “are fated to be separate and

to fight each other” (1960, pg. 142). Through envisioning each other as “crowds” that are at war, both crowds form, in effect, a masochistic co-relationship, where the existence of one ensures the existence of the other, providing each other with the energy and stamina required to remain united in conflict over the long term (Brill, 2003, pg. 89). According to Canetti, “as long as the war lasts they must remain a crowd, and the war really ends as soon as they cease to be one” (1960, pg. 73). However, the nature of the War on Terror(ism) prohibits the dissolution of these two crowds because the goals and objectives of each crowd are absolute: the systematic surrender, conversion, or eradication of the other. The consequence of this is two fold. First, until the long-term objectives of either crowd are achieved, the existence and permanence of each crowd is almost certainly guaranteed. Second, the bi-partitioned internecine war crowd creates a physical and psychological space where the participants in the conflict can unite in a real or imagined fashion and collectively fight against their common and shared enemy, while maintaining the density necessary for a crowd to maintain its potency.

The final fundamental attribute and quality of the crowd is that all crowds must have motives, objectives, and an overall direction. According to Canetti, the goals, objectives, and direction of the “crowd” are “essential for the continuing existence of the crowd” (1960, pg. 29). Canetti believes that “the crowd needs a direction. It is in movement and it moves towards a goal. The direction, which is common to all its members [(which includes ideologically affiliated organizations and groups)] strengthens the feeling of equality” (1960, pg. 29). Canetti goes on to state that “a goal outside of the individual members and common to all of them drives underground all the private differing goals which are fatal to the crowd as such” (1960, pg. 29). Without collective

goals, objectives, and direction the crowd, including Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations, groups, and cells) would dissipate because their reason for existing would no longer serve a defined purpose.

Jessica Stern echoes Canetti's position on the importance of the objectives and direction (mission) of terrorist organizations:

the most important aspect of the organization is the mission. The mission is the story about Us versus Them. It distinguishes the pure from the impure and creates group identity. The organization's mission statement—the story about its *raison d'être*—is the glue that holds even the most tenuous organizations together [e.g. the fatwas and edicts issued by the leader of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, which I have referred to earlier, are the equivalent of a mission statement for Al Qaeda's members and its ideological adherents]. Without this mission statement, the organization is little different from an organized criminal ring. (2004, 143)

However, the mission, direction, and objectives of a terrorist organization are not necessarily fixed and inert. Rather, they are dynamic and can change depending on the circumstances a terrorist organization is confronted with:

a professional terrorist chooses his mission carefully. He is able to read popular opinion and is likely to change his mission over time. Astute leaders may find new missions—or emphasize new aspects of the mission—when they realize they can no longer “sell” the old one to sponsors and potential recruits, either because the original mission was achieved or, more commonly, because the impossibility of achieving the mission has become obvious. (Stern, 2004, pg. 262)

The following are examples of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations that have changed their mission and objectives in response to the changing environment the organizations and its leaders found themselves in:

1. Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ): The original mission of the EIJ was to change Egypt into an Islamist state. However, many of the spiritual leaders and commanders were killed, imprisoned or forced to move abroad. Consequently, without the

proper infrastructure in place to achieve their objectives, Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the groups leaders and chief strategists, and who is now the chief counsel to Osama bin Laden and purported mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks, formed an alliance with Osama bin Laden and shifted his mission from fighting the “near enemy” (Egypt) to fighting the “far enemy” (the West and the United States) (Stern, 2003, pg. 266). As Ayman al-Zawahiri states: “The battle today cannot be fought on a regional level without taking into account the global hostility toward us” (Stern, 2004, pg. 267).

2. Islamic Army of Aden Abyan (IAA): Primarily operating in Yemen, the IAA began with a domestic agenda and evolved into a terrorist organization with global targets. Initially, the organization/group, under the leadership of Zein al-Abidin, began issuing communiqués criticizing the Yemeni government’s policies and advocated the overthrow and dissolution of the Yemeni government. However, through its contacts with Al-Qaeda, its operational mandate enlarged to include foreign targets. The most high-profile operation carried out by the IAA was the attack against the U.S.S. Cole in October of 2000. Members of the IAA are believed to be fighting the United States and its allied forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Schanzer, 2004, pg. 76-80).
3. Al Qaeda: Initially operating as a proxy force in Afghanistan under the name of the Mujahidun, its primary mandate was to fight the invading Russian forces. However, after the defeat of the Russian forces, the Mujahidun transformed into the present Islamist extremist/terrorist network, Al Qaeda (Stern, 2004, pg. 268).

The operational activities of Al Qaeda are varied and are international in scope, and its presence is equally geographically dispersed.

Incidentally, all three of these Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations are signatories of the World Islamic Front edict and subsequently are ideological affiliates. Although their operational activities may be concerted or different, they share a collective mission and objective: the ultimate destruction of the West in general and the United States in particular. The willingness and ability of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations to change missions is indicative of a strategic resilience and versatility.

Although some of the goals and objectives of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations may be short term—carrying out attacks on specific targets and engaging in conflicts in various areas around the world—an important element of their success is the nature of their collective mission and ultimate objective. The nature of the goal is critical to the crowd dynamic and its ability to sustain itself over an extended period of time, or perhaps, in the instance of Islamist extremism/terrorism, even assure itself a perpetual existence. According to Canetti, the nature of the goal/objective/mission can be conceptualized through what he terms the *quick* crowd and the *slow* crowd (my focus).

The *quick* crowds have an immediate goal and are temporally short lived. These crowds are conspicuous and readily distinguishable, and examples of each appear in every day modern-life e.g. the political crowd, the sporting crowd, the protesting crowd, etc (1960, pg. 30). Conversely, the *slow* crowd is much different than the quick crowd in that the goals of the slow crowd are spatially and temporally distant. According to Canetti, religious (Islamist) crowds are the quintessential slow crowd: “their goal is distant, their way to it long, and the true formation of the crowd is relegated to a far off

country or to another world (paradise). Of these slow crowds we actually only see the tributaries [(Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations, groups, and martyrs)], for the end they strive after is invisible and not to be attained by the unbelieving. The slow crowd gathers slowly and only sees itself as permanent in a far distance” (1960, pg. 30). As Canetti later continues, the individuals that comprise the slow crowd move with great persistence towards their ultimate goal/objective and keep together in all circumstances regardless of the obstacles and the dangers that threaten them (1960, pg. 39). Stern illustrates this point through an interview she conducted with an Islamist extremist/terrorist. In response to the question, “Are you afraid of fighting?”, the interview subject responded: “What is there to be afraid of? I pray for death every day. During my studies, reading the Koran, I decided to sacrifice my life for jihad. If I die in jihad, I go to paradise. Allah will reward me” (2004, pg. 123). Time and space are irrelevant, so long as the mission and objectives/goals are eventually reached.

A variant of the slow crowd, which I believe pertains to the Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations and groups, is one that makes reference to an ultimate invisible goal, not immediately attainable in this life. As Canetti explains, the invisible goal that this variant of the slow crowd seeks to attain is a “well-defined goal and belongs to the faithful alone. They see it clearly and distinctly in front of them; they do not have to be satisfied with a vague symbol. Life is a pilgrimage towards it, but between them and their goals stands death (1960, pg. 40). Canetti goes on to state that for the members of this slow crowd “the way ahead is difficult to know, for it is nowhere marked; many go astray and many get lost. But the hope of the world beyond still colours the life of the believer to such a degree that we are entitled to speak of a slow crowd to which all the

followers of a faith [(the Islamist interpretation of Islam is my emphasis)] belong in common” (1960, pg. 40). Furthermore, as with the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, “the anonymity of this crowd is particularly impressive” (1960, pg. 40-41). The members of this variant of the slow crowd are not necessarily acquainted or in physical proximity to one another; instead, they can be geographically dispersed throughout various cities, countries, and regions around the world while remaining united in the same theological/ideological (Islamist) framework and striving to achieve the same collective objective and goal: sacrifice, death, and a place in paradise.

The significance of this form of invisible goal/objective is that, regardless of the short-term goals/objectives that may be achieved, the slow crowd will persistently and relentlessly continue moving towards its ultimate aim and objective until it is achieved, neither recognizing boundaries of time and space nor the sanctity of their own life and that of others: “no concession, however great, would be enough to [assuage] or end bin Laden’s ‘mission’ because, unlike many previous terrorist organizations, it does not intend to create a state nor does it wish to introduce political reforms. Its objective is metaphysical: a titanic struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ forces, in which any means can be used to achieve the end” (Delpech, 2002, pg. 38-39). Therefore, the invisible goal/objective of the Islamist extremist/terrorist *slow* crowd, and for others who subscribe to this system of prophetic doctrine, virtually guarantees the indefinite perpetuation of their struggle. So long as Islamist extremists/terrorists understand their actions, which are “grounded on divine truth as represented in a complex and evocative holy text” (Barth, 2000, pg. 59), to be in defense of Islam and sanctioned by Allah, the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology and the physical and psychological violence that ensues will

continue irrespective of the strategic and tactical successes Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency achieve as a result of their conceived metaphysical struggle.

The *crowd* and its related fundamental qualities and dynamics create a controlled physical, psychological, and ideological space where the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency/Umma in general and individual groups like Al Qaeda and their ideological affiliates remain unified as a collective organic unit. Moreover, the Islamist extremist/terrorist *crowd* and the space it constructs and functions within systematically produces and fashions a uniform, homogeneous, and normative identity and subjectivity, which is necessary to sustain the focus and resolve required to successfully plan, implement, coordinate, and execute transnational operations over long periods of time in myriad geographical locations.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist *crowd* and the dynamic physical and psychological space it has constructed are powerful instruments in maintaining the polycentric and geographically and spatially fragmented decentralized network structure of Al Qaeda, the umbrella organization embodied by the World (International) Islamic Front, and other directly or indirectly connected ideological affiliates who comprise the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency. Indeed, the Islamist extremist/terrorist *crowd* dynamic and the strength and power it provides is especially important given that Al Qaeda's base of operations in Afghanistan has been disrupted and displaced, and other countries, which initially may have provided Al Qaeda and other similar groups with provision of safe haven, can no longer provide asylum to these organizations and groups because of the potential ramifications they will face from the United States and/or its

allies. However, Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates have proven their ability to adapt their methods and structures in response to the setbacks they have endured as a result of the War on Terror(ism). While Al Qaeda and several of its ideological affiliates have “often drawn on several regional hubs for plotting global operations, they have proved willing to move these hubs, shifting responsibility from one country to another in accordance with changes in the security environment” (Byman, 2003, pg. 146). As the Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist network becomes more virtual and geographically and spatially dispersed, the importance of the physical, psychological, and ideological connectivity that results from the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd dynamic exponentially increases.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd and the controlled growth, equality, density, and mission, goals, and objectives inherent in its structure are integral to the geographical and spatial imaginings required to further develop and sustain Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist transnational network. The transnational geographical and spatial imaginings made possible by the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd and the space it constructs and occupies are attributable, I argue, to two dimensions of the *crowd*: the physical and the virtual. The physical dimension of the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd allows individual organizations and their subsidiary groups and cells to deploy regionally or globally while maintaining the physical and psychological unity, force, and power the spatiality of the *crowd* generates. The virtual dimension of the *crowd* encapsulates the entirety of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency, regardless of geographical location, spatial proximity, or organization/group affiliation, and allows the constituency as a whole to operate and function like a *crowd*—whether real or imagined.

Subsequently, the physical and virtual dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist crowd, operating in tandem, cultivate and nurture a potent and powerful geographical and spatial imagination that supports and informs the development, growth, and expansion of a progressive and dynamic transnational network that is effective, versatile, adaptable, and essentially limitless in geographical reach and operational capability and ambition.

The forces of globalization and the emergence of advanced Information Technology and communications systems and devices are an integral element in the transnationalization of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon. As I have briefly alluded to in my argument, advancements in information and communications technologies have significantly increased the capacity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network to not only geographically and spatially expand and extend its presence around the world, but to coordinate, plan, and successfully perpetrate acts of terror and violence. It is to this subject that I now turn.

Globalization, the Infosphere, and the Advance of (Islamist) Extremism/Terrorism

The forces of globalization consist of a complex array of processes: “globalisation is political, technological and cultural, as well as economic” (Giddens, 2003, pg. 10). As Giddens suggests, however, the forces and processes of globalization have been influenced above all by developments and advancements in systems of communication (2003, pg. 10). Information technologies and advanced communications systems and devices have revolutionized, or perhaps even radicalized, the way nations, corporations and institutions, and people interact. Information technologies and advanced forms of communication have created a global reality that is becoming increasingly integrated, interconnected, and interdependent. Consequently, the world we inhabit today “has

become a seamless and indivisible web of interconnected parts despite all the borders that divide its many states” (Nassar, 2004, pg. 2). Although globalization and its related forces will not supplant the relative power or relevance of geopolitics, the nation-state, nationalism, geostrategy, and geographical thought in general, the contours of geopolitics, the nation-state, nationalism, geostrategy, and geographical thought are shifting and transforming.

Information Technology and advanced communications systems have dramatically impacted the way governments, corporations, and people in general imagine the world in which they inhabit. Geographical, spatial, and temporal barriers and boundaries have become virtually obsolete as people can instantaneously transfer, receive, and share information, as well as communicate with virtually anybody, at any time, in any location. As a result, the technological forces inherent in globalization have caused a perceptual and conceptual shift in the collective geographical and spatial imagination of people from around the world: the world has become virtually smaller, and experiences and activities once thought unimaginable have become imaginable. Moreover, the integration, interdependence, and interconnectivity inherent in globalization, facilitated by advanced information and communications systems, have enabled governments, corporations, and people to organize and coordinate themselves in ways not possible before the advent of the internet, satellite communications, fiber optics, cellular telephones, laptop computers, and other mobile and wireless forms of communication: “globalisation is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life circumstances. It is the way we now live” (Giddens, 2003, pg. 19).

Although in principle the globalization phenomenon and the geographical and spatial constructions and imaginings it makes possible should, in theory, benefit all people and have a positive impact on international political, cultural, economic, and social relations and cooperation—as envisaged by McLuhan’s utopian global village—the reality is much different. As Giddens asserts, “globalization, of course, isn’t developing in an even handed way, and is by no means wholly benign in its consequences. To many living outside Europe and North America, it looks uncomfortably like Westernisation—or, perhaps, Americanisation, since the US is now the sole superpower, with a dominant economic, cultural and military position in the global order” (2003, pg. 15). Consequently, the forces and processes of globalization—including perceived political, cultural, and theological homogenization, increased economic and social inequality, and environmental degradation—have been met with protest, resentment, fear, anxiety, and resistance, both non-violent and violent, as characterized by the emergence of counter-hegemonic entities such as the anti-globalization movement, nationalist movements and groups, and various extremist/terrorist organizations and groups.

The contemporary manifestation of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the resultant transnational network that has emerged are a result of, as much as it is a reaction to, the forces and processes of globalization. Although some groups may predominantly operate or be engaged in conflicts in particular regions or specific countries, the transnational Al Qaeda network “is not guided by territorial jurisdiction—its theatre of support, as well as its operations, is global. Instead of resisting globalisation, its forces are being harnessed by contemporary Islamist groups, constantly looking for new bases and new targets

world-wide” (Gray, 2003, pg. 77). By embracing the forces of globalization and the tools of advanced information and communications technologies and devices, Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates have been able to not only imagine, but develop, construct, and organize a polycentric, diffuse, and dispersed transnational network that is limited in reach and scope only by the limits of its own geographical and spatial imagination and technological sophistication.

In addition to exploiting satellite phones and disposable cellular phones, laptop computers, encrypted communications and websites, internet cafes, forged passports and supporting documentation, and various modes of transportation for long distance travel for mobilizing, planning, communicating, coordinating, and escalating its capacity to perpetrate regional and international physical acts of terror (Gunaratna, 2002, pg. 169), Al Qaeda and its transnational network of ideological affiliates are using this technology to extend their terror operations and activities into the virtual dimension. Not only is the internet and cyberspace used to extend the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, it is also a weapon of the network. In effect, they are using the forces of globalization to attack the very systems that make globalization possible: advanced information and communications technologies. Cyberspace, and its characteristic ‘placelessness’ (Lonsdale, 1999, pg. 139), has become a powerful strategic and tactical dimension of unconventional and asymmetric warfare—the virtual environment enables Islamist extremists/terrorists to be geographically and spatially everywhere and nowhere. Consequently, “the information age produces a reach and power almost unparalleled for sub-state [and non-state] actors” (1999, pg. 145).

The development and spread of advanced information technologies and communications systems has revolutionary and radical implications for the War on Terror. Advanced information technologies and communications systems have not only empowered Islamist extremist/terrorists and other nefarious groups by enabling them to more effectively carry out strategic and tactical operations in conventional environments: land, sea, and air, but has created what can be termed a “fifth dimension”¹³ for strategic power and tactical operations—the “infosphere” (1999, pg. 139). As stated in the text, “due to its ethereal nature the infosphere does not take easily to any concrete definition” (1999, pg. 139). However, the infosphere can be best conceptualized as “a polymorphous entity where information exists and flows. Although clearly not a medium in the same vein as the other dimensions of strategy, an information dimension can be identified. Weapons, in the form of malicious software, can flow through the infosphere, and in this sense the fifth dimension acts as a medium for [and space of] strategic power” (1999, pg. 139). As governments, corporations, and individuals increasingly rely and depend on the infosphere for their day to day activities, the strategic power and importance of the infosphere, and its subsequent attractiveness as a tool and target of terrorism, proportionately escalates.

The infosphere and the potential ability to control, disrupt, and manipulate information that it presents, serves as a very powerful force in operational activity and capability. The infosphere can be used for intelligence gathering and dissemination; terrorism (my emphasis); strategic warfare; symbolic raids; small wars; political and cultural warfare; economic warfare; logistical support; interdiction; and in the direct

¹³ As outlined in the text edited by Gray & Sloan, there are four conventional dimensions of strategic power: sea, land, air, and space. However, according to the contributing author of the text, Information Technologies have created a fifth dimension of strategic power and importance: the ‘infosphere.’

support of conventional and unconventional warfare” (1999, pg. 145). Furthermore, the geographical and spatial flexibility and accessibility of the infosphere increases its potency, as it can be accessed from almost anywhere at anytime in order to support individual or multiple operations and/or be used as a weapon to attack individual or multiple targets that rely on and are supported by the infosphere. As groups like Al Qaeda become more technologically advanced and sophisticated, the use of the infosphere (fifth dimension) as a strategic and tactical space and weapon will grow (Gray, 2003, pg. 83).

Terrorism is an invasive enterprise that seeks to penetrate, exploit, and terrorize any space that is available to advance its cause and message. As Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks note in their text, *The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism*: “Terrorists (and terrorism) seek to exploit the everyday—things that people do, places that they visit, the routines of daily living, and the functioning of institutions. As previously stated, terrorism in general and Islamist extremist/terrorism in particular is an adaptive threat which changes its target, timing, and mode of delivery as circumstances are altered” (2003, pg. 2). Ironically, Islamist extremism/terrorism has adapted to the information age and has infiltrated the fifth dimension; consequently, the infosphere has created a digital battlefield where extremists/terrorists are using “bites” as well as bombs and bullets to attack the technologically advanced United States and the West: “the soldiers (terrorists) in this war are invisible figures buried deep inside [computer systems and networks], ‘hacking’ there way into computers in enemy territory” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 106).¹⁴

¹⁴ According to Gray (2003), Zapatista Rebels in Mexico have used the infospace to disrupt financial markets and there have been reports that Al Qaeda has attempted to do the same (pg. 83).

The Internet/information highway/World Wide Web (www) is a pervasive information network that has a powerful ability to communicate mass amounts of information and is precisely why the Internet is assuming a growing role in the “terrorist calculus” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 105). Nacos notes that the “World Wide Web proves to be an ideal vehicle for terrorists to send their messages to the world during and after their violent actions” (2002, pg. 105). Terrorists can send messages to each other and their supporters or sympathizers, send messages to their enemies, and provide information about their cause and motivations to neutral people and organizations by email, websites, chat-rooms, web-casts, etc., and all of this can be done at a relatively low cost and with minimal levels of risk: “the World Wide Web has become a very effective propaganda instrument since it allows terrorist organizations to spread their message globally by providing background information and updated information about their struggle” (Valeri and Knights, 2000, pg. 16). Cyberspace has created a vehicle for terrorists to “publicize their own propaganda” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 104). Moreover, “terrorists are using these technologies in the same way they have exploited the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television” (Valeri and Knights, 2000, pg. 16).

Extremist/terrorist attacks perpetrated in or via the infosphere and cyberspace can potentially cause serious and detrimental impacts to the critical physical and information infrastructures post-industrialist societies, like the United States and the West, are increasingly becoming dependent upon. Extremists/terrorists can sabotage the operations of information systems and networks, thereby, depending upon the target, cause myriad problems. The infosphere and cyberspace could be used to severely damage or impact entire financial and economic institutions such as banks, stock markets, and e-commerce,

or shut down power grids, disrupt telecommunications and transportation routes, and alter environmental control mechanisms at water treatment facilities, sewage plants, etc. As well, the infosphere and cyberspace could be used to perpetrate acts of physical violence. In the article, “Weapons of Mass Disruption and Terrorism,” Bunker lists several possible scenarios that a computer and cyber-terrorism could be used to perpetrate. Some these examples and scenarios include:

- Attack the next generation of air traffic control systems, cause two large civilian aircraft to collide, causing a mass casualty incident.
- Remotely set-off a series of conventional bombs, or Weapons of Mass Destruction, strategically placed to cause mass casualty and [physical and information] infrastructure disruption/destruction. (Bunker, 2000, pg. 40).

What these examples indicate is that the potential destruction/disruption that an extremist/terrorist could cause includes a vast stratum of scenarios that appear to be limited only by the extremists’/terrorists’ level of technological sophistication and imagination.

In a world that is increasingly becoming more dependent on technology, extremists/terrorists will continue to become more technologically proficient and sophisticated and will utilize and exploit the infosphere and cyberspace to carry out their nefarious and clandestine campaigns of violence: “considering the reach of the World Wide Web—the unfettered content of and access to its sites, and the opportunities for propaganda, recruiting, and fundraising—Internet utilities confirm that the Web of hate and terror is here to stay and is likely to play a larger role in the divisive and inciting

propaganda of extremists and in the terrorist schemes of tomorrow” (Nacos, 2002, pg. 127).

Where terrorism perpetrated in or through the infosphere and cyberspace and traditional terrorism converge, what emerges is a hybridized form of extremism/terrorism and terrorist strategies, tactics, and weaponry. Hybridized terrorists organizations and networks, like Al Qaeda, can utilize both traditional forms of terrorism e.g. bullets and bombs, and infosphere/cyberspace based acts of terrorism e.g. “bites” and “electrons” in terrorist campaigns and attacks, which, as a consequence, could dramatically enhance the impact threshold of a terrorist attack and can cause significant damage to both critical physical and information infrastructures simultaneously. As Bunker states: “weapons can be combined in what has been termed a hybrid attack or hybrid threats which combine modes of attacks as a force multiplier/disruption enhancer, as in the case of a conventional power plant bombing taking place in tandem with an information attack on electric transmission, distribution, and/or control systems” (2000, pg. 44). This method of terrorism is conceivable given the rapidity of terrorists to assimilate new strategies and tactics for carrying out their operations. The hybrid terrorist—a combination of the conventional and digital/cyber terrorist—is on the avant-garde of an emerging terrorist class that use both physical (human) space and the infosphere (digital space) to exploit and attack their perceived enemy.

The Infosphere and cyberspace are e-merging as spaces of terror. Cyber-terrorism is a virus that will continue to grow and proliferate, transforming the body of terrorism in general and Islamist extremism/terrorism in particular into a cybernetic entity that could conceivably be geographically and spatially everywhere and nowhere.

The advanced technological forces of globalization and the strategic and tactical importance of the infosphere and cyberspace have revolutionized and radicalized not only the geographical and spatial imagination of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network, but has revolutionized and radicalized the geographical and spatial relationships of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network. Advanced forms of Information Technology and communications systems have enabled the Islamist extremist/terrorist network to assume an organization structure that is both physical and virtual in nature. Consequently, the geographical and spatial barriers that once inhibited or prevented this network from effectively and forcefully mobilizing beyond the borders of particular countries or regions have virtually dissipated. The result is the development of a powerful diffuse transnational network that is virtually borderless and barrier free. As illustrated through the numerous successful terrorist strikes preceding and following the monumental attacks of September 11, 2001, in various geographically dispersed locations, the “fifth dimension” has significantly enhanced the international virulence and capacity of Islamist extremism/terrorism.

I have argued that the geographical and spatial imaginings made possible through the imagined community, the dynamics of the *crowd*, and the forces of globalization have constructed a space that has significantly enhanced the ability of Al Qaeda, the World (International) Islamic Front, and other Islamist ideological affiliates to develop a transnational organizational style and dynamic that is on the avante garde of organizational structures today—a network of networks (Stern, 2004, pg. 279). According to Stern, this network of network includes hierarchical structures; resisters who are inspired through virtual contacts; ideological affiliated groups who may provide

logistical or monetary support in return for participation in operational activities; and free-lance agents—Richard Reid, the convicted “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up a plane—who may or may not be associated with any group affiliated with the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency/Umma (2004, pg. 279). The network as a whole and its sub-networks, as previously stated, are predominantly united by their common mission; however, some groups, like Hamas, Hezbollah, Moro Islamic Front, Jemmah Islamiah, and the GIA, may pursue multiple missions e.g. locally oriented, nationally oriented, or regionally oriented agendas that may be of little interest to other members of the network (2004, pg. 279).

The result of this diverse, varied, and dynamic organizational style is the development of a resilient cluster system that varies in size and complexity. As Stern states, “with each cluster, every node is connected to every other node in what is known as an “all channel” network. But only certain members of the cluster communicate with other clusters, and the ties between clusters are weak, to minimize the risk of penetration” (2004, pg. 271). Moreover, this decentralized organizational style and the tightly controlled communication between nodes reduces the risk of the entire network collapsing if one or several clusters or nodes are infiltrated or apprehended while operating in a law-enforcement rich environment. Unlike the static nation-state, the dynamic international/transnational organizational structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network of networks makes locating, situating, personifying, and identifying it much more difficult. Instead, the Islamist extremist/terrorist network of networks can only be located and identified in sequence, one site of violence and/or terrorist activity after the other, not all at once (Weber, 2002, pg. 453). Although an

established superstructure may increase the efficiency and capacity of a network, this system increases the resilience, effectiveness, and ability of the Islamist extremist/terrorist network of networks to carry out surreptitious international operations without detection and subsequent impunity.

The transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist network of networks, and its ability to penetrate geographical, spatial, political, cultural, and social barriers, represents an undeniable threat to sovereign power and its ability to protect its citizens and national interests. As Andreas states in his article entitled “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century:”

The close links between territory and the state are breaking down.... In the political realm ... authority is simultaneously being relocated upward toward supranational entities, sideward toward transnational organizations and social movements, and downward toward sub-national groups and communities.... These shifting tendencies are diminishing the competence and effectiveness of states and rendering their borders more porous and less meaningful. (Andreas, 2003. pg. 80)

Consequently, the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and its network of networks are assuming a power that once was reserved for the sovereign nation-state. Whereas sovereign nation-states historically had the power to: execute people; grant life or death; pass laws which increased the freedom of some and reduced the freedom of others; to control its borders and the people entering its sovereign territory; declare war on other sovereign nations; sanction, under the auspices of war, mass scale killing and high-scale casualty rates; and carry out the destruction of physical infrastructure and landscapes; the transnational Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency/Umma, through their mode of organization and action, has the ability and the power to make these decisions (Milbank, 2002, pg. 305). The political and geopolitical landscape has shifted and is being

transformed by the geographical and spatial forces of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and its diffuse transnational network structure.

The codifications once associated with the sovereign nation-state and its related national imaginings are eroding. As a result, the codifications of belonging are being contested and are forcing new interpretations of identity and subjectivity, especially as the codifications relate to organizations and individual actors who understand themselves to occupy an ideological space that transcends and exists beyond the borders of any particular geographical, geopolitical, and national unit (Delanty & O'Mahony, 2002, pg. 171). The Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency and its related network of networks signify the rise of a recalcitrant and intractable force that occupies a space that is both within and without geographical and spatial limits.

2nd Movement: (Dis)Locating the Islamist Extremist/Terrorist Subject

In the wake of September 11, 2001 the need to identify and understand the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject has become a matter of urgency. Speaking of and analysing Islamist extremists/terrorists as actors participating only in conflicts in a "far off country and between people of whom we know nothing" (Segaller, 1986, pg. 7) is no longer tenable; the theories and analysis that emerge must engage terrorism and the terrorist actor as a force that has penetrated and infiltrated "Western" society and culture. A critical understanding must be established with regards to how "they" operate "here." However, what does "here" mean? The term "here" certainly denotes a place, a position, a location, indeed a space—physical and/or psychological and/or social.

For the purpose of my analysis, I focus on the events of September 11, 2001, and the purported Islamist terrorist group that is responsible for this tragic attack: Al Qaeda and the leader of the organization, Osama Bin Laden. In particular, I examine the cultural "space" an Islamist extremist/terrorist organization/cell or individual actor occupies after successfully infiltrating and penetrating the borders of the "West" in general and North America in particular.

My (dis)locating of the "cultural" space—identifying and (de)constructing "here"—of an Islamist extremist/terrorist consists of three movements. Using a Bhabhabian post-colonial theoretical trajectory and Soja's concept of "Thirdspace," I explore how the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject occupies the *liminal thirdspace* between the Dominant/Other or Subject/Object, resulting in a hybridized identity/subjectivity that resists and subverts conventional forms of codification and

identification through cultural mimicry. In the second movement, I utilize the Butlerian concept of performance to analyse how the hybrid identity/subjectivity of a terrorist is a cultural performance, and that the identity and subjectivity of an extremist/terrorist manifests and are realized through committing/perpetrating an actual terrorist act. Finally, I discuss the phenomenon of suicide bombing/martyr operations, and argue that suicide bombing/martyr operations represent the absolute identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremist/terrorist organizations and the individual extremist/terrorist actors.

(De)Constructing a Third Space: the Liminal, the Hybrid, and the Mimic Man

In order to begin to construct the *liminal thirdspace* that the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject occupies and to develop an understanding of the identity and subjectivity that emerges from that space, it is important to explain the processes of cultural assimilation that the terrorist undergoes upon entering Western Society (the United States in my focus). The terrorist subject must transgress the cultural boundaries (real or imagined) that exist between the Dominant/Other and the Subject/Object, and occupy a space that is 'in-between' these dichotomous binaries in order to remain undetected and effectively invisible to the Dominant.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist, upon penetrating and infiltrating Western society, in effect becomes the archetypal postcolonial subject and actor:

Whereas both colonial and counter-colonial configurations operate in the medium of division and conflict, the postcolonial is generally associated with a more consensual, more harmonious domain of 'multiple identity, travelling theory, migration, diaspora, cultural synthesis, and mutation. The [terrorist], [like the] postcolonial, is an open-ended field of discursive practices, characterised by boundary and border crossings. [...] Nothing is so typically and so insistently postcolonial as the refusal of all binaries. (Hallward, 2001, pg. xiv)

The Islamist extremist/terrorist subject uses cultural synthesis and cultural transformation as a strategy and a tactic to deconstruct the antagonistic binary systems that help identify the extremist/terrorist subject as Other. The terrorist moves in-between the Dominant/Other and Subject/Object and occupies a *liminal* cultural *thirdspace*.

In order to further understand what the *liminal thirdspace* is, it is important to establish definitions of the terms *liminal* and *thirdspace*. The term *liminal* is defined as: "namelessness, absence of property, nakedness or uniform clothing, transvestitism, sexual continence, [heterogeneity], minimized distinctions of sex, [race], rank, and wealth, humility, obedience, and silence" (Makaryk, 1993, pg. 578). It is the space of the "dislocation and confusion of identity" (pg. 579). By occupying the liminal space between the Dominant/Other and the Subject/Object, the terrorist subject becomes an indeterminate and mutable figure who does not readily align with the Dominant or the Other, or the Subject and the Object, and, therefore, assumes a position of unrecognizable and unnoticed otherness.

The liminal space between the Dominant/Other is a *thirdspace* where "Western" (Occidental) and the "Eastern" (Oriental) cultural hegemonies converge, and what emerges is the in situ counter-hegemonic identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. In this liminal cultural *thirdspace*, the extremist/terrorist subject temporarily assimilates and exhibits the characteristics, ideologies, and values of both the West (Dominant) and the East (Other), which results in the identity and subjectivity of a terrorist becoming a cultural hybrid production:

The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper (Dominant) and lower (Other), and black (Middle Eastern, Islamic, or Arab) and white. The hither (we) and

thither (they) of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents identities [and subjectivities] at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. This interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity [.]
(Bhabha, 1994, pg. 4)

Similar to liminality, the concept of *thirdspace* conceptualizes identity as occupying a space that is “unstable, shifting, multiplicitous, situational, refractory, hybridizable, always being negotiated and contested, never static or fixed” (Soja, 1996, pg. 113). However, unlike liminality, *thirdspace* is not just a position or a space that one benignly occupies, *thirdspace*, as Soja suggests, is a space of political and cultural choice and agency: “[a] site where one’s radical [identity] and subjectivity can be activated and practiced in conjunction with the radical [identities] and subjectivities of others” (1996, pg. 99)—“others” in this context refers to Islamist extremist/terrorists: figures who consciously situate themselves in a marginal spatial matrix where resistance, struggle, dissent, and subversion are covertly nurtured and eventually deployed. Therefore, to actively occupy and appropriate *thirdspace* is necessarily a counter-hegemonic political and cultural act where one “works toward a multiple, pluralized, and radical [self-reflexive] conceptualization of agency, identity [and subjectivity]” (1996, pg. 91), contesting “existing power relations at the source” (1996, pg. 89)—from within the Dominant system.

Before continuing, I believe it is prudent to provide a more elaborate definition and conceptualization of *thirdspace* and its theoretical precepts, especially as it relates to the spatiality of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor. According to Soja, “in its broadest sense, *thirdspace* is a purposefully tentative and flexible term that attempts to capture what is actually a constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events,

appearances, and meanings” (1996, pg. 2). Moreover, Soja suggests that thirdspace “is a space where issues of race, class, and gender (to this list I add varying political, cultural, and religious ideologies) can be addressed simultaneously without privileging one over the other; where one can be Marxist and post-Marxist, materialist and idealist, structuralist and humanist, disciplined and transdisciplinary at the same time” (1996, pg. 5). Soja continues, “thirdspace itself [...] is rooted in just such a recombinational and radically open perspective” (1996, pg. 5). Soja attempts to open up a new space of critical thinking and discourse, where he challenges the spatial imagination and attempts to open it up to “ways of thinking and acting politically that respond to all binarisms, to any attempt to confine thought and political action to only two alternatives, by interjecting an-Other set of choices” (Soja, pg. 5). Thirdspace is a mode of thinking that seeks to transcend the ontological, epistemological, and theoretical boundaries of modernist cultural-political binaristic logic engendered by essentialist, reductionist, and totalizing dualisms: We/They, Us/Them, Dominant/Other, Subject/Object, West/East, Occident/Orient, Civilized/Barbaric, Progression/Regression, Modern/Primitive, etc. Thirdspace, as a radical postmodern perspective, deconstructs and subsequently reconstructs and restructures the bifurcated modernist mode of knowledge formation, and attempts to expand the way one understands, perceives, and conceives space and spatiality—an Other set of choices. However, it is important to note that concept of thirdspace does not advocate the dissolution of binary logic, but, rather, reaches beyond the limits of the identities and subjectivities entrenched within this ontological and epistemological system, “renewing its strengths and shedding its weaknesses” (1996, pg. 93), and reconstitutes them in an expanded and continually expanding geographical and

spatial imagination that is necessary for the development and conceptualization of a radical/extremist/hybridized postmodern cultural-politico identity and subjectivity: “thirding introduces an “other-than” choice that speaks and critiques through its otherness. That is to say, it does not derive simply from an additive combination of its binary antecedents but rather from a disordering, deconstruction, and tentative reconstitution of their presumed totalization producing an open alternative that is both similar and strikingly different” (1996, pg. 61)—almost a new space, but not quite.

As previously stated, Soja (de)constructs and (re)constitutes thirdspace through revising and reevaluating particular ontological and epistemological assumptions. Soja utilizes two “trialectic” models, a base and a superstructure to use Marxian terms, to develop thirdspace into something at least linguistically concrete (a brief encounter with these models will help further develop the concept of thirdspace). The first trialectic model is an ontological model. According to Soja, “the trialectics of being” are constituted by Historicity (the Historical), Spatiality (the Geographical), and Sociality (the Social): Historicity-Spatiality-Sociality: “although primarily an ontological assertion, the trialectics of Spatiality, Historicity, and Sociality (summary terms for the social production of Space, Time, and Being-in-the-World) apply at all levels of knowledge formation, from ontology to epistemology, theory building, empirical analysis, and social practice (1996, pg. 71). Soja maintains that there has been a persistent tendency over the last half century to “over privilege” the dynamic relations of Historicity and Sociality, which has resulted in the marginalization of Spatiality as a critical component of ontological investigation and theory. Subsequently, Soja’s thirding-as-Othering reintroduces Spatiality as a primary ontological mechanism that

“involves the reassertion of Spatiality against this pronounced tendency in Western philosophy, science, historiography, and social theory (including its most critical variants) to bifocalize on the interactive Historicality and Sociality of being” (1996, pg. 71). Consequently, the trifocalizing of Soja’s thirding-as-Othering establishes the foundation for an epistemological orientation that (re)positions Spatiality not only as a primary dimension of the geographical imagination, but as a primary tool for the critical analysis of political and cultural spaces—real and imagined.

The second trialectic model is an epistemological model and provides a framework for the trialectics of Spatiality. According to Soja, Spatiality consists of three dimensions: Perceived/Physical space (Firstspace); Conceived/Psychological space (Secondspace); and Lived/Social space (Thirdspace). However, as Soja asserts:

No one of the three forms of spatial knowledge is given a priori or ontological privilege, but again there is a strategic privileging of the third term, in this case Thirdspace, as a means of combating the longstanding tendency to confine spatial knowledge to Firstspace and Secondspace epistemologies and their associated theorizations, empirical analyses, and social practices. (1996, pg. 74)

Similar to the emphasis on the bifocalization of Historicality and Sociality in the past, Soja suggests that the Firstspace-Secondspace dualism has predominated spatial modes of thought and discourse. Through introducing Thirdspace into the spatial mode of discourse, Soja deconstructs and reconstitutes the Firstspace-Secondspace duality—thirding-as-Othering: “such thirding is designed not just to critique Firstspace and Secondspace modes of thought, but also to reinvigorate their approaches to spatial knowledge with new possibilities heretofore unthought of inside the traditional spatial disciplines” (1996, pg. 81). Thirdspace opens up a landscape of possibilities that does not seek to undermine Firstspace-Secondspace epistemologies, but expand the

epistemological frame to include a Thirdspace epistemology that generates an epistemological imbalance that challenges the traditional spatial modes of knowledge production and analysis.

Now that a comprehensive and robust definition and conceptualization of Thirdspace has been established, I will discuss how Thirdspace lends itself to the theorization and interpretation of the spatiality (my focus is on the cultural and political spatiality) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. Thirdspace, or the thirding-as-Othering, (de)constructs a site/space of resistance that rejects the systematic encoding processes embedded within a dominant symbolic order that traditionally codifies cultures using a dichotomous system of binary logic e.g. Dominant/Other, We/They, Us/Them, etc. Thirdspace opens up a new space of ontological and epistemological possibilities, a space not outside of the binary system but within it. Thirdspace enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to occupy a counter-hegemonic cultural space that is at once mutable, metamorphic, adaptable, heterogeneous, pluralistic, and, as stated above, hybridized. As the hegemony of the Dominant system seeks to identify the Other in symmetrical terms (systemic binaries), Thirdspace enables a hybridized asymmetrical cultural position to emerge “in-between” these polarized dichotomous binaries. This assertion is echoed by Bhabha:

All forms of culture are continually in a process of hybridity. But for me, the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity is the “third space” which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom [...] The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation. (Bhabha cited in Soja, 1996, pg. 139)

Consequently, the “new and unrecognizable” asymmetry of Thirdspace, figuratively and literally, enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to assume and maintain a hybridized radical identity and subjectivity that resists traditional modes of codification and identification. The result, as will be elaborated upon later, is the emergence of a performative space of resistance and subversion where the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject can plan and execute their activities both within and without the Dominant system—asymmetrical/hybridized cultural and political terror.

In the liminal cultural Thirdspace, the Islamist terrorist subject/actor occupies a position with the productive capacity to actively nurture the processes of cultural and political hybridity and mimicry. That is, the provenance of Thirdspace enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor to reconstitute or re-present themselves as an “in-between” translation of the cultural and political politics of polarity and its related inscriptions and articulations.

I will now move on to discuss the significance of the cultural and political mechanisms of hybridity and mimicry, and their importance in understanding the processes the Islamist terrorist subject/actor undergoes in a liminal cultural Thirdspace. The hybridization of the extremist/terrorist subject results in the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject becoming a 'double' self with "doublevoicedness" (Bakhtin, 1981, pg. 429): "hybrids can be read as belonging simultaneously to two or more systems" (1981, pg. 429). The hybridized extremist/terrorist subject becomes a confluence of the Dominant (West) and the Other (East), exhibiting, as stated above, qualities and characteristics of both cultural systems, thereby, in effect, becoming a third voice in a third system. As a double self, or, more appropriately, a third self, the Islamist

extremist/terrorist subject represents a site of vacillation between the Dominant and the Other, and this constant movement between these two cultural systems represents "the idea of culture-in-action, of culture growing within the [terrorist] like a new organ" (Artaud, 1958, pg. 8). The liminal cultural Thirdspace of the hybridized extremist/terrorist subject is a space of agency. The identity and subjectivity of the extremist/terrorist is always actively transforming "in-between" the Dominant and the Other—a hybridized figure. Consequently, as a cultural hybrid production, the extremist/terrorist subject is never static or stable. The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is cognizant of the cultural space he occupies, and constantly and actively reacts to the changing conditions within this liminal cultural Thirdspace.

The subversive power of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject occupying and positioning himself within a liminal cultural Thirdspace can be further explained through Bhabha's concept of *mimicry*. Bhabha defines mimicry as "[...] the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite" (1994, pg. 86). Bhabha goes on to state, "mimicry is thus the sign of a double articulation (double self); a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power" (1994, pg. 86). Although Bhabha discusses mimicry in the context of colonization, and the relationship between the Colonizer and the Colonized, Bhabha's concept of mimicry translates well into explaining the Dominant/Other dichotomy because the same power relations are being described. The Dominant (West—my emphasis is the United States) seeks to appropriate the Other (East—includes country or region that is "alien" to the West), so that the Other becomes an authorized form of otherness. The process of mimicry can be most aptly characterized

through, as Bhabha points out, Macaulay's *Minute on Indian Education*, where Bhabha identifies Macaulay as wanting to develop a "class of interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian (Middle-Eastern, Islamic, Arabic, or Oriental) in blood and colour, but English (USA) in tastes, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect" (1994, pg. 87). The double articulation or double self (Thirdself) that is created through the process of mimicry is a hybridized subject who is Other in appearance, but adheres and conforms to the cultural hegemony of the Dominant. Subsequently, through the process of mimicry, the Islamist extremist's/terrorist's otherness is significantly diminished and assumes an identity and subjectivity that is authorized—almost the same, but not quite. Therefore, the process of mimicry enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to transgress the boundary of the Dominant/Other and open up a liminal cultural Thirdspace that is both resemblance and menace.

Like the colonized subject, the Islamist terrorist subject/actor can use the process of mimicry to his advantage. Although the Dominant (USA) has the Other assimilate and conform to the governing ideology in order to establish a culturally and politically authoritative position over the Other, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject can use the Dominant's cultural hegemony against itself. The more the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject resembles the Dominant, the more the watchful gaze and surveillance of the Dominant is displaced. Mimicry becomes a powerful mechanism for displacing the gaze and surveillance of the Dominant because mimicry serves as a cultural camouflage:

mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage [...] It is not a question of harmonizing with the background, but against a mottled background, of becoming mottled--exactly like the technique of camouflage practiced in human warfare. (1994, pg. 85)

The Islamist extremist/terrorist, by assuming the camouflaged and mottled identity and subjectivity of an "authorized version of otherness (1994, pg. 88), is able to evade the panoptical surveillance of the Dominant and maintain the effect of invisibility and concealment. The extremist/terrorist, through the process of mimicry, "is at once resemblance and menace (1994, pg. 86)."

By actively resembling the Dominant and subsequently occupying the liminal cultural Thirdspace, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is able to reverse the gaze of surveillance and observe the Dominant (USA): "the observer becomes the observed" (1994, pg. 89). The Islamist extremist/terrorist, as the observer, "mimes the forms of authority at the point at which [the Islamist extremist/terrorist] deauthorizes them" (1994, pg. 91). The Dominant is deauthorized and destabilized through the subversive and undermining act of the reversal of surveillance. The menace of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor is precisely that "they" are watching "us" from within.

The act of observation and the reversal of surveillance empowers the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject because of his other ability to learn more and more about the Dominant, which, therefore, enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, through cultural and political knowledge, to penetrate deeper and deeper into the recesses of Western Society: "the intended victim has to be watched for a certain time, his habits and movements studied to establish the most promising place and time for the action (terrorist act)" (Laqueur, 1987, pg. 93). Furthermore, as Laqueur states, "the success of terrorist operations depends on reliable information about the targets to be attacked and the movements of the victims to be killed or abducted" (1987, pg. 109-10). The power of observation, achieved through the positionality of Thirdspace and the processes of

hybridity and mimicry, provides the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject with the knowledge necessary to successfully adapt, resist, subvert, and attack the Dominant not only from outside Western political and cultural boundaries but from within them (my focus): “the terrorist networks rely on hidden or silent members, members so hidden and silent that they are not yet terrorists. They are the “sleeper” or “dormant” terrorists who live among us, adopting “Western” practices of life, working, going to school, and generally disguising themselves as good neighbours” (Passavant & Dean, 2002, pg. 3). An example of this tactic is illustrated through the devastating events of September 11, 2001.

The nineteen Islamist extremists/terrorists who hijacked the four U.S airplanes and attacked the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon and crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania (potentially on route to Washington, D.C) executed the attack after years of planning and living in Europe and the United States. Although the attacks of September 11, 2001 represent the most ambitious attack planned by Al Qaeda to date, the events, perhaps more importantly, are significant because of the tactics and strategies used in order for the attacks to be successful. The individuals who carried out the attacks “were not individuals who acted foolishly on the spur of the moment, but a coterie of several determined individuals who acted in unison to carry out a simultaneous series of hijackings for which they had been groomed for years” (Israeli, 2003, pg. 6). Furthermore, the individuals selected to carry out the attacks were not Arab Afghans, “but were members of another group of recruits who belonged to the Arab diaspora in Europe or had been educated in Europe or America” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 58).¹⁵

¹⁵ The Hamburg, Germany contingent: Mohamed Atta (Egyptian), Ramzi Binalshibh (Yemeni), Marwan al Shehhi (United Arab Emirates), and Ziad Jarred (Lebanon) all resided in Germany for years, studying at

According to Laqueur, selecting non-Afghan veterans was necessary because conducting operations in America and Europe required individual actors with backgrounds and training that were different than that offered in Pakistani and Afghani training facilities. In order for the operation to be successful, the Islamist recruits required the skills necessary to assimilate and adjust to Western society: “a higher education, a working knowledge of languages, and some experience with how to behave in alien societies” (2004, pg. 58). Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehi, Nawaf al-Hamzi, and Ziad Jarrah, some of the individuals responsible for carrying out the 9-11 operation, lived in the United States for almost two years, took flight lessons, availed themselves of prostitutes, and, according to reports, drank alcoholic beverages and played video games in a bar in Florida.¹⁶ This behaviour, seemingly anti-Muslim, especially for individuals whose resolve and conviction caused them to carry out the terrorist attacks, reflects the strategies and tactics—a cultural schizophrenia—used to plan and execute the events of September 11, 2001 (Ruthven, 2002, pg.10, 13, 16). That is, occupying an authorized cultural position that would not arouse suspicion and displace the watchful gaze of the Dominant. These strategies and tactics (hybridity and mimicry) used by the Islamist extremists/terrorists of September 11, 2001 indicate with violent evidence the fact that Islamist extremists/terrorists have located a cultural space—a Thirdspace—that is beyond

various universities and preparing for *jihad* (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, pg.160-164).

¹⁶ Even before entering the United States, this group of individuals began preparing for their attack through making clear efforts to avoid appearing radical. After leaving Afghanistan, they distanced themselves from conspicuous extremists (individuals known to espouse violent jihad who made public anti-American and anti-Western exhortations) in order to avoid unwanted attention. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the entire Hamburg contingent changed their appearance and behaviour. For example, Atta wore western clothing (he previously dressed in traditional Arab clothing), shaved his beard, and no longer attended extremist mosques (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, pg. 167).

the symmetry of the Dominant/Other binary and have revealed its exploitative and destructive capabilities.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, as someone who appears to be almost the same but not quite, can subvert the Dominant from within. The extremist/terrorist uses mimicry as a powerful subversive mechanism; the objective for the terrorist, unlike Fanon's Negro, is not to become "like the white man" (Fanon, 1967, pg. 229)—resemble the Dominant—and be recognized as an equal, but to become almost white so as to become unrecognizable and attack the Dominant from a liminal Thirdspace authorized by the Dominant: “[The Islamist terrorist and] terrorism, like viruses, are everywhere. There is a global perfusion of terrorism, which accompanies any system of domination as though it were its shadow, ready to activate itself anywhere, like a double agent. We can no longer draw a demarcation line around [the Islamist terrorist or terrorism]” (Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 10).

The identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject that is produced through hybridity and mimicry is not passive, but is active. The Islamist terrorist subject must actively participate in the processes of hybridity and mimicry in order to occupy the liminal Thirdspace cultural and political position, and to maximize the effectiveness of this mechanism of concealment and weapon of subversive activity. In effect, the terrorist subject must perform and function like an actor on a stage, adapting and reacting in a “theatrical” environment.

The Islamist Extremist/Terrorist Theatre

The identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is an active performance. Using Judith Butler's theory of *performativity*, I examine the relationship that exists between the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject and performance. The Islamist extremist/terrorist must perform their identity and subjectivity as an authorized, conforming form or otherness, and must incorporate a performance—terrorist activity—of some form in order for their true identities and subjectivities to be realized and actualized.

Although Judith Butler model of performativity and performance relates to gender identity, the notion of gender identity as a performance, in its operational sense, works well describing the act of performing (mimicing) an identity and a subjectivity as a racialized Other and more specifically an Islamist extremist/terrorist Other. As Judith Butler contends, the theory of performativity and its transposition to matters of race has been explored by scholars such as Bhabha whose emphasis on the “way minority identities are produced and riven at the same time under the conditions of domination” (Butler, 1999, pg. 192), closely correlates with her theory of performativity and gender. Furthermore, Butler suggests that the categories of gender and race always work “as a background for one another, and [that] they often find their most powerful articulation through one another” (1999, pg. xvi). However, my interest in the relationship between gender and race is limited to the notion that identity and subjectivity, whether one is analyzing gender, race, sexuality, etc., is an active cultural construct and that the conforming identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist, like gender and race, “is a kind of cultural performance which results from the effect of contested power

relations" (Mahtani, 2002, pg. 426). Through performing mimicry, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor superficially allows himself to be *interpellated*¹⁷ by the Dominant, and adheres and conforms to the cultural and political demands prescribed by the hegemony of the Dominant power structure.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor uses cultural performance to construct an identity and subjectivity that are an authorized version of otherness. As an authorized subject of otherness, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor is not recognized as a terrorist by the host community, but, rather, is recognized by the host community as an authorized citizen who has been appropriated by the Dominant. The art of mimicing the Dominant is an active process because the Islamist extremist/terrorist must be constantly cognizant of his cultural and political space and react accordingly, so as to exude the appearance of being an authorized and acceptable form of otherness. In effect, the Islamist extremist/terrorist is always in the process of "doing identity" (Mahtani, 2002, pg. 426). The Islamist extremist/terrorist, while situated in alien cultures i.e. the United States, is performing or "doing" the language, mannerisms, sensibilities, traditions, and social mores associated with the Dominant. Through assuming and mimicing, indeed performing, the hegemonic ideology of the Dominant, the Islamist extremist/terrorist adopts an identity and subjectivity that is "'strategic, tactical, mobile, multifaceted, blurred, awkward, and ambivalent'" (2002, pg. 425). Therefore, the identity and subjectivity that

¹⁷ "*Interpellation*, or hailing, is a term that is associated with the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, who employs it as part of his theory of ideology in order to explain how ideology constitutes and 'centres' subjects in the social world. [...] "Althusser develops the term in order to demonstrate how ideology is not simply an illusion or false consciousness masking the 'real' nature of society but is instead a material system of social practices producing certain effects upon individuals and providing them with their social identities" (Makaryk, 1993, pg. 566-567).

emerges within the matrix of power relations is not a simple replication or copy of the [Dominant] itself, a uniform repetition of a [Dominant] economy of identity [and subjectivity]. [This cultural performance and its associated productions] swerve from their original purposes and inadvertently mobilize possibilities of “subjects” that do not merely exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility, but effectively expand the boundaries of what is, in fact, culturally intelligible. (Butler, 1999, pg. 39)

Consequently, as Gregory (2004) states, “performance creates a space for which it is possible for ‘newness’ to enter the world. Judith Butler describes the conditional, creative possibilities of performance as a ‘relation of being implicated in that which one opposes, yet turning power against itself to produce alternative [cultural] and political modalities [of contestation]” (pg. 19). Performance enables the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor to assume a cultural and political identity and subjectivity that is both an authorized and unauthorized form of otherness that operates within the boundaries of Dominant cultural and political codes. However, through operating within the Dominant system and using its own cultural and political codes against itself, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/actor expands the cultural and political boundaries of the Other and simultaneously destabilizes the cultural and political intelligibility of the Dominant. As a result, the performance of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject creates a space where cultural and political modalities of contestation can be mobilized and deployed.

The identity and subjectivity of the performative Islamist extremist/terrorist subject are "strategic, tactical, blurred, and ambivalent," because the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor assumes an identity and subjectivity that allows him to appear and perform one thing, while, in reality, be or perform something else: terrorists "use the banality of American (Western) everyday life as cover and camouflage. Sleeping in their

suburbs, reading and studying with their families, before activating themselves suddenly like time bombs" (Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 19-20). In a sense, and to pick up on Judith Butler's terminology, terrorists appear in cultural "drag" or perform a cultural "masquerade" (Butler, 1991, pg. 21). These two terms are significant because drag and masquerade suggest two contradictory meanings. On the one hand, drag and masquerade suggest that identity and subjectivity are a play of appearances. On the other hand, drag and masquerade suggest that beneath the play of appearances there exists an alternate identity and subjectivity that precedes appearances, a fixed subject or being that promises to emerge and disrupt and displace the hegemonic economy of the Dominant through violent disclosure (Butler, 1999, pg. 60). The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor, as someone who is in effect performing "drag" or participating in a cultural "masquerade," exists as a cultural and social double. The Islamist extremist/terrorist actor appears to possess characteristics of both the Dominant and the Other, and represents the public and the private, the external and the internal, the body and the mind, and appearance and reality—where these binaries converge, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor emerges.

In effect, the Islamist extremist/terrorist, as a cultural and social double self, performs both a public function and a private function. The public self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor can be characterized by the external and the visible space the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor occupies. In the public space, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor performs the authorized and sanctioned functions, sensibilities, attitudes, and behaviours of otherness. The Islamist extremist/terrorist, in effect, allows his body to become a site of inscription, on which the Dominant inscribes their cultural, political, and social hegemonic dictum/language. The body, in drag and performing a

cultural masquerade, reflects the cultural and sociological ideologies of the society the Islamist extremist/terrorist has infiltrated; therefore, the body serves as a signifier, signifying that the Islamist terrorist actor has tacitly assumed an authorized, Westernized or Americanized identity and subjectivity:

Words, acts, gestures, and [perceived ideological acceptance] produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity [and subjectivity] as a cause. Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense that the essence or identity [and subjectivity] they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through [active and self-reflexive cultural inscription]. (Butler, 1999, pg. 173)

The “public” self (social body) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor deceives the Dominant and conceals the subversive activities, violent tendencies, and destructive objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist group/individual actor. Consequently, the body (public self) of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor becomes a potent strategic and tactical weapon. However, beneath this fabricated and manufactured identity and subjectivity—cultural drag and cultural masquerade—is the private self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.

The “private” self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is what the public cannot physically observe: the mind, motivations, and objectives of the real Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. The private self is the disaffected, dispossessed, dislocated, decentered, disenchanting, resolute, and highly motivated Islamist extremist/terrorist. Unlike the public self, the private self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor does not possess an ideological orientation that is expressible in American/Western dominant culture: “the unthinkable is thus fully within culture, but fully excluded from dominant culture” (1999, pg. 99). The public self, performing cultural drag and masquerade,

assumes the ideology of the Dominant in order to gain further access into the cultural, social, and political fabric of their host nation and society—elevating acceptance as an authorized version of otherness. However, the ideology that is performed and practiced by the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor in the public space does not function as a tool of representation and expression for the private self.

The private self, like Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's subaltern, does not possess a voice or a language that can be heard. However, unlike Spivak's subaltern, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject consciously chooses not to speak in order to help maintain the Islamist extremist's/terrorist's cultural, political, and social façade. The private Islamist extremist/terrorist actor performs silence in order to provide a voice for the authorized public self. Silence is conducive to concealment and produces the illusion of conformity, supplication, and subordination. The public and private that constitute the double self of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject function in a reciprocal relationship: the private and individual ideological space informs the public and social ideological space, and the public and social ideological space informs the private and individual ideological space. In other words, the public and private identities and subjectivities help to construct the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.

Through performing cultural drag and masquerade and remaining effectively silent, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor can position himself in a liminal cultural Thirdspace where the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor can plan and eventually perform an act of terrorism: "power is not uniform. It takes on many forms and can be exercised in my different ways. One does not have to be extremely well-armed to be powerful: one simply needs to be an attentive and aware opportunist" (Silke, 2000, pg. 93).

The actual identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor emerges and is realized by performing a terrorist act—the invisible enemy becomes the visible enemy. Performing an act of terrorism becomes a poignant rhetorical device that translates into an ideology and a language of political and cultural dissent, resistance, subversion, and abjection. In effect, extremist/terrorist activity and the damage and destruction it causes becomes an extension of the identity and subjectivity of the terrorist and functions as a violent language, promulgating their political and cultural position to the individuals, groups, and government they are attacking.

Terrorism and terrorist activity can appear in a multitude of forms, places, and spaces. For example, terrorist activity can include kidnapping, expropriation (robbery), car bombs, hijacked planes, assassinations, or mass destruction. (My focus will be on the destruction of the World Trade Centres on September 11, 2001.) However, regardless of the type of extremist/terrorist activity, the objectives of extremism/terrorism are all generally related:

Terrorist acts or campaigns have two levels of objective. Tactically, the goal is publicity, and recognition of a problem or claim. For the terrorist with a cause to promote, the advertisers' apocryphal saying holds true: all publicity is good, and bad publicity is better than none. Terrorism without publicity is a weapon firing only blanks. At the strategic level, the goal is absolute change—freedom, independence or revolution.
(Segaller, 1986, pg. 11)

Furthermore, regardless of how perverted the political agenda of Islamist extremists/terrorists and related extremist/terrorist organizations, the objectives of terrorism are always politically motivated and challenge existing power structures: "terrorism is a system-wide challenge to power, in addition to being a specific and directed challenge to a particular governing structure or government" (Gold-Bliss, 1994,

pg. 39). Consequently, for the political objectives of the Islamist extremist/terrorist to be made public, it is necessary for Islamist extremists/terrorists, indeed any terrorists, to perpetrate an act of terrorism. Islamist extremists/terrorists eventually want to reveal themselves and be identified by the Dominant; subsequently, action and performance become an intrinsic and mandatory component of the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.

Terrorist acts and activity communicate the message of the individual Islamist terrorist or Islamist terrorist group. As mentioned previously, the action of a terrorist operates like a language and, like a language, the louder the voice the more attention someone commands. For the Islamist extremist/terrorist, the decibels of the voice and the strength of the message being communicated are measured through the level of violence and collateral damage caused by an act of terrorism. The more theatrical, sensational, and spectacular an act of terrorism is, the more attention they elicit, which increases the power and strength of the message of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject. Violence, for the Islamist extremist/terrorist, is the language and the medium of communication: "the violence of terrorism is positively verbose: always accompanied by threats, communiques and manifestos, and succeeded by historical argument and political reaction. First the violence, then the claim; first the blood, then the bluster. Violence is the megaphone for terrorists and their claims" (Segaller, 1986, pg. 1).

The terrorist subject/actor uses violence as a source of power and a measurement of conviction: "the most feared terrorists are arguably those who are the most successful in translating thought into action: ruthless and efficient, demonstrating that they are able to make good on their threats and back up their demands with violence" (Hoffman, 1998,

pg. 178). If a terrorist or terrorist group threatens violence but does not actually commit a terrorist act, can that individual or group actually be codified or categorized as terrorist? I suggest that a terrorist must perform an act of terrorism before that individual or group they represent can assume the actual identity and subjectivity of a terrorist or be codified as a terrorist. If terrorist threats remain idle, the threats only remain symbolic and, consequently, are impotent.¹⁸ However, where threats become active and violent, the threat and fear of terrorists becomes real and potent. Therefore, thoughts must always be "translated into action" and violence. Violence is the vehicle that turns symbolic power (thought) into real power (action). In effect, action and violence bring the extremist/terrorist subject into being. One is not born, but rather becomes a terrorist, and the process of becoming necessarily requires nascent, nefarious, and insidious actions and violence. For Islamist extremists/terrorists, Rene Descartes' statement, 'I think therefore I am,' becomes 'I destroy therefore I am.' Indeed violence and "action [are] the undeniable cynosure of all terrorists" (Hoffman, 1998, pg. 175).

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the consequent destruction of the World Trade Centres and the damage to the Pentagon, certainly represent the apotheosis of contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist activity and violence. These attacks represent the movement of symbolic power to real power and the substitution of dialogue for literal forms of violent communication:

the collision of the hijacked planes with the twin towers was an ugly metaphor of how violent confrontation has substituted for dialogue and meaningful communication. Public policy, at least in theory, is presumed to enable such communication. Yet, unless the United States [and the West] reexamines [their] foreign policies and goals, public policy will have been reduced to propaganda that marginalizes and dehumanizes "the other,"

¹⁸ Although threat of terrorism can frighten and terrorize a target population, if an actual attack is never perpetrated the terrorist group may not be taken seriously or be perceived as a toothless tiger.

consequently precluding meaningful dialogue and communication. (Andoni, 2002, pg. 85)

Don DeLillo, in his book *Mao II*, describes the dynamics of terrorism and the substitution of violence for passive discourse and dialogue in the following terms: “It’s confusing when [terrorists] kill the innocent. But this is precisely the language of being noticed, the only language the West understands. The way they, [the Islamist terrorists], determine how we see them” (DeLillo, 1991, pg. 157). For Islamist terrorists, violence as a mode of expression is the only meaningful form of dialogue and communication and is inextricably linked to their identity and subjectivity. John Michael reinforces this position in his article, “Beyond Us and Them: Identity and Terror from an Arab American’s Perspective.”

In his article, Michael argues that,

identity [and subjectivity] emerge not as an organic expression of preexisting traditions and timeless belief, but as a reactive formation to challenges and assaults perceived as external to the self and the group in question (Islamist terrorists). Identity and [subjectivity] are ineluctably linked expressions of an inherently intercultural and conflicted process, the mark of [one’s] often-unhappy engagement with rather than retreat from the world. For Maalouf, identity [and subjectivity] and violence questions appear so often conjoined because identity [and subjectivity] emerge as an expression [...] of conflict. (2003, pg. 76)

The events of September 11, 2001 poignantly symbolize not only the mode of violence as intrinsic to the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist actor, but violence as a precipitate of the contested power relations of the United States (the West) and the Islamist terrorists—violence embodies the message.

At the precise moment of the attacks, the "shock, anger, and sense of impotence" (Segaller, 1986, pg.2) that was experienced by the people in New York City, Washington D.C., and across the United States was the direct result of the violent political and

cultural discourse (language) of Al Qaeda and the individual Islamist extremist/terrorist actors acting on its behalf. Moreover, the moment of an attack is significant because it is in this precise moment where the Dominant/Other dichotomous binary is temporarily inverted or reversed. The Other, however temporarily, becomes the Dominant, which is evident in the destruction, the death, the blood, and the shocked citizens and government who are left effectively powerless. It is only after the government and citizens can direct their blame to an identified Other/enemy that the pre-existing power relations between the Dominant and the Other are restored. The violence of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject becomes an empowering performance that subverts the Dominant and allows the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to emerge brandishing his/her true identity and subjectivity. At this moment the private becomes the public, the internal becomes the external, the mind (thought) becomes the body (action), and the deceptive authorized Other transforms into the real Islamist extremist/terrorist subject/enemy.

Suicide Terrorism/Martyrdom Operations: The Expression of Absolution

The repertoire of terrorist tactics is extensive and varied: assassinations, the hijacking of airplanes, kidnappings and the taking of hostages, the use of car bombs and other mobile delivery devices, cyberterrorism, and suicide bombings/martyr operations. Although all terrorist activities and the tactics previously mentioned can prove to be devastating and can dramatically impact the political, social, cultural, and psychological stability of the targeted group, society, and nation, the “most politically destabilizing and psychologically devastating form of terrorism” (Atran, 2004, pg. 67) is the use of suicide bombings/martyrdom operations. Certainly the phenomenon of suicide bombings/martyrdom operations as a strategy and tactic of terror is not new in the

diachrony of terrorist operations; however, “there is something novel about the type of terrorism in which the terrorist’s death is a necessary and essential part of his/her act, not just an incidental cost” (Economist, 2004).¹⁹ Therefore, as I will argue, the definitive performance of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor and the absolute and ultimate measure and expression of their identity and subjectivity is revealed through what the United States and the West has rhetorically characterized as “suicide” terrorism.

In a modern context, to date suicide bombings have occurred in more than 20 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Chechnya, China, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Palestine, Panama, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, Uzbekistan, and the Yemen (<http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/s/Suicide-bombing/htm>). According to data compiled by Robert Pape, from 1980 to 2003 a total of 315 suicide attacks/martyrdom operations have occurred worldwide (Pape, 2005, pg. 3).²⁰ Furthermore, the contemporary use of suicide operations as a terrorist strategy and tactic has significantly increased:

At the same time that terrorist incidents of all types have declined by nearly half, from a peak of 666 in 1987 to 348 in 2001, suicide terrorism has grown, and the trend is continuing. Suicide terrorist attacks have risen from an average of three per year in the 1980s to about ten per year in the 1990s to more than forty each year in 2001 and 2002, and nearly fifty in 2003. These include continuing campaigns by Palestinian groups against Israel and by Al Qaeda and Taliban-related forces in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, as well as at least twenty attacks in Iraq against U.S. troops, the United Nations, and Iraqis collaborating with the American occupation.

¹⁹ For an historical account of the use of suicide terrorism/martyrdom operations refer to Bernard Lewis (1967). *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (2nd ed.). Great Britain: Weidenfeld & Nicolson., and Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. (2002). *Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

²⁰ According to data collected by Pape, approximately half of the suicide attacks that have occurred between 1980 and 2003 were associated with Islamic Fundamentalism. As is evident in Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Iraq, the use of suicide terrorism/martyrdom operations as a strategy and tactic is continuing and its frequency is increasing.

(Pape, 2005, pg. 6)

The increase in the use of suicide operations by various extremist/terrorist groups is attributable to the fact that extremists/terrorists have learned that it works (Pape, 2005, pg. 61).

According to Pape, “although many Americans have hoped that Al Qaeda has been badly weakened by U.S. counterterrorism efforts since September 11, 2001, the data show otherwise. In 2002 and 2003, Al Qaeda conducted fifteen suicide terrorist attacks, more than in all of the years before September 11 combined, killing 439 people” (2005, pg. 8). As Atran suggests, “the past three years saw more suicide attacks than the last quarter century” (2004, pg. 67). In fact, “from 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide attacks killed more than 5, 300 people in 17 countries and wounded many thousands in addition” (2004, pg. 68). Moreover, as Atran later asserts, 2003 witnessed more suicide attacks than any other year in contemporary history with a higher and higher percentage of suicide attacks being religiously motivated—since 2000 Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups were responsible for over 100 suicide attacks and are responsible for the majority of casualties (9/11) related to suicide terrorism (2004, pg. 68, 70).²¹

As the number of “religiously” motivated suicide bombings increases and its popularity as an effective terrorist strategy and tactic gains momentum, a central question

²¹ “Religiously” motivated terrorism does not simply denote that religion is the primary motivational force behind suicide campaigns. Religion, in this case Islamist extremism, provides an ideological framework within which the acts of “martyrdom” are justified and substantiated. However, as Pape suggests, “the targets that Al Qaeda has attacked, and the strategic logic articulated by Osama bin Laden to explain how suicide operations are expected to help achieve Al Qaeda’s goals, both suggest that Al Qaeda’s primary motive is to end foreign military occupation of the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim regions” (2005, pg. 51). As Paper later continues, “the taproot of Al Qaeda’s animosity to its enemies is what they do, not who they are” (2005, 2001). According to Pape, Al Qaeda suicide terrorists are twice as likely to come from Muslim countries with a strong Islamic fundamentalist population compared to Muslim countries with marginal Islamic fundamentalist populations. However, Al Qaeda suicide terrorists are ten times more likely to come from Muslim countries where there is a U.S. military presence, and 20 times more likely to come from Muslim countries with both a U.S military presence and a strong Islamic fundamentalist population (2005, pg. 103-104).

to understanding this phenomenon and ultimately the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor *ad extremis* is: what motivates Islamist individuals and/or Islamist groups to perform a suicide attack/martyrdom operation against a seemingly innocent population?

As a point of departure into the complex phenomenon of suicide terrorism, a brief analysis of the language deployed to describe this activity will permit entry into the Islamist frame and the ideological architecture that support this extremist ideology. The terms suicide terrorism, suicide bombing, and/or homicide bombing are Western political and sociological constructs used to denigrate, malign, demonize, and vilify the individual(s) and the group(s) responsible for perpetrating these acts of self-immolation. The term “suicide” connotes despair, anguish, hopelessness, maladjustment and social dysfunction, depression, and in the case of killing others before or while killing oneself, some form of psychopathology. However, as Atran states in his article “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism:”

suicide terrorists on the whole have no appreciable psychopathology and are often wholly committed to what they believe to be devout moral principles. A report on the *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism* used by the Central and Defense Intelligence Agencies (CIA and DIA) finds ‘no psychological attribute or personality distinctive of terrorism.’ Recruits are generally well adjusted in their families and liked by peers and often educated and economically better off than their surrounding population. (2004, pg. 73)

Raphael Israeli contributes to and reinforces this position by arguing that Islamist terrorists who kill themselves or who are prepared to die for their convictions are not motivated by what Western psychiatry defines as the “requisite steps of the regular and “normal” suicide type:

1. “A thought about killing oneself.

2. The presence of a plan—how to proceed, what the precise steps to be taken, their sequence and timing and so forth—all concocted in solitude and single-handedly.
3. The suicidal individual must have a certain energy level, that is, the capacity to carry out the plan” (2003, pg. 72).

In contrast, as Israeli argues, the determination and driving force of Islamist extremists/terrorists is to kill their perceived enemy. Moreover, “the plan relates to killing others and it is often prepared by the [terrorist’s] superiors, not independently on his/her own initiative” (2003, pg. 72). Lastly, the plan of the Islamist extremist/terrorist is not individualistic, but, rather, is part of a broader schema “for which they are trained and prepared, together with others who share their convictions, and are prepared for arduous and long-term studies and physical and mental training and preparations (2003, pg. 73). Another significant difference between an individual who commits suicide and the Islamist terrorist, who is prepared to die for convictions in the service of an entity greater than the individual, is the social acceptance of the act of self-immolation. Whereas in Western culture suicide is a source of embarrassment and sadness to family and friends, Islamists and others who subscribe to this extremist ideology perceive the terrorist’s selected for and who carry out the operations as models of adulation. They are worshipped and celebrated like heroes by their families, friends, and community, and are honoured for what is understood as a sacrifice (2003, pg. 73-74). (I do not wish to insinuate that Islamic people as a whole condone this type of activity. I refer only to those that support Islamist extremism/terrorism and extremist ideologies that advocate the use of suicide terrorism.)

The term “sacrifice” is significant in understanding the motivations for performing this particular terrorist act and the identity and subjectivity of the individuals

and groups were plan and execute this extreme form of physical and psychological violence. It is important to note that Islam strictly forbids suicide and is “therefore looked down upon, shunned and discouraged in Muslim tradition, and consequently provokes reactions of horror, disbelief, fear, outrage, dismay and anger, especially when it is performed *en masse*, like on 11 September, 2001” (2003, pg. 71). However, “martyrdom in the struggle for Allah is not [forbidden]; on the contrary, it is a religious duty” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 71). Therefore, in this context and under these circumstances, the term “suicide” is an inaccurate description of this form of violence. Rather, the terms martyr, self-martyrdom, or martyr operations (several terms in Arabic are used to describe this vanguard of violence: *itishhad*, *mustahhid*, and *shahid* (Ruthven, 2002, pg. xviii, xx, xxi)) more accurately capture the motivations and identity and subjectivity of the individuals and groups whom perform this specific terrorist act. Martyr operations or self-martyrdom, from the Islamist extremist/terrorist perspective, are considered sacrificial forms of violence that are sanctioned by the Qu’ran and are a necessary dimension in their struggle against their perceived enemies: “the defense of religious freedom is the foremost cause for which arms may—and indeed must—be taken up or else, as in the concluding phrase of 2:251 ‘corruption would surely overwhelm the earth’” (Ruthven, 2002, pg. 49). Ruthven goes on to cite a string of verses that substantiates and justifies the use of armed struggle and violence: “‘And when the sacred months are over, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait of them in every stratagem of war’” (2002, pg. 49)[.] Certainly, the folly of language is in its ability to be manipulated, perverted, exploited, and (mis)interpreted to suit and support an agenda that may be otherwise contrary to its original meaning and

context. However, regardless of the malleability of language, and given the fact that many people who perform acts of terrorism and martyr operations are well-educated, the ideological mechanisms, conditioning, and indoctrination that are utilized to prepare individuals for martyr operations are very important.

The success of a martyr operation is contingent on the level of commitment, strength of convictions, and depth of resolve of the individuals and/or small groups that perform this sacrificial form of violence. However, the individuals or small groups that carry out these operations represent the “last link in a chain” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 91). The Islamist candidates that are selected for and inaugurated into this extremist “culture of martyrdom” (Hage, 2003, pg. 72) are recruited from the Muslim diaspora, from countries comprised of a Muslim majority and countries with a Muslim minority (e.g. Muslims from England, “Muslims from France, Muslims from Germany, Bosnian Muslims, Chechnians, Filipino Moros, and others” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 81)). The Islamist candidates who are recruited for martyr operations are generally between the ages of sixteen and twenty-eight and are almost always male. Although groups in Palestine and Algeria have used females to perform martyr operations, groups like Al Qaeda only recruit males (Laqueur, 1999, pg. 142).

The Islamist recruits who are selected to perform the martyr operations “gather their forces, their passion, and deep commitment around charismatic leaders like Osama Bin Laden who usually have an impeccable record of simplicity, modesty and honesty, shun extravagance and waste, and provide their followers with a model of populist sincerity, paternal devotion and concern, and scholarly wisdom and knowledge” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 84). The leaders serve as role models for the recruits and inspire a deep level

of commitment that is necessary for these individuals to perform their carefully crafted martyrdom operations. Although the Islamist leaders and “people who guide the [self-martyrs] have their political agenda” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 91), the arguments proffered for performing this violent form of sacrifice are usually framed within a theological context—a potent vehicle for justifying and substantiating the necessity of this ultimate sacrificial operation.

The ideological indoctrination of the Islamist recruits selected for martyrdom operations usually begins by dividing individuals into “relatively small and closeted cells” (Atran, 2004, pg. 77)—a physically, psychologically, and emotionally tight and devoted fraternity or brotherhood. These individuals and groups/cells are revered, extolled, and aggrandized as a corps d’elite: morally and spiritually superior to others and, therefore, “deserving of the ultimate form of training in preparation for their supreme act of devotion” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 83). Upon being inaugurated into the group/cell, the individual experiences a figurative death:

the individual succumbs to the organization and there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity [and subjectivity], and individual decision-making. As a result, the individual fuses with the terrorist organization, bonded by common goals and beliefs, and in doing so gains a sense of power and belonging from the group while losing a sense of personal responsibility for the actions of the group of which he is a member. (Speckhard et al, 2004, pg. 322)

Moreover, according to Islamist terrorists who have been interviewed²², “[...] a sense of collective consumes individuality and members [appear] unable to distinguish between personal goals and that of the group” (2004, pg. 322). The Islamist martyrdom groups/cells, in effect, undergo a transformation and function and operate as an organic

²² Speckhard et al cites findings made by Post et al regarding 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists who were interviewed in an effort to establish an understanding of their psychology and decision-making in general. (I cite Post et al in Chapter 3 of my thesis).

unit, collectively supporting and nurturing one another as they move toward their ultimate objective.

As Raphael Israeli details in his text *Islamikaze*²³—a term Israeli uses to codify the individuals who engage in martyrdom operations because of their close correlations with the Japanese Kamikaze pilots of World War II—there are three elements that are utilized to incrementally construct the ideological commitment of the individuals and groups selected to perform martyrdom operations: “identifying the enemy; strengthening the value of *jihad*²⁴ in particular and doctrinal conviction in general against the identified enemy; and then instigating the [self-martyr] to show personal valour and self-sacrifice for the attainment of the prescribed goal” (Israeli, 2004, pg. 89). By using these “elements” or ideological mechanisms, not only are the self-martyrs’ depth of conviction, commitment, and resolve enhanced and permanently ingrained into their identity and subjectivity, these mechanisms “emasculate the fear of death” (2004, pg. 85) that the self-martyrs may experience during the performance and execution of their particular operation. The success of the indoctrination methods is evinced through the myriad martyrdom operations that have been successfully perpetrated against a multitude of targets around the world, most notably the attacks of September 11, 2001: “the indoctrination survived years of exposure to the temptations of Western civilization” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 94). This seemingly impervious ideological commitment and devotion illustrate the strength of the convictions and resolve of the Islamist

²³ Another term that could be used to describe individuals who participate in suicide operations/martyrdom operations is *zealot*, which, according to Ask Oxford.com, refers to “a fanatical or uncompromising follower of a religion or a policy” (www.askoxford.com).

²⁴ **Jihad** is defined by Malise Ruthven, in his text *Fury for God*, as: struggle – a term used for holy war; the “greater jihad is sometimes used to refer to the struggle against one’s own evil tendencies, while the “lesser jihad” is the physical struggle against one’s enemies or the enemies of Islam. Jihad promises access to paradise.

extremists/terrorists selected to perform this ultimate form of sacrificial violence—self sacrifice is the absolute and definitive expression of the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject.

According to Laqueur, martyrdom operations have been an effective strategy and tactic because of the level of physical damage and destruction martyr operations cause, the long-term psychological impact of this type of terror on the direct and indirect victims, the relative ease of planning these operations because of the level of commitment of the martyr and the difficulty in stopping them (2004, pg. 91). Correspondingly, according to Pape, one of the most striking aspects of recent suicide terrorist campaigns “is that they are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political cause about half the time” (Pape, 2005, pg. 64).²⁵ Pape continues, “of the thirteen suicide terrorist campaigns that were completed during 1980-2003, seven correlate with significant policy changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals” (2005, pg. 63). As Pape later asserts, “even a 50 percent success rate is remarkable: international military and economic coercion generally works less than a third of the time, and is especially rare for groups with few other options” (2005, pg. 65). Moreover, “contemporary suicide terrorism [—martyr operations—] are conducted with the desire of appearing in the lens of the worldwide media with the promise of an immediate social impact” (Speckhard et al, 2004, pg. 316)—the performance of martyrdom is a violently devastating message that

²⁵ Of the thirteen suicide campaigns that were completed between 1980-2003, seven are attributed to significant policy changes by the target state toward the demands of the terrorists’ major political goals. Hezbollah achieved total U.S/French withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983; in three cases, the terrorists’ territorial objectives were partially achieved (Hezbollah and Israel, 1983-1984; Hamas and Israel, 1994, and Hams and Israel, 1994-1995); in one case, the target government entered into sovereignty negotiations with the terrorists (LTTE and Sri Lanka, 1993-1994 and 2001); and in one case, the terrorist organizations top leader was released from prison (Hamas and Israel, 1997) (Pape, 2005, pg. 64-65). With respect to the current Al Qaeda campaign, which is being waged against the United States and its allies, the outcome is still to be determined (Pape, 2005, pg. 40).

can induce a perpetual state of panic and fear because anyone, in any place, at any time can become a victim of an invisible army and phantom menace. Within the spatiality of the culture of martyrdom emerges “asymmetric warfare par excellence” (Laqueur, 2004, pg. 96): it has no limits or boundaries.

I have attempted to demonstrate how one might interpret the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist extremist/terrorist subject who no longer is situated in a cultural space that is over 'there' e.g. the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, Southeast Asia, but occupies a liminal cultural Thirdspace that is 'here' (the United States). I have suggested that the Islamist terrorist Other occupies a liminal cultural Thirdspace that is positioned within and without the Dominant/Other dichotomous binary, resulting in a hybridized identity and subjectivity that enables the construction of a double self, indeed a third self. By occupying this liminal cultural Thirdspace, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject uses mimicry as a mechanism for temporarily assuming the identity and subjectivity of an authorized version of otherness. By exhibiting the qualities and traits of the Dominant, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject tactically deceives and strategically conceals himself from the watchful gaze of the Dominant. While concealed and camouflaged, the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor reverses the gaze and observes the Dominant.

In effect, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subjects exists on the borders and in the margins of society; however, through occupying this marginal position, the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject can more easily penetrate and infiltrate the political, cultural, social, and economic system that they seek to subvert and ultimately attack and destroy.

Using the Butlerian concept of performance, I attempted to convey the idea that the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject is a performance and that the real identity and subjectivity of an Islamist terrorist only emerges in the instant of a violent terrorist act. Furthermore, I suggested that the violence of the Islamist terrorist act operates as the voice and language of individual Islamist terrorist and that of the Islamist terrorist group. In order to remain a clandestine, unrecognized Islamist terrorist Other, the terrorist subject must remain effectually silent. However, the silence of the Islamist terrorist is not imposed by the Dominant but is willfully accepted. For the terrorist, silence functions as a weapon and tool of empowerment. Through violence, the silence of the Islamist terrorist actor is broken, and the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist Other emerges in his/her true form—a visible enemy.

Lastly, I argued that the ultimate and absolute expression of the identity and subjectivity of an Islamist terrorist actor is illustrated and realized through the sacrificial violence of martyrdom operations. This mode of self-sacrifice reflects and reveals the depth of resolve and strength of the convictions of the Islamist terrorist subject, and is an indication of an ideological indoctrination process that inspires a level of commitment beyond the physical and psychological manacles imposed by the self. The absolute identity and subjectivity of the Islamist terrorist subject reaches its apotheosis in the act of self-immolation, a concept not readily and easily understood by ideological apparatuses that constitute the West in general and the United States in particular.

Terrorists are redefining the terrain and contours of the battlefield. No longer are Islamist extremists/terrorists readily identifiable or codifiable subjects. Islamist extremists/terrorists are using the openness of pluralistic and democratic societies against

itself. Consequently, we cannot engage the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject with preconceived notions of culture and their identity and subjectivity. New theories and modes of analysis must be developed that operate as interpretive mechanisms for, at least, understanding the hybrid identities and subjectivities of these transnational actors as they exist in Western culture and society.

In the next movement, I examine the significance of the landscapes of terror(ism) that have emerged as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the response of the United States and the West.

3rd Movement: Landscapes of Terror(ism) and the Contours of the Symbolic

Sometimes a landscape seems to be less a setting for the life of its inhabitants than a curtain behind which their struggles, achievements, and accidents take place. For those who, with the inhabitants, are behind the curtains, landmarks are no longer geographic but also biographical and personal. (Berger, 1976, pg. 13)

A terrorist attack is not only calculated to have an immediate devastating and destructive impact on the selected target and its audience, but it is designed to generate a long-term disruption in the political, economic, social, and cultural systems of governance that are characteristic of the target country, region, or city/urban environment. In some cases, depending on the severity of a terrorist attack and the extent of the collateral damage, a terrorist attack may permanently alter the physical and psychological landscape of a nation, region, and/or city/urban environment.

Landscapes, both as a geographical and spatial entity, are not just inert, static, passive, neutral containers of human praxis and physically and materially posit(ion)ed objects, but are dynamic and active places and spaces that influence as much as embody political, cultural, social, and economic activities, behaviour, and relations (Williams, 2003, pg. 276): “[l]andscape does not simply mirror or distort “underlying” social relations, but needs to be understood as enmeshed within the processes which shape how the world is organized, experienced and understood, rather than read as its end product” (Robertson & Richards, 2003, pg. 8). That is, landscapes influence and produce various social relations and activities as much as they are constructed and produced by social relations and activities. In effect, landscape—both the material (physical) and the psychological (symbolic)—and its inherent geography and spatiality, constitute an intrinsic dimension of what and who we are as individual actors and as a society.

Don Mitchell conceptualises landscape as something that “works” in the service of individuals and human groups not only with respect to social relations but individual and group identity and subjectivity construction, formation, articulation, and maintenance (Brace, 2003, pg. 121). This conceptualisation of landscape is supported by W.J.T Mitchell who argues that one can only “understand the relationships between landscape and identity if we change the word landscape from a noun to a verb—an ‘object’ word to a ‘doing’ word. This makes us ask not just what landscape *is* or *means* but what it *does*. It stops us from seeing landscape as an object or text, and makes us see it as a ‘process by which social and subjective identities are formed” (Brace, 2003, pg. 123).

The material and symbolic codes “enmeshed” and “embedded” in a landscape communicate myriad political, cultural, economic, and social values, principles, and sensibilities—the ideologies—that frame and formulate the identity of a particular place, region, or nation, and the individual actors and social groupings of actors who inhabit a specific space—international, national, regional, or local. Given the diverse range of processes, activities, and relationships that the landscape embodies, one can conceptualize the landscape as a multi-layered system of signification that is subject to a multiplicity of interpretations, which are contingent upon the perspectives of the interpreter (Robertson & Richards, 2003, pg. 12). For example, depending upon an individual or group’s gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, class, religion, and political ideology, cultural customs, geographical location, and the political and cultural milieu in which they operate, their interpretation and understanding of the physical and symbolic landscape, and its inherent processes, will vary. Moreover, their interpretation and understanding of the landscape will also, in part, inform how these individual actors

and/or groupings of actors understand, imagine, and define themselves and invariably how others understand, imagine, and define them. Therefore, in effect, “multiple identity positions are performed in and through landscape” (Till, 2004, pg. 349), whether at the international, national, regional, or local scale.

The multiple identity positions that are performed in and through landscape reveal not only the multi-dimensional elements of landscape and its attendant processes, but the “polyvocal” and “polyvisual” interpretations of landscape and the complex array of identities, subjectivities, and positionalities produced and articulated through landscape (Robertson & Richards, 2004, pg. 6). For instance, the “security barrier” currently being constructed to separate Israel from the Palestinian Territory could be interpreted by Israelis as a symbol of safety, security, and defense against the perceived campaign of terror of Hamas and the Palestinians. On the other hand, the Palestinians may interpret the security barrier to represent the perceived political, economic, cultural, and sociological oppression and geopolitical expansionism of Israel. The result of multiple identity positions and the subsequent situated polyvocal and polyvisual interpretations of landscape is that landscape, under certain conditions and depending on the actors involved, becomes an active medium/site through which various identity positions are contested and where conflict, resistance, and subversion are performed and communicated.

As Till (2004) suggests, individual actors and groups “may construct symbolic or material landscapes, or use the landscape in ways, to alter or question existing social, political, [and cultural] relationships” (pg. 349), or claim and challenge political and cultural authority (pg. 357). The tragic and devastating Islamist terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001 and the subsequent Post-9/11 epoch are striking examples of how extremist/terrorist groups use landscape and its attendant spatiality to physically and symbolically challenge and subvert contemporary political, cultural, and socio-economic processes, activities, relationships, and ideological authority. The permanent alteration of the physical and psychological landscape that resulted from the attacks exemplifies the “work” that landscape “does” in constructing, formulating, articulating, maintaining, and extending the identity and subjectivity of Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency.

By examining the symbolic significance of landscape/cityscape, the militarization, citadelification, and the authoritarian tendencies that have emerged in the physical and psychological landscape of the United States, and the politicization of places and spaces that has occurred as a result of the production of landscapes like Camp X-Ray, Guantanamo, Cuba, I argue that landscape produces, extends, and articulates the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremism/terrorism.

The Cityscape/ Urban Landscape and the Emergence of Terror

As Williams (2003) asserts, “terrorism grimly highlights the spatiality of politics and political values. Chiefly, terrorism affects the spaces in which we live our lives, the places that ground our meaningful experiences and the scales by which we organize our world(s)”(pg. 281). Examples of this include the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, the Oklahoma City bombing, the train bombings in Madrid, the recent attacks in London, England and Sharm el-Sheikh and Naama Bay, Egypt. Although acts of terrorism could conceivably occur anywhere in any space, contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism predominantly occurs in and by means of, as the above mentioned

examples indicate, the cityscape/urban landscape. One probable explanation for this is that the cityscape/urban landscape “offer rich targets that are highly accessible to terrorists” (Swanstrom, 2002, pg.137). However, in addition to providing a multitude of rich targets of opportunity such as transportation nodes and densely populated public spaces e.g. restaurants, businesses, hotels, water treatment facilities, power-generating facilities, the cityscape/urban landscape also provide myriad targets that possess politically, economically, militarily, and culturally important symbolic capital (Williams, 2003, pg. 282). Indeed, the targeting of the cityscape/urban space is strategically important as it virtually guarantees the disruption of people’s lives and attendant spatial practices and activities and the material and symbolic communication and articulation of their political and cultural positionality and values.

Cityscapes/urban spaces are magnificent structures that encompass a complex, interwoven system of political, economic, social, environmental, and cultural processes. In effect, the cityscape/urban landscape (re)produces and reflects, represents, and symbolises the values, principles, sentimentality, institutions—indeed the dominant ideology—of the inhabitants that live and work in the city, and the region and nation in which a cityscape/urban landscape is situated and constructed. Therefore, as one surveys a particular cityscape/urban landscape, one is inundated with a multitude of objects and symbols, comprised of numerous places, spaces, buildings, monuments, human praxis, etc., that communicate a dominant ideology. As Black (2003) states, “[...] landscapes can transform ideologies into concrete visible form” (pg. 23). Therefore, as Black continues, “landscapes can serve to naturalise asymmetrical power relations and cultural codes, thus serving to stabilize various hegemonic practices” (pg. 23). As Duncan

suggests in *The city as text: the politics of landscape interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom*, "landscapes are communicative devices that encode and transmit information" (1990, pg. 2). However, the nature and significance of the information that is communicated through a landscape is contingent upon the symbols in which the information is encoded and how those symbolic codes are interpreted. Furthermore, within the context of the cityscape/urban landscape, and depending upon the political and cultural context, certain buildings (objects), places, and spaces can be more "significant" than others, whether that be because of their physical or symbolic (my focus) attributes or the types of activities and processes that occur in and through a particular space.

In order to reach an understanding of how landscape functions as a symbolic system, I will now turn to the symbolic method employed by Cosgrove and Daniels. Cosgrove and Daniels use an iconographic mode of analysis to read, decode, and interpret "landscape." In its broadest terms, the concept of iconography is defined as "the theoretical and historical study of symbolic imagery" (Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988, pg. 1). Furthermore, according to Cosgrove and Daniels, "the iconographic approach seeks to conceptualize pictures (landscapes) as encoded texts to be deciphered by those cognisant of the culture as a whole in which they were produced" (1988, pg. 2). Therefore, in order to interpret a landscape (my focus is on the Post 9/11 US landscape) one must understand the underlying processes out of which the landscape was produced and constructed.

According to Cosgrove and Daniels, "landscapes are cultural images, a pictorial way of representing, structuring, or symbolising surroundings" (1988, pg. 1). Moreover, the idea of landscape can be conceived in the following terms, which I quote at length:

While landscape obviously refers to the surface of the earth, or a part thereof, and thus to the chosen field of geographical enquiry, it incorporates far more

than merely the visual and functional arrangement of natural and human phenomena which the discipline can identify, classify, map and analyse. Landscape shares but extends the meaning of 'area' or 'region' [(to this I would add 'nation')], both concepts which have been claimed as its geographical equivalents. As a term widely employed in painting and imaginative literature as well as in environmental design and planning, landscape carries multiple layers of meaning. Commenting on the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins's neologism, *inscape*, W.A.M Peters has commented that the suffix 'scape' "posits the presence of a unifying principle which enables us to consider part of the countryside or sea [or city] as a unit and as an individual, but so that this part is perceived to carry the typical properties (ideologies) of the actually undivided whole.

That unifying principle derives from the active engagement of a human subject with the material object. In other words landscape denotes the external world mediated through subjective human experience in a way that region nor area immediately suggest. Landscape is not merely the world we see, it is a construction, a composition of that world. Landscape is a way of seeing the world. (Cosgrove, 1984, pg. 13)

However, "landscapes are constructed linguistically as much as they are visually" (Duncan, 1990, pg. 13). Some landscapes are constructed via the language (governing ideology) of the Dominant. Although the visual landscape is comprised of physical objects, places, and spaces, these same objects symbolise a particular set of ideologies—political, cultural, social, and economic. In effect, landscape is (re)produced by and (re)produces the hegemonic dictum of the Dominant.

Hegemony serves as an orienting trajectory, a "political and social code" (Burke, 1954, pg. 23), that conditions and influences individuals and society as a collective whole to interpret and understand landscape from a particular perspective: "he was conditioned not only as regards what he should and should not do, but also as regards the reasons for his acts. When introspecting to find the explanation for his attitudes, he would naturally employ the verbalisations of his group--for what are his language and thought if not a socialized product" (1954, pg. 20). Hegemony is necessarily a socialized product: by

socialized I mean to suggest that it is not "natural" and must be maintained in order for it to continue to exert power and authority over the masses: "hegemony is not universal and "given" to the continuing rule of a particular class [or society]. It has to be won, reproduced, sustained" (Davis & Schleifer, 1998, pg. 661).

The cityscape/urban landscape serve as a powerful medium of expression for the (re)production and reinforcement of hegemony. Specific spaces and material constructs serve as visual symbols of cultural, political, economic, and social hegemony e.g. the White House, the Security Wall separating Israel and Palestine, the Eiffel Tower, the Sears Tower, the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, the Pentagon, the Hague and the ICC, the Statue of Liberty, embassies and consulates, museums (Louvre), and other related buildings and objects that symbolise and represent embedded institutions, systems, ideologies, values, etc. Hegemony assumes its maximum force when it is embedded in physical forms because it provides a tangible object through which the subject can interact with and experience specific dominant ideologies.

As particular physical features (objects) of the cityscape/urban landscape assume greater symbolic importance, the greater the potential that it will become an extremist/terrorist target. The same symbols that (re)produce and reinforce the hegemonic dictum of the Dominant domestically also transmit and communicate this information internationally through foreign policy, including diplomacy, development, trade, and military operations. The consequence of this is that (Islamist) extremist/terrorist actors/groups identify and interpret particular spaces—including nations and various objects and structures—as the physical manifestation of the ideologies they oppose and contest. For terrorists these spaces present the

means/medium through which they can attack and subvert the hegemonic constructs of their enemy. Therefore, if (Islamist) extremists/terrorists target and attack specific physical spaces within the cityscape/urban landscape, they are effectively rendering an assault on the very ideologies that underpin, support, and (re)produce them. In a North American context, the apotheosis of this type of assault was realized through the devastating attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

Developing an understanding of the symbolic cityscape/urban landscape can provide an illuminating and incisive perspective on the motivations for (Islamist) extremist/terrorist target selection, and can help one to understand why particular places and spaces resonate with or become landscapes of terror(ism). In my opinion, it is undeniable that historical and contemporary (Islamist) extremist/terrorist attacks and activity have been informed by a geographical and spatialized mind. This assertion is demonstrated through the litany of Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks that have taken place in various locations around the world in the last two decades: the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing in New York; the 1995 bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan; the destruction of the World Trade Centres and attack on the Pentagon in 2001; the Bali night club bombings in 2002; the attack of the housing compound in Riyadh in 2003; the bombing of the English Embassy in Turkey in 2003; the train explosions in Madrid in 2004; the continued Al Qaeda-led extremist/terrorist insurgency in Iraq; the recent attacks on the transportation systems in London, England in July, 2005; and the July, 2005 attacks on the Red Sea resorts in Egypt. In all of these cases, the places and spaces that were targeted were carefully selected not only because of their geographical location but because of their symbolic significance. In the article "The role of Ideology

in Terrorists' Target Selection," Drake states: "in practice [...] attacks by non-state terrorist groups are rarely indiscriminate. Target selection is instead determined by a number of factors, and the terrorists' ideology is central to this process, not only because it provides the initial dynamic for terrorists' actions, but because it sets out the moral framework with which they operate" (1998, pg. 53). Therefore, in order to understand the motivations behind terrorist target selection and the significance of the symbolic coding contained within the cityscape/urban landscape, it is important to understand their ideological framework and the other factors that contribute to their decision-making processes.

The ideology of Islamist extremist/terrorist actors is deeply rooted within theology, irrespective of how perverted and comprised the interpretation of the religious doctrine. For these extremist/terrorist groups, extremist/terrorist acts are "committed not just for a strategic political objective but as part of a religious mission. In many cases, the perpetrators see themselves as soldiers in a spiritual army, engaged in a great cosmic war. These religious warriors hope that their victory will usher in a new epoch and a new religious kingdom" (Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 16). Religion serves as a valuable ideological vehicle because it not only motivates, legitimises, and substantiates the existence the extremist/terrorist actor/group, it supplies the "glue that makes that [terrorist's] community [and network] of support cohere (brackets are my inclusions)" (1997, pg. 17). In a terrorist's vision of a world gone mad, "what most of us regard as ordinary politics, [economics, and culture], is viewed as the enemy of religion" (1997, pg. 18). And as the enemy of religion, or, put more accurately, "the satanic enemy of Islam" (1997, pg. 18), any act of violence carried out to defend that religion is believed to be

justified and "mandated by God" (1997, pg. 18). The importance of religion in providing the ideological framework within which Islamist extremist/terrorist groups operate cannot be given enough emphasis as, to reiterate what has been stated previously, it plays a central role in Islamist extremism/terrorism as a whole, and in particular the motivations for target selection. However, some of the other factors that contribute to Islamist extremism/terrorism are worth mentioning, if only to convey the complexity of the motivational forces of extremist/terrorist activity.

In the article entitled "Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak, and Laurita Denny attempt to reveal the motivational forces behind individuals joining a terrorist organization and actively engaging in terrorism. I will briefly outline some of the findings. According to the terrorists interviewed "the major influence was the social environment of the youth. As one terrorist remarked, "Everyone was joining." Individuals from strictly religious Islamic backgrounds were more likely to join Islamist groups, while those who did not have a religious background might join either a secular or a religious group. The peer group was of much greater influence, and in many cases, it was a friend or acquaintance in the group who recruited the subject" (2003, pg. 173). The authors later indicate that the Islamist group members social environment was "dominated by the mosque, religious organizations, and religious instruction" (2003, pg. 173). Again, this indicates the importance of the role of religious indoctrination in Islamist extremism/terrorism. Another important factor was the role of the family: "clearly families that are politically active socialized their sons to the movement at an early age and were supportive of their involvement" (2003, pg. 172). As well, the

findings of the authors suggest that many of the extremists/terrorists initially became involved in extremist/terrorist organizations because of the sense of community and belonging. For those who felt disenfranchised, disaffected, dispossessed, dislocated, and disenchanting, the terrorist organization provided an environment of purpose, collectivism, vision, and meaning (2003, pg. 175-176).

Ideology is vital to target selection (Drake, 1998, pg. 54). An “[...] important effect of ideology is that it transforms people or objects into representative symbols” (1998, pg. 59). When one surveys the landscape of contemporary Islamist extremist/terrorist acts, one feature/factor appears to recur: “in virtually every recent example of terrorism, the general space or place and/or the actual physical structure that has been targeted has had a symbolic significance” (Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 19). And it is to this symbolic significance that I will now direct my attention.

As I have mentioned previously, the symbolic significance of a landscape—cityscape/urban landscape—and its inherent processes are subject to polyvocal and polyvisual interpretations. Obviously, the ideology that informs and motivates the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject will have a significant impact on the way Islamist extremist/terrorist actors conceptualize, comprehend, and interpret a landscape—cityscape/urban landscape—and the symbolic codes and representative symbols that function in and through a particular landscape. An example of the effect of Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology transforming the landscape into representative symbols and an encoded system that communicates an ideology contrary to their political, cultural, economic, and social values and beliefs is manifested in the Islamist (Occidental) conception of the North American/Western cityscape/urban landscape.

The Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology is about an idea: an idea, almost a vision, about the West/Occident in general and the United States in particular (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 9). The Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology and the ideas it propagates and promulgates envision, indeed imagine, the West/Occident and the United States as “a mass of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, and unfeeling parasites” (2004, pg. 10) that have attempted to replace the world of God (Allah) with an impure world of Man (2004, pg. 18). Nowhere are these characteristics more prevalent than in the Western/North American cityscape/urban landscape.

According to Buruma and Margalit (2004), the Western/North American cityscape/urban landscape symbolizes hubris, greed, godlessness and spiritual pollution, rootless cosmopolitanism, selfish individualism, corruption, depravity, secularism, empire building, and global capitalism (pg. 16, 21, 39). These conceptions and ideas of the Western/North American cityscape/urban landscape are echoed in the observations and impressions of Sayyid Qutb, the very influential Islamist intellectual and architect of contemporary Islamist extremism/terrorism whom I describe in Chapter 1, who visited New York City and various mid-Western rural communities e.g. Greeley, Colorado, in the late 1940s. As Buruma and Margalit state:

When Sayyid Qutb arrived in New York from his native Egypt in 1948, he felt miserable in the city, which appeared to him as a “huge workshop,” “noisy” and “clamouring.” He longed for a conversation that was not about “money, movie stars or car models.” In his letters home, Qutb was particularly distressed by the “seductive atmosphere,” the shocking sensuality of daily life, and the immodest behaviour of American women. (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 31-32)

Similarly, when Qutb attended a church dance in rural Colorado, the dance struck him as “wickedly lascivious” (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 32). Consequently, Qutb’s

experiences in the United States solidified his prejudices against the West and reinforced his ideal of a spiritual community and society that was devoid of the temptations and sordid improprieties reflected in the landscape and its attendant human praxis. This fantasy of a pure spiritual community contained the “seeds of violence and destruction” (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 32) that Qutb would later espouse as strategies and tactics necessary to provoke change. A dramatic illustration of the rejection of the West and an attempt to (re)produce a cityscape/landscape of religious/spiritual purity is Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban:

The aim of the Taliban’s assault on Kabul was to turn it into a City of God. All signs of Westernization, such as “British and American hairstyles,” had to be erased. Women were banned from work and hidden from public view. The religious police decreed that “women going outside with fashionable, ornamental, tight, and charming clothes to show themselves ... will be cursed by Islamic *Sharia* and should never expect to go to heaven. Music was banned, and so were television, kite flying, chess, and soccer. Adultery would be punished by stoning, and drinking alcohol by whipping. The only law was *Sharia*, or religious law. (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pg. 44-45)

Furthermore, a symbolic act of purification “was the torture of former leftist president Najibullah. The Taliban cut off his testicles and dragged his battered body behind a jeep. Then they shot him and hanged his corpse from a street lamp. As a sign of his citified debauchery and corruption, the ex-president’s pockets were stuffed with money, and cigarettes were pressed between his broken fingers” (2004, pg. 44). Correspondingly, the religious impulses and political and cultural sensibilities of Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atta (one of the Islamist extremists/terrorists who violently “sacrificed” his life during the September 11, 2001 attacks) curdled into a violent and destructive force that compelled Osama bin Laden, by proxy, and the 19 individuals to both physically and

symbolically attack New York, America, the idea of America, and the West it represents (2004, pg.14).

The ideology that informs the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor has transformed the Western/American cityscape/urban landscape into symbols that represent everything they purportedly detest, oppose, resist, and revile. The landscape, or in this case the cityscape/urban landscape, serves an ontological and epistemological function, enabling the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject to define who they are by physically and symbolically representing and (re)producing what they believe they are not and what they resist. In effect, the interpretation of landscape is a reflection of the mind and the mind is a reflection of the landscape. Therefore, extremist/terrorist actors physically and symbolically utilize landscapes and particular spaces and places to violently represent, express, and communicate their ideology and construct, project, and extend their identity and subjectivity. Moreover, the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology and the imaginings it produces e.g. how they conceptualize and understand the West, the United States, and cities that populate the Western and American landscape, will undoubtedly inform and influence the targets they select and the symbolic value they attribute to particular spaces and spatial activities and behaviours.

I believe that the immediate and enduring level of impact on the targeted society is proportional to the symbolic significance or symbolic capital of the target selected: "in showing the vulnerability of a nation's most stable and powerful entities, movements that undertake these acts of sabotage touch virtually everyone in a nation's society" (Juergensmeyer, 1997, pg. 19). For instance, the attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, the commuter trains in Madrid, and the transportation nodes in

London, England will have undoubtedly caused people in the United States, Spain, and London, England, and all people around the world who feel that their country in general and/or particular cityscape/urban landscape is susceptible or vulnerable to attack, to question the stability and safety of the places and spaces of their spatial activities and behaviours. The resulting consequence is that Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks and the physical and psychological scars they have leave on cityscape/urban landscape have created a symbolic landscape of terror(ism) engendered by fear and paranoia.

When powerful political, cultural, economic, and social symbols and icons—physical and symbolic constructs of hegemony—are targeted and damaged or destroyed, "the power and legitimacy of society itself" (1997, pg. 20) are challenged. One of the most compelling and profound examples of a powerful symbol being destroyed and the political and cultural hegemony of a nation subverted and its legitimacy challenged is the events of September 11, 2001. The symbolic duality of the cityscape/urban landscape at the World Trade Centre site serves as a valuable case study with regards to understanding the targeting of symbols within the cityscape/urban landscape and the processes that contribute to the (re)production of symbols and encoded systems that help a nation imagine and define itself.

The destruction of the World Trade Centre and the future construction of the "Freedom Tower" and the "Reflecting Absence" memorial on the same site, in a sense, represent a symbolic duality or a double narrative: "the narrative, advanced not only by the terrorists and their sympathizers but also by many on the left in the USA and around the globe, that blames the US cultural imperialism and economic [and political] hegemony for the 'chickens coming home to roost'; versus the patriotic, right-wing

version that casts the US democracy and freedom as the innocent target of Islamic madness” (Petchesky, 2002, pg. 40). Furthermore, this symbolic duality and double narrative demonstrate the "vulnerability of American cities to terrorists, but the attack and aftermath also illustrate the strength and resilience of our (US) cities [and nation]" (Briffault, 2002, pg. 564). I will first analyse the symbolic significance of the attack on the World Trade Centre and will then proceed to provide an analysis of the symbolic significance of the yet to be constructed "Freedom Tower" and "Reflecting Absence" memorial.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 “devastated one of the nation's most visible urban symbols” (Barron & Frug, 2002, pg. 583). The World Trade Centre (WTC), geographically located in the financial district in one of the largest and most cosmopolitan cities in the world, not only symbolized and represented the economic and financial hegemony and economic system of governance of the United States—capitalism, globalization, and the free-market system—but symbolized “a whole Western value-system and a world order” (Baudrillard, 2002, pg. 41), whether real or imagined. In addition to the unprecedented and devastating physical and economic toll the Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks had on New York: "2, 823 people killed; 1, 721 unidentified victims; 1.8 million tons of debris; 3.1 million hours of labour spent on cleanup; a countless number of American souls rattled to the core" (Verchick, 2002, 557); and “a total economic loss to New York being estimated at \$83 billion” (Briffault, 2002, pg. 563), the symbolic destruction may be much greater: “certainly the terrorists’ attack on the battlefield of reality was devastating on its own, but their attack on the symbolic

battlefield was far more devastating in terms of achieving their global aspirations”

(Butterfield, 2002, pg. 15). As Baudrillard states,

the towers, for their part, have disappeared. But they have left us the symbol of their disappearance, their disappearance as symbol. They, which were the symbol of omnipotence, have become, by their absence, the symbol of the possible disappearance of that omnipotence—which is perhaps an even more potent symbol. Whatever becomes of that global omnipotence (hegemony), it will have been destroyed here for a moment. (2002, pg. 51-52)

The absence of the World Trade Centre in the New York cityscape/urban landscape and skyline will continually serve as a reminder of the victims of September 11, 2001.

Furthermore, the absence of the WTC will perpetually and irrevocably symbolize the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks, the fact that terrorists can strike anywhere at any time, violence and tragedy, the illusory nature of safety and security, and resistance, contempt, conflict, and the counter-hegemonic presence of terror. In other words, the former WTC site will permanently symbolize, communicate, and resonate with a landscape of terror(ism) and the threat to safety and security terrorism embodies.

The absence of the World Trade Centre and the symbolic import of this absence have caused the cityscape/urban landscape to signify "a place of danger and ambient fear" (Barron & Frug, 2002, pg. 587). Consequently, the ramifications of the destruction of this towering symbol have resulted in the temporary and permanent alternation of both the physical and psychological cityscape/urban landscape and its attendant spatial practices and behaviour. For example, a recent debate has been ignited about the danger and fear engendered by density and the highly concentrated spatiality of the cityscape/urban landscape and the perceived relative safety and security of the deconcentrated and decentralized peripheral spaces of these landscapes. As Barron and Frug (2002) suggest, this conception and argument is informed by, or drawing strength from, “a long-standing,

ideological structure that presents the urban center as a place of danger and fear” (pg. 587). Baron and Frug continue, “indeed, one commentator expressly linked the new reasons to fear the central city to the old ones. ‘We may see the beginnings of what we saw in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The reason people left cities was the crime wave. This is a sort of crime wave in a different way” (pg. 287). Although a mass exodus of people and businesses has yet to be witnessed from urban centers and the lower Manhattan area is rebounding, employment in the area remains down, businesses displaced by the attack have relocated many of their employees to peripheral spaces, many businesses are currently seeking new locations outside of the city, some people have left, and others contemplating moving to the city have decided not to come, and area residents and businesses have to cope with the anxiety of the potential for another extremist/terrorist attack to occur as well as coping with increased security measures. (Briffault, 2002, pg. 565). Certainly, the current debate surrounding the perceived character of particular spaces and places is influencing land-use policies and practices, and the relationships that exist in and through landscape(s). Not only is this evinced through the change in peoples spatial practices and behaviours but, as I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, through the overt presence and use of repressive state apparatuses and related authoritarian measures to control spatial practices and behaviours at the national, regional, localized, and site specific scales.

The destruction of the World Trade Centre and the plethora of Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks that have taken place in particular spaces and places around the world since this spectacular event occurred have caused, as previously alluded to above, a pertinent question to emerge: "Are fear and urbanism at war?" (Swanstrom, 2002, pg.

135). As well, I believe a related question that has emerged is: Are terrorism and urbanism at war? Perhaps the answer to these questions can be found in the following assertion made by Swanstrom:

Cities are not only target rich; they are highly accessible. In the Middle Ages, cities had walls that offered their citizens protection from marauding thieves and pillaging armies. Cities are now unwalled, and that is a source of both their strength and their vulnerability. Cities are basically heightened access--to people, to jobs, to ideas, to culture. Open accessibility makes cities vulnerable to terrorist attacks. New York City is the quintessential unwalled city. (2002, pg. 136)

How does one maintain an open and accessible city while providing safety and security to its citizenry, businesses, and visitors? Should cities be militarized and become veritable citadels and Bastilles or panopticons of surveillance and scrutiny (Marcuse, 2002; Graham, 2002; Warren, 2002)? If the cityscape/urban landscape is to maintain its attractiveness and vibrancy as a space of political, cultural, and socio-economic practices, activities, and opportunity, people will have to be convinced that these landscapes are relatively safe and secure. Therefore, visible changes to the cityscape/urban landscape will have to be made if priority is to be given to the deterrence, prevention, and detection of extremist/terrorist threats. However, in addition to enhancing security of cityscapes/urban landscapes through overtly fortifying these spaces, the redevelopment and reconstruction of spaces affected by extremism/terrorism play an equally important role in creating a space that physically and symbolically communicates safety and security and, in some cases, defiance, hegemony, and power.

As has been mentioned above, the Islamist extremist/terrorist attack on the WTC and the proposed redevelopment and reconstruction of this space represents a symbolic duality and/or double narrative. Just as the destruction of the WTC was an articulation of

the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology, the reconstruction of the WTC site is an articulation of the dominant ideology of the United States. In early November of 2001, New York state Governor Pataki and New York City Mayor Giuliani established an authority comprised of a combination of state and city officials and appointees to plan and oversee the development of lower Manhattan and the adjacent spaces affected by the attack. This authority, the Lower Manhattan Redevelopment Corporation (LMRC), will be required to work closely with the Port Authority, who owns the site, and developer Larry Silverstein, who acquired a 99-year lease on the site shortly before its destruction. Additionally, the LMRC will seek federal cooperation and assistance in redeveloping the site and will attempt to devise strategies to entice businesses and residents to return to the redeveloped and reconstructed space (Langdon, 2001, pg. 3).

The rebuilding and (re)development of the space is to include six design principles that serve a utilitarian and symbolic function. The following is a distillation of the six design principles:

- Make connections. Create rational pathways for Lower Manhattan, which has what New Visions describes as “the densest mix of trains, subways, ferries, roadways, and walkways in the world.”
- Create diverse uses. “Plan for a balanced mix of commercial, residential, cultural, and recreational sites to develop a true 24-hour community.”
- Allow for growth. “Create synergies with planned development in other parts of the city.”
- Improve environmental quality. Restore the viability of affected neighbourhoods “incrementally and aggressively” while replanning and rebuilding is underway.

Leverage cultural resources. Use cultural and historical resources as “major nodes of circulation pathways, neighbourhood definition, and urban growth.”

- Honour the sacrifices. “Plan a memorial process that is inclusive and gives meaning to the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan” (Langdon, 2001, pg. 5).

After receiving many proposals and engaging in dialogue with various stakeholders and interest groups, including a coalition of families representing the victims of the September 11, 2001 attack, the redevelopment of the space is supposed to include a new tower—the “Freedom Tower”—and a WTC memorial entitled “Reflecting Absence.”

The Freedom Tower, offering “70 occupied floors topped by a cable superstructure and a spire reaching 1, 776 feet”(Glanz, 2004, section 2, pg.1), has been selected as the primary edifice to occupy the space currently empty at perhaps, “scariest address on earth” (2004, section 2, pg. 1). Additionally, “a light that can shine vertically or horizontally will sit at the top of the antenna to further promote the building’s image as the new beacon for downtown Manhattan” (Joshi, 2005, pg. 1). The Freedom Tower “takes after the former Twin Towers in many ways: its base is 200 by 200 feet and its observation deck stands at 1, 362 feet, while its railing rises to 1, 368 feet—the same height as each of the old Twin Towers” (2005, pg. 2). David Childs, the primary architect and designer of the Freedom Tower, states, “in a subtle but important way, this building recalls—but in a new shape—those buildings that were lost” (Joshi, 2005, pg. 2). However, rather than design and resurrect a building that is unassuming, thereby reducing its symbolic capital and significance, a building unparalleled in its design and structural features will dominate the New York skyline, much like the former World Trade Centres.

The former WTC space will also include a memorial entitled “Reflecting Absence.” The “Reflecting Absence” memorial will include a “tree-studded plaza with two reflecting pools above subterranean corridors that would house artefacts and victim’s remains in alcoves set aside as shrines” (Cockfield, 2004, pg. 1). According to Michael Arad, the designer of the memorial, and Pete Walker, the landscape architect, “this memorial proposes a space that resonates with the feelings of loss and absence that were generated by the destruction of the World Trade Center and the taking of thousands of lives on September 11, 2001” (Arad & Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org). As Arad and Walker continue, “the surface of the memorial plaza is punctuated by the linear rhythms of rows of deciduous trees, forming informal clusters, clearings and groves. [...] Through its annual cycle or rebirth, the living park extends and deepens the experience of the memorial” (Arad & Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org). Moreover, “the memorial plaza is designed to be a mediating space; it belongs both to the city and to the memorial. Located at street level to allow for its integration into the fabric of the city, the plaza encourages the use of this space by New Yorkers on a daily basis. The memorial grounds will not be isolated from the city; they will be a living part of it” (Arad & Walker, 2005, www.wtcsitememorial.org). As an accessible “living” space, the “Reflecting Absence” memorial is designed to be an integrated, active, dynamic, and engaging landscape that (re)produces and shapes the consciousness of memorialisation and much as it is produced and shaped by the consciousness of memorialisation.

Landscapes and/or spaces of memorialisation “strive to turn loss (either private or public in magnitude) into gain, sorrow into consolation and the tragic past into redemptive visions of the present and/or the future” (Howard, 2003, pg. 47). The

juxtaposition of the of the “Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” are a spatialized and dialectical montage of symbols that simultaneously reflect and articulate human suffering, lamentation, and tragedy as well as renewed strength, power, resilience, fortitude and the enduring ideal of freedom. This landscape of memorialisation is a process through which loss is transformed into gain, absence is transformed into presence, sorrow is transformed into solace, and the tragic past is transformed into a vision of the present and the idealized future (Howard, 2003, pg. 48). However, the “dialectical temporality” and the “contradistinctions” this landscape symbolises both permit and limit the ability of New Yorkers and the United States populace to imagine an other place and time beyond the present imperfect world engendered by human conflict, complication, contestation, violence and destruction, and competing ideologies. (Howard, 2003, pg. 53-54).

The “Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” symbolically permit people to connect to the tragic past and to the idealized future, but, also physically limit and position people in an inescapable present, one constructed by and produced through the real and imagined threat of terror(ism). Although the construction of the “Reflecting Absence” memorial and the “Freedom Tower” is an attempt to cathartically reconcile the past and reassert the political, cultural, and economic omnipotence of New York and the United States, as well as serve as a vehicle through which people can move beyond the spectacle of terror of September 11, 2001, the redeveloped and rebuilt landscape will irrevocably and perpetually resonate with a present characterized by terror(ism), the threat of terror(ism), and the fear of terrorism. In effect, this redeveloped space physically and symbolically (re)produces a landscape of terror(ism), and physically

and symbolically embodies the identity and subjectivity of Al Qaeda—the group that permanently changed the physical and psychological topography of the New York cityscape/urban landscape and the United States nation-space.

While the full psychological, physical, economic, and geographic and spatial consequences of the Islamist extremist/attacks on New York city, Washington D.C, London, Madrid, Bali, Riyadh, Casablanca, and other cityscapes/urban landscapes around the world that have been targeted by Islamist extremists/terrorists are yet to unfold, and ultimately how these attacks will shape the fabric of human praxis in and through cityscapes/urban landscapes has yet to be realized (Sawislak, 2002, pg. 599), what appears to have changed are the practical and symbolic importance and roles of the cityscape/urban landscape. As Verchick (2002) suggests, while historically cities have stood on the front line of politics, culture, jurisprudence, economics, ecology, and social movements, etc., “what appears to have changed since September 11, 2001, is the opening of a new front line on which American cities [and other cities affected by and vulnerable and susceptible to acts of terrorism] will be expected to prominently and permanently serve homeland security” (pg. 558). As a result, (Islamist) terrorism has and is altering the physical and psychological landscape of not only cities and urban spaces but the nation-space as a whole.

Militarization, Citadelification, and the Use of Authoritarian Measures

The imprint of (Islamist) extremism/terrorism on the physical and psychological landscape can be profound as has been demonstrated not only through the attacks of September 11, 2001, but through the threat and security environment that has emerged in the Post-9-11 era. The “War on Terror,” the continued Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks

on selected targets around the world, and the threat of future acts have generated a physical and psychological landscape of fear with international and national implications. The creation of fear, uncertainty, and paranoia among the general population is not only altering how nations conduct themselves internationally and nationally, but the activity patterns and behaviours of groups of people and/or individual people, “with widespread social, political, and economic effects” (Cutter, Richardson & Wilbanks, 2003, pg. 2).

Clearly, the security implications of the 9-11 Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks go well beyond the United States “War on Terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, “a variety of global and regional security arrangements not directly related to the terrorizing spectacle of 9-11 are being reshaped and reproduced by responses to those attacks (Hershberg & Moore, 2002, pg. 5) e.g. India’s renewed assertiveness with respect to Pakistan (particularly over Kashmir), Russia’s aggressive pursuit of its objectives in Chechnya, the renewed fervour of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the draconian measures used or being implemented to apprehend and detain suspected extremists/terrorists or suspected extremist/terrorist sympathizers in Saudi Arabia, Germany, Pakistan, Yemen, Indonesia, England, the United States, and Canada. In each of these cases, the real or imagined battle “has become a more potent currency in domestic political affairs than was the case prior to September 11, 2001” (Hershberg & Moore, 2002, pg. 5). The result, as has been demonstrated by the United States and more recently England, has been the development and implementation of aggressive legislation that empowers governments to use authoritarian measures to “protect” its citizens. Furthermore, the threat of Islamist extremism/terrorism serves as a vehicle for legitimizing repressive strategies and tactics, and the temporary and/or permanent suspension of civil liberties, in order to protect a

nation's citizens from an extremist/terrorist attack and/or prevent an extremist/terrorist attack. Consequently, the events of 9-11 and the responses to the attacks have provoked and influenced a change in the spatial imagination of the nation-space, the cityscape/urban landscape, and its citizens, and the spatial practices and behaviours therein.

Just as there is a spatial dimension to the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon, so to is there a spatial dimension to how anti-terrorism operates and functions. As Williams asserts (2003):

there is a spatial dimension with regard to how both terrorism and anti-terrorism operates. Both use strategies and counter-strategies, techniques and counter-techniques to achieve their goals—all of which occur across the landscape and cityscapes. In short, they occur in space. However, insofar as terrorism and anti-terrorism occur in space, they also occur by means of space—and, indeed, have an influence on the production of space itself. (pg. 274)

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government, operating at the national, regional, and local levels, implemented policies designed to create and (re)produce, what one urban planner calls, “defensible spaces” (Maben, 2001, pg. 12). Although some urban planners, architects, and policy practitioners advocated the design and construction of spaces that remained “open” and “friendly” for public use and enjoyment, and resisted the temptation to build “walls, erect gates, and harden targets” (Maben, 2001, pg. 12), the decisions associated with constructing and (re)producing “defensible spaces” and the authoritarian measures used to support “defensible spaces” were impaired by fear and subsequently an imbalance between safety and security and civil liberties. According to Warren (2002), the “actions and policies pursued in the War on Terrorism have been justified by mantras, propagated by the American government

and echoed in the mass media, of ‘everything has changed’ and the ‘world will never be the same’” (pg. 614). Furthermore, as Warren continues, these statements contain subtexts that suggest the (Islamist) extremist/terrorist threat will take years to eliminate and “that violations of civil rights and international rules of warfare (Geneva Conventions) by the US may be legitimate responses to the unique conditions of fighting terrorists who are organized networks rather than nations and whose identity cannot always be known” (pg. 614). The physical and psychological manifestations of (re)producing and (re)constructing “defensible spaces” are evident in the militarization and citadelization of cityscapes/urban landscapes and the use of authoritarian measures to actively scrutinize and control access to spaces and the human praxis that functions in and through these spaces and landscapes.

As the attacks of September 11, 2001 have demonstrated, as well as the recent Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks on the transportation systems in London, “transnational forces—Islamist extremism/terrorism—are rendering [physical and] political boundaries less useful at protecting its citizens from external influences” (Williams, 2003, pg. 279). Islamist extremism/terrorism and the purposeful and calculated selection of soft targets signals that “there are no safe zones for civilians or non-combatants. The public-private spatial structure, so much a hallmark of Western-style liberal democracy, provides no physical protection from violence. Individuals are not safe in their homes or businesses, and they are not safe in public spaces and buildings” (Williams, 2003, pg. 283). Consequently, given the relative and apparent porosity of boundaries that Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks exploit, the normative boundaries that spatially delineate and delimit political/judicial boundaries between

international and intranational entities, public/private spaces and related human praxis, citizen/non-citizen and the rights associated with citizens/non-citizens are being redressed (Williams, 2003, pg. 279).

In effect, terrorism and anti-terrorism policies and techniques have caused a new quotidian normalcy and normativity to emerge at the international, national, regional, and site-specific scales (Williams, 2003, pg. 274). Indeed, the physical and psychological landscape has been (re)shaped, (re)produced, and transformed in the United States and other countries to address and bring into force this new quotidian normalcy and normativity with varying affects on the spatial activities, behaviours, and practices of citizens and non-citizens alike. A visible example of a new paradigm emerging is, as I have previously mentioned, the (re)construction and (re)production of “defensible spaces” in the cityscape/urban landscape.

As part of (re)constructing defensible spaces, “security, surveillance, and monitoring practices in around western, and particularly US cities, have been dramatically intensified” (Graham, 2002, pg. 589). In the US and England, “cities and urban flows are being scrutinized through military perspectives so that the inevitable fragilities and vulnerabilities they display can be significantly reduced. Massive new institutional complexes supporting Homeland security are being built up with extraordinary speed under the highest political mandate. As a result, for the first time since the height of the Cold War issues surrounding international, military, and geopolitical security now penetrate utterly into practices surrounding the governance, design, and planning of cities and urban regions” (Graham, 2002, pg. 589). Correspondingly, Warren (2003) asserts that there has been “an evolving and significant

revision of military urban doctrine since the end of the Cold War” (pg. 615). As he continues,

it is now assumed by the United States and its allies that their military presence in cities, in humanitarian, peacekeeping, policing and homeland security, as well as combat roles, will be unavoidable in the twenty-first century. Probability alone will be a factor given the projected increases in the number and size of urban areas and their importance as control centers. It is expected that urban military action and presence will be required to deal with the aggression of ‘rogue’ nations, individual and networked acts of terrorism, and civilian riots and disorders. (pg. 615)

Certainly the events of 9-11, the subsequent war on terror, and the continued Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks and threat of attack has given impetus to this doctrine. The political mobilization of this doctrine and related policies have manifested and continue to manifest in various spaces and landscapes throughout the United States and most recently England.

The following are examples of the mobilization and manifestation of militarized doctrine and policies. Currently a battery of missiles and other counter-measures have been put in place on top of the White House. Additionally, concrete barricades populate the cityscape/urban landscape around the White House and prevent unauthorized motorized vehicles from moving in and around the White House. The Liberty Bell in Philadelphia is under guard twenty-four hours a day and access to the location is tightly controlled and monitored. Similarly, events, meetings, or summits considered to be politically or culturally sensitive and important are subject to military-grade surveillance and control. For instance, the various EU, G8, WTO, World Bank, IMF, and World Economic Forum summits and meetings held in Barcelona, Brussels, Davos, Genoa, Gothenburg, Los Angeles, New York, Quebec, Washington D.C, and St. Andrews, Scotland were tightly controlled spaces where public access to various locations in the

cityscape/urban landscape were temporarily suspended, and concrete barricades, steel fences, and military and police formations were used to mitigate and diminish the capacity of political activists to effectively protest (Warren, 2002, 616). Additionally, the 2002 Super Bowl in New Orleans was classified as a National Special Security Event and consequently subject to policies in line with the war on terror. Again concrete barricades and steel fences were erected all around the stadium, vehicular access to the site was banned, and ticket-holders were required to arrive hours before the event in order to be subjected to several searches and security clearances (Warren, 2002, pg. 617).

More recently, the successful and failed Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks in London, England prompted city officials and the federal government, who are historically familiar with terrorism as a result of the IRA campaign, to react with draconian anti-terrorist measures including high-visibility policing—approximately 6, 000 additional police officers were deployed—in various public spaces around London and the random interpellation of citizens who look “suspicious.” The term “suspicious” of course is rhetorically used as an innocuous term for “racial profiling.” As reported in the *Globe and Mail*, Joe Friesen recently interviewed an individual of Italian decent who looks Middle Eastern. When asked about the current security environment the individual described being stopped several times in one week, under the authority of the Terrorist Act, and subject to a search of his person and his possessions. In all instances, the individual was surrounded by police officers carrying machine guns (Friesen, 2005, August 8, pg. A10). Although the overt and significantly enhanced police presence was designed to reassure the public, the result of the use and projection of force “drove home the impression of a city under siege” (Friesen, 2005, August 8, pg. A10).

In a related vein, spatial structures in the United States are being shaped by a anti-terrorism discourse and its related militarized doctrine. As Marcuse (2002) suggests, “development will be towards protected, secured citadels, to internalize and shield the activities critical to the top tiers of global and national businesses” (pg. 600). In fact, as Marcuse (2002) maintains, “the trend towards citadelization already exists, but will be modified and accentuated. The new form will be citadels within buildings or fortified complexes, including more and more of the facilities necessary for daily life within the building itself” (pg. 600). In essence, one will never have to leave the citadel, and access to the fortification will be highly controlled through security checkpoints and other counter-measures. The result has been and will be the virtual “barricading of segregated spaces” (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 600).

Although the “barricading” and “citadelization” of the cityscape/urban landscape will potentially provide some citizens with a sense of safety and security, these militarized tendencies and actions reflect the how space is being negatively (re)shaped and (re)produced as a result of the real and/or imagined fear of Islamist extremist/terrorist threats: public space will become and is becoming less public and publicly accessible spaces will and are becoming virtually inaccessible (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 601). For example, severe restrictions have been placed on assemblies and other public uses of the spaces in front of City Hall in New York City (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 601). Moreover, public spaces that do remain “open”—city streets, parks, public transit terminals, city squares and plazas, public libraries, and court houses—will be subject to pervasive and invasive forms of surveillance. This form of panoptical surveillance is already being employed in England and is quickly gaining momentum in the United States and Canada.

The expansion and increasing visibility of military-style surveillance and control, reminiscent of the USSR and current authoritarian regimes e.g. North Korea, Iran, Syria, Burma, Saudi Arabia, etc., in cityscapes/urban landscapes has been accompanied by a well-orchestrated and coordinated strategy to use the War on Terror to substantiate and legitimize the temporary and/or permanent suspension of the political and cultural values and principles that provided the foundation for an “open,” “free,” and “democratic” socio-spatial and politico-spatial system (Warren, 2002, pg. 617). Therefore, “security becomes the justification for measures that threaten the core of urban social and political life, from the physical barricading of space to the social barricading of democratic activity” (Marcuse, 2002, pg. 602). Although the full extent of the militarization and citadelization of the cityscape/urban landscape has yet to unfold, the new quotidian normalcy and normativity of surveillance and spatial control that has emerged as a result of the War on Terror and the continued threat of Islamist extremists/terrorist attacks are transforming the physical and psychological landscape of the US, its allies, and others who have been targeted by Islamist extremism/terrorism.

The broader geographical and spatial implications of anti-terrorism policy and its associated militarized doctrine, practices, and activities are evident in the passage of legislation that is not only shaping and influencing the spatiality of the cityscape/urban landscape but the nation-space as a whole. In response to 9/11, the United States government ratified two pieces of legislation that significantly increased the authority and subsequent ability of the government to prevent future extremist/terrorist attacks on the nation-space and serve as a vehicle for re-establishing the order of the “Homeland.” As a result of the “Homeland” being violated and its own mythology demythologized, the

United States government introduced the Homeland Security Act and the USA PATRIOT Act.

The Homeland Security Act presaged a state of emergency that required the suspension of and departure from the values and principles to which the denizens of the United States have become accustomed. According to Pease (2003), the Homeland Security Act “tore to the ground the democratic institutions—freedom of speech, religious tolerance, formal equality, uniform juridical procedures, universal suffrage—that had formerly nurtured and sustained the national peoples” (pg. 6). Moreover, the Homeland Security Act is supra-territorial in its design inasmuch that the dislocation of the Homeland by external forces necessitates the pursuit of its enemies outside of the US nation-space. As Pease (2003) states:

the emergency state is marked by absolute independence from any juridical control and any reference to the normal political order. It is empowered to suspend the articles of the Constitution protective of personal liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, inviolability of the home, and postal, telephone, and Internet privacy. In designating Afghanistan and Iraq as endangering the Homeland, Operations Enduring Justice and Iraqi Freedom simply extended the prerogatives of the domestic emergency state across the globe. (pg. 7)

A concomitant piece of legislation that is (re)shaping and (re)producing the physical and psychological landscape of the United States and other areas around the world is the USA PATRIOT Act.

The Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act—the USA PATRIOT Act—passed on October 26, 2001 is rhetorically presented as a critical step forward in the War on Terror and the reordering of the US nation-space. The USA PATRIOT Act has been described by former Attorney General Ashcroft “as legislation that authorizes ‘new weapons for us

to fight the war at the borders and here at home” (Coleman, 2003, pg. 90). These new weapons include roving surveillance and search of anyone at any time, in any place, and under any circumstances and conditions; expedited arrest, detention, deportation, and extradition, without judicial oversight and constitutional review; the authority to withhold information from the detainee and legal representatives; and the authority to secretly search homes and property (Coleman, 2003, pg. 90, 97; Williams, 2003, pg. 287).

Additionally, Attorney General Ashcroft modified the guidelines pertaining to the surveillance of public meetings: FBI agents can now infiltrate public meetings without any prior basis of suspicion. Moreover, Attorney General Ashcroft also reduced any special protection for religious or political meetings (Heymann, 2003, pg. 103).

Although the consequence of these modifications to the guidelines may appear relatively benign, people attending one of the 1, 200 Mosques in the United States or pro-Palestinian meetings “will be deeply concerned about what they say if they believe that an FBI agent may be present” (Heymann, 2003, pg. 103).

The USA PATRIOT Act “effected the most dramatic abridgement of civil liberties in the nation’s history. This emergency legislation subordinated all concerns of ethics, human rights, due process, constitutional hierarchies, and the division of power to the state’s monopoly over the exception” (Pease, 2003, pg. 7). For example, operating under the aegis of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has detained more than “1,000 Middle Eastern and South Asian males since the 11 September 2001. Although some have been released and many deported, hundreds remain imprisoned—indeinitely, and without bail or official legal counsel” (Coleman, 2003, pg. 97). Similarly, in response to the recent Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks in London,

Prime Minister Tony Blair has proposed amendments to their anti-terrorism legislation that would empower the government and its various apparatuses to arrest, detain, and deport anyone suspected of not only being a terrorist, but supporting or propagating extremist/terrorist perspectives and ideologies through public and/or private meetings. In certain instances in England, Imams and clerics, considered to espouse extremist ideologies, have been arrested and deported. In Canada, the highly publicized Arar case is an example of an innocent individual being detained, deported, and tortured as a result of the draconian measures being employed against an unsuspecting citizenry under the auspices of anti-terrorism and related security policies.

The Homeland Security Act and the USA PATRIOT Act have bestowed upon the United States security apparatuses the power and the authority to (re)shape and (re)produce the physical and psychological landscape of the US nation-space. In effect, these anti-terrorism legislative instruments have simultaneously caused a rebordering and debordering of the socio-spatial and politico-spatial practices that occur in and through the US nation-space. On the one hand, in an effort to reassert the territoriality of the Homeland, these legislative instruments are focused on the territorial borders and boundaries of the US nation-space: “implementing order concerns fortifying borders” (Coleman, 2003, pg. 90). In addition to physically fortifying and barricading borders, thereby (re)establishing a clear distinction between the outside and the inside, inclusion and exclusion, and controlled space and uncontrolled space, the rebordering of the US nation space and its desired anti-terrorism effect also involve other spatial dimensions and consequences. These other spatial dimensions and consequences include, but are not limited to:

controlling access to airports; controlling the ports of entry into the US via the US Border Patrol and Coast Guard, as well as via the Immigration and Naturalization Service; the strengthening of relevant government agencies by providing more resources through the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act; and the creation and future use of tamper-resistant visas and passports. (Williams, 2003, pg. 284)

Additionally, non-citizens may be fingerprinted and photographed and, as required by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, all foreign students residing in the US will be tracked and entered into a notification system. Furthermore, all persons wishing to enter the United States may be arrested, detained, and questioned if suspicion arises (Williams, 2003, pg. 284-285). All of these rebordering anti-terrorism measures are designed to both control and monitor movement and actions within the nation-space, and the controlling and monitoring of access to place. In effect, the rebordering of the nation-space determines who is “out of place” and “who belongs in the landscape” (Till, 2004, pg. 356).

The debordering effect of the Homeland Security Act and the US PATRIOT Act involves the dissolution and disintegration, as alluded to above, of the boundaries between public and the private spaces. Although certain violations of privacy are considered accepted norms of behaviour and policy e.g. conceding to searches at airports and certain public buildings, the militarized and authoritarian approach to combating Islamist extremism/terrorism, both at the international and national (domestic) scale, which has heralded a new quotidian normalcy and normativity of spatial activity and behaviour, does not recognize the distinction between public and the private space(s). As the public/private spatial structure is reconfigured, an ironic value system has emerged where the very rights, values, principles, and sentimentality that the US government

professes to be protecting and securing, are the very rights, values, principles, and sentimentality that are being undermined and suspended by the US administration.

The reconfiguration of the public/private spatial structure and the suspension of privacy and relative anonymity are symptomatic of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the corresponding clandestine and surreptitious strategies and tactics employed by Islamist extremist/terrorist actors. As Islamist extremists/terrorists can be almost anywhere at any time, planning, supporting, or ready to perpetrate an attack, both the public and the private space have come to be associated with danger, fear, chaos, and disorder (D'Arcus, 2004, pg. 362). Consequently, in response to the potential danger, disorder, and threat the public and private space represent, the US Administration instituted anti-terrorism policies and spatial strategies that enabled the state to regain spatial control, order, and conformance through rendering all domestic space effectively borderless and subject to intrusive roving surveillance and authoritarian violation. In effect, the US government has rendered all space and its attendant spatial activities and behaviours subject to its gaze and authority, thereby ensuring that all spatial activities and behaviours, whether in a "public" and "private" place, are authorized, lawful, regulated, and do not constitute the Islamist extremist/terrorist threat against which state power has (re)defined itself. For, the body politic and its special articulations must be protected against deviant anti-citizens and outside agitators who George W. Bush, in his eloquent cowboy rhetoric, referred to as the 'forces of evil' (D'Arcus, 2004, pg. 368).

For the United States, "the world has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001" (Heymann, 2003, pg. 38). As Heymann (2003) states:

we no longer feel secure, although we cannot measure the extent of the danger. Nothing is more important to us than re-establishing the reality and

sense of security. In the meantime, being less secure means that we have to take a variety of steps to reestablish safety. Some of those steps involve reducing the harmful consequences of any attack; some involve the psychological sense of enhanced security and autonomy that comes with effective retaliation. (pg. 38)

As a result of the landscape of fear, paranoia, and terror that has been created by 9/11 and the declared state of emergency that followed, the physical and psychological landscape of the United States has been reshaped, reproduced, and reconstructed by an “all encompassing [militarized] definition of reality” (Lutz, 2002, pg. 286). Although this militarized reality and militarized landscape may provide an enhanced sense of safety and security for the citizens and body politic of the United States, the new quotidian normalcy and normative spatiality, engendered by anti-terrorism security protocols, policies, and procedures, are actually generating and (re)producing spaces and landscapes of terror.

As previously mentioned, just as landscapes are shaped by consciousness, landscapes shape consciousness. As people act in and through the militarized and citdelized cityscape/urban landscape and nation-space, the threat and fear of Islamist extremism/terrorism and its potentially devastating and destructive capacities are continually articulated through the symbols and underlying spatial activities of anti-terrorism that are embedded in the landscape. When one is confronted with the symbols and activities of anti-terrorism, one is immediately confronted with the symbols and activities of extremism/terrorism. In effect, the construction and production of spaces and landscapes of anti-terrorism result in the reconstruction and reproduction of spaces and landscapes of extremism/terrorism. Similarly, the real or imagined safety and security that the anti-terrorism landscape creates and communicates is inescapably haunted by and recreates and communicates the threat, fear, and terror of

extremism/terrorism. Therefore, the physical and psychological landscape that has been shaped and produced by anti-terrorism, and the associated authoritarian reconfiguring of socio-spatial and politico-spatial structures and systems, unwittingly recreates, reproduces, and articulate the “terror” it seeks to erase and eliminate.

**“Honourbound to Defend Freedom”: The ‘War of Terrorism’
and the Politicization of Space**

Rasul was the last one processed, and by the time he got to his cage it was dark. First he was stripped naked and, still wearing his goggles and chains, was given a piece of soap and told to shower. When his goggles were finally removed, he peered through the tropical night at the cacti and razor wire and low scrubby hills beyond. Mosquitoes buzzed and bit. ‘I looked around and thought, *what the hell is this place.*’ (Rose, 2004, pg. 6-7)

In December 2001, the Pentagon began devising plans for a detention facility for the prisoners the United States would take captive in the declared War on Terror and the ensuing military operations in Afghanistan and its other operational theatres (including direct operational involvement and/or proxy operations). In selecting a space for the construction of the detention facility, the United States had three options: a foreign sovereign country, the United States or some other American territory, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. U.S. military and intelligence officials ruled out a foreign sovereign country because of concerns of access, while the United States or a US territory was ruled out because of fear of attracting further extremist/terrorist attacks and detainees would be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal courts and its related legal policies and procedures. “That meant that any detainee who wished to challenge an aspect of his treatment, his denial of Geneva rights, or his continued incarceration, could have brought a federal Habeas Corpus action, the ‘judicial review of the detention of a person to determine if the detention is lawful’” (Rose, 2004, pg. 32). Therefore, geopolitically,

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a space technically belonging to Cuba, despite the indefinite U.S. lease, provided the United States with the means to circumvent both domestic and international legal procedures and responsibilities: “‘Gitmo is a unique piece of property, owned by Cuba but controlled by the U.S. under a perpetual lease [...]. It minimized foreign relations concerns and domestic security concerns ... since the property belonged to Cuba [...].’ Far from being the least worst place, ‘Gitmo was the best possible place’” (Rose, 2004, pg. 32-33)—a stateless space or extra-territorial landscape that exists beyond the vanishing point of national and international legal and political (sovereign) structures and related spatial policies and procedures—a legal and political “black hole.” The name ascribed to this stateless space and extra-territorial landscape is “Camp X-Ray.”

The construction and production of Camp X-Ray as a stateless space and extra-territorial/extra-juridical landscape is considered a necessary counter-measure given the extraordinary character of the War on Terror and omnipresent threat of Islamist extremism/terrorism. According to the U.S administration, given that the War on Terror is not an “ordinary” or “conventional” war, the detainees and/or prisoners at Camp X-Ray are not subject to the laws, rights, and conventions afforded to politically and legally recognized Prisoners of War (POWs). As Butler outlines, on 22 January 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld explained why the detainees at Camp X-Ray should not be designated Prisoners of War: “For the United States, these are not POWs, because this is no ordinary war; it is not primarily a battle between recognizable nation-states or, in parlance of the Geneva Conventions, ‘High Contracting Parties’ (Butler, 2002, pg. 3). Instead the prisoners at Camp X-Ray have been codified as “battlefield detainees” and/or

“unlawful combatants,” designations that position and situate the detainees/prisoners at Camp X-Ray in a politically and legally unrecognizable policy space that exists in a liminal gap between national and international political and legal systems of governance. The detainees/prisoners at Camp X-Ray are legitimate illegitimate actors who, acting outside of the state-centric “conventions” of war, are not subject to the provisions governing the treatment of prisoners of “conventional” war.

Under Article Four of the Geneva Convention, combatants entitled to legitimate Prisoner-Of-War status “include the organized armed forces of a state and also members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a party to conflict” (Thornberry, 2003, pg. 19). Furthermore, conditions are applied to those that qualify for Prisoner-of-War status: “there must be a command structure; arms must be carried openly; and operations must be conducted in accordance with the laws of war” (Thornberry, 2003, pg. 19). As Article Four demonstrates, the conventions governing armed conflict and violence are biased towards regular armed forces that are acting directly or indirectly on behalf of a recognized sovereign nation-state. Therefore, armed conflict and violence waged by individuals or groups not representing or directly or indirectly acting on behalf of a nation-state are illegal and illegitimate and are not guaranteed the protections of the Geneva Conventions (Butler, 2002, pg. 4). Certainly, the fact that Al Qaeda and its ideological affiliates operate regionally, nationally, and/or transnationally through systematically effacing themselves from public detection and function in a surreptitious and clandestine fashion are anathema to the conventional conception of war. As such, these individuals and groups, as evidenced through the anti-terrorism policies and

practices that have shaped and produced Camp X-Ray, are relegated to a position on the margins and in the interstices of national and international mechanisms of political, judicial, and spatial governance and territorial belonging.

The signifiers “extremism/terrorism” and “unlawful combatants” have assumed an important function in the U.S War on Terror and its associated political, juridical, and spatial discourse. These signifiers become the rhetorical codes through which distinctions are drawn between legitimate violence and illegitimate violence, authorized armed conflict and unauthorized armed conflict, citizen and non-citizen, legitimate state actor and illegitimate non-state actor, civilized and misanthropic, and inside the law and outside of the law. Moreover, to be codified as an “extremist/terrorist” or an “unlawful combatant,” and therefore a non-state actor and illegitimate practitioner of violence, suggests that these non-state actors are “pure vessels of violence” and “do not become violent for the same kinds of reasons that other politicized beings do, that their turn to violence can make no sense historically, or cannot make sense the way conventional wars make sense, and that their violence is somehow groundless and infinite, if not innate and constitutive” (Butler, 2002, pg. 7). Therefore, if one follows this line of reasoning, the actions of “extremists/terrorists” and “unlawful combatants” have no political goals, “or cannot be understood politically.” Extremism/terrorism and unlawful combatants emerge from the irrationality of fanaticism do not espouse a point of view or coherent perspective, and, therefore, “do not have a part in the human community” or inclusion in the boundaries of civilization (Butler, 2002, pg. 7). The consequence of which is that the construction and production of spaces like Camp X-Ray are deemed necessary by the United States for the detention and control of these designated misanthropic subjects and

illegitimate combatants and stateless violent actors. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated in response to mounting international criticism and scrutiny of Camp X-Ray in January 2002:

“these people are committed terrorists [...]. We are keeping them off the street and out of the airlines and out of nuclear power plants and out of ports across this country and across other countries [...]. They [are] the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face of the earth. [...] We were able to capture and detain a large number of people who had been through terrorist training camps and had learned a whole host of skills as to how they could kill innocent people, not how they could kill other soldiers. We’ve got a good slug of those folks off the street where they can’t kill more people.” (Rose, 2003, pg. 8).

Although the veracity of Donald Rumsfeld’s prognostications have been indirectly challenged and/or undermined through the observations and opinions of both a guard at Camp X-Ray and a senior Pentagon official with extensive knowledge of Guantanamo: according to the guard at least 200 of the detainees were not terrorists and were relatively harmless and, according to the senior Pentagon official, “at least two thirds of the 600 detainees held as of May 2004 could be released without hesitation immediately” (Rose, 2003, pg. 42), the hyperbolic sentiments conveyed by Rumsfeld provide the “mytho-logic” (Pease, 2003, pg. 14) that render the U.S Administration exempt from legitimate critical scrutiny and empower the U.S Administration to shape, create, and produce a physical and psychological space/landscape in and through which they enact their eschatological version of *realpolitik* and its attendant spatiality.

In January of 2002 the first of the approximately 750 detainees who would eventually enter this liminal anti-terrorism space began arriving at Camp X-Ray (Rose, 2003, pg. 9). One of the most salient images of the War on Terror is that of detainees being escorted shackled hand and foot, wearing orange jumpsuits, black-lense goggles, surgical masks, head phones, and gloves behind chain-link fences and razor wire entering

this landscape of anti-terror. For a population and Administration still reeling from the shock and horror of the 9-11, these images were particularly poignant and important both materially and symbolically. Materially, the images produced tangible evidence that the declared War on Terror was experiencing relative levels of success, justice was being administered, and that the virtual invisibility of the Islamist extremist/terrorist threat and unlocatability of the Islamist extremist/terrorist actor was being rendered “visible” and “locatable.”

By exhibiting the images of detainees at Camp X-Ray, the security apparatus reinstates its control over, and through, by means of, the visible. Indeed, what is visible in the images is not so much the detainees themselves (they are vague, indeterminate figures, whose identifying features are deliberately concealed; it is merely their abstract being, the “species essence” as terrorists, that is on display, while their individual identities are guarded from view), as the spectacle of the state’s power over them. (McClintock, 2004, pg. 154)

In effect, the images of the detainees signified the ability of the state to locate, dominate, subjugate, and control the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and the threat and violence these actors and groups represent. Correspondingly, the images of the detainees at Camp X-Ray have a significant symbolic register. The images of the detainees and by extension the landscape produced by Camp X-Ray symbolise the restoration of safety, security, order, and the “will to redemption” (Arnault, 2003, pg. 155) in the American popular imagination.

The events of 11 September 2001 and the horror the attacks inspired violated the physical and psychological landscape of the United States and destabilized the conceptual norms and fundamental moral and ethical prescriptions of the U.S body politic. Consequently, because of this violation and the feelings of fear, incredulity, and revulsion

the violation provoked, the logic of redemption became an attractive tool in order to restore or redeem that which was violated (Arnault, 2003, pg.171). As Arnault states:

during or after the experience of horror, we tend to be attracted to the logic of redemption because horror signals violation—the fact that the world is not as we think it should be. As creatures who are committed to things existing in the way we conceive them to exist, when our expectations are violated, we want to see things set or made right. Committing ourselves to the prescription that the future will redeem the past is one way of expressing our resolve to see the world (Islamist extremists/terrorists are my focus) conform to our universalizing prescriptions. (2003, pg. 157)

The images of the detainees and the penitential landscape of Camp X-Ray symbolically represent a redemptive present and future where the past, namely the events of 11 September 2001, and its related transgressions and violations of conceptual norms and moral and ethical prescriptions will be resolved and conformity restored. In effect, the images of the detainees and the Camp X-Ray landscape represent sites of inscription and act as an expressive medium through which the United States can figuratively inscribe and communicate its hegemonic dictum. However, just as the images of the detainees at Camp X-ray serve an important material and symbolic function for the American popular imagination, the images of the detainees also serve an important material and symbolic function for the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency.

The images of the detainees, in conjunction with the repeated reports of physical and psychological torture, the suspension of international and national political and juridical policies and procedures, the violation of human rights, and the purported desecration of the Qu’ran have caused Camp X-Ray to become a landscape in which and through which people become politicized. For the detainees and their families, which include individuals from Afghanistan, Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, France, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia,

Sweden, Syria, Yemen, among other countries totalling approximately 40 nations (McClintock, 2004, pg. 161), Camp X-Ray has become synonymous with despair, anguish, pain, humiliation, oppression, torture, “the shattering of innocents’ lives, and for detainees’ families, an indeterminate sentence of uncertainty and loss” (Rose, 2004, pg. 133). As Rose later suggests the pain, suffering, humiliation, and despair experienced by the detainees and the detainees families has been replicated across the Muslim diaspora and has tapped and created new currents of anti-American rage (2004, pg. 135).

According to Dr. Tim Winter, a lecturer in Islamic Studies at Pembroke College, Cambridge, “the guy with the crew cut, the club and the crucifix, standing over the detainee in goggles and chains, symbolizes not only American oppression of the Third World, but also the oppression of governments friendly to America inside Muslim countries” (Rose, 2004, pg. 135). The consequence of this perceived humiliation, despair, suffering, and oppression is that Camp X-Ray, like the Palestinian conflict, the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, the grotesque and sadistic abuse of prisoners at Abu Graib, and the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula—“sacred” territory that Osama bin Laden identifies as a primary reason for the *jihad* being waged against the United States and its “Coalition of the Willing”—has become “a focal point for anger and political action” (Dr. Tim Winter quoted in Rose, 2004, pg. 135). In short, Camp X-Ray has become a landscape through which individuals and/or groups within the Muslim diaspora are politicized, perhaps even radicalized, and moved to “action.” Certainly, “action” does not solely refer to perpetrating acts of extremism/terrorism. “Action” can also include providing funding to various Islamist extremist/terrorist groups, ideological sympathy and therefore tacit support of the Islamist extremist/terrorist

transnational movement, providing safe haven for Islamist extremists/terrorists either physically or through silence, logistical support, or propagating, promulgating, and espousing the Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology on websites, in Mosques and/or community centres, or through literature disseminated throughout various communities and media outlets.

The effects of Camp X-Ray as a landscape that “works” as a mechanism of politicization has manifested in various forms. For example, Guantanamo/Camp X-Ray was cited by Osama bin Laden in a communiqué he issued on 24 November 2002 entitled “Letter to America.” In this communiqué Osama bin Laden outlines the hypocrisy of the actions taken by the United States in the War on Terror to undermine the very human rights they extol and claim to protect:

“You (the United States) have claimed to be the vanguard of human rights, and your Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues annual reports containing statistics of those countries that violate any human rights. However, all these things vanished when the Mujahideen (Al Qaeda) hit you, and you then implemented the methods of the same documented governments that you used to curse. In America, you captured thousands of Muslims and Arabs, taking them into custody without reason or court trial, not even disclosing their names. You issued newer, harsher laws.

What happens in Guantanamo is a historical embarrassment to America and its values, and it screams into your faces, you hypocrites: “What is the value of your signature on any agreement or treaty?”

What we call you to do is to take an honest stance with yourselves—and I doubt you will do so—to discover that you are a nation without principles or manners, and that to you values and principles are something to be merely demanded from others, not that which you yourself must adhere to.” (Marlin, 2004, pg. 70-71)

Through turning U.S exceptionalism and moral relativism against itself, Osama bin Laden attempts to render any counter-arguments to Al Qaeda’s and their ideological affiliates strategies and tactics powerless because Osama bin Laden has undermined the

moral and ethical authority of the United States. Consequently, reciprocal actions become justified and substantiated in the mind of Osama bin Laden and those that subscribe to his particular Islamist extremist/terrorist ideology. This particular belief is expressed in a communiqué Osama bin Laden issued on 12 November 2002 entitled “As You Kill, So Shall You Be Killed,” “reciprocal treatment is part of justice” (Marlin, 2004, pg. 53). Therefore, to add to the warning issued by Osama bin Laden, “You will be killed just as you kill, you will be bombed just as you bomb” (2004, pg. 55).

Further examples of the politicizing effect Guantanamo/Camp X-Ray landscape is having on the Muslim consciousness is demonstrated through editorials being published in Muslim newspapers. As one editorial states in Britain’s politically moderate *Muslim News*, “out of the window has gone any regard for the norms of international law and order ... with Muslims liable to be kidnapped in any part of the world to be transported to Guantanamo Bay and face summary justice” (Rose, 2004, pg. 136). Moreover, as Rose identifies, “on Islamist websites and in the Arab Press, Guantanamo is cited time and again as a rallying point for jihad, as a justification for creating more suicide “martyrs”” (2004, pg. 2004). As one senior Defense Intelligence Agency official stated: “it’s a public relations disaster. Maybe the guy who goes into Gitmo does so as a farmer who got swept along and did very little. He’s going to come out a fully fledged jihadist. And for every detainee, I’d guess you create another ten terrorists or supporters of terrorism” (Rose, 2004, pg. 136). One of the most dramatic examples of the politicization occurring as a result of the Camp X-Ray landscape was the epiphenomena of decapitations that occurred both in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In these cases, both before and during their executions, the hostages were dressed in orange costumes, in deliberate imitation of the

detainee uniforms at Camp X-Ray (Rose, 2004, pg. 136). More recently, feverish and vociferous anti-American protests were ignited in Afghanistan, Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), Libya, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine (including Hamas), Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sudan in response to the alleged desecration of the Qur'an at Camp X-Ray. Although the United States Administration denied these allegations, the report further fuelled the feelings of humiliation, rage, and anger within the Muslim diaspora (AlJazeera.Net, Saturday 14 May 2005).

By constructing and shaping an anti-terrorism landscape at Camp X-Ray, the United States has not only produced a space that actively politicizes, but has physically and symbolically created a landscape that situates the United States Administration and by de facto the U.S populace on the margins of the very political and legal system the War on Terror is supposed to uphold and protect. In effect, the marginality of Camp X-Ray, advertently or inadvertently, has introduced a nuance to the "War on Terror." The "War on Terror" has now become the "War of Terror." Although ideologues like Osama bin Laden and other members of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency have historically imagined this to be the case, the Camp X-Ray landscape, and the images associated with the Camp X-Ray landscape, have posited the "War of Terror" perspective into the consciousness of the Muslim diaspora and elevated anti-American sentiment within the Muslim Umma in general and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency in particular.

In the Post 9-11 epoch, the contours of the United States anti-terror nation-space and cityscapes/urban landscapes, and its concomitant spatial practices and behaviours, have been shaped by as much as they have shaped Islamist extremism/terrorism. As

Butterfield notes: “Baudrillard, scandalous as ever, hands the symbolic victory of the war on terror to the terrorists, all but crediting them with recent economic, political, and psychological “recessions” in the West, and with the fact that “deregulation has ended in maximum security, in a level of restriction and constraint equivalent to that found in fundamentalist societies” (Butterfield, 2002, pg.16). Although these “recessions” may be considered necessary in order to effectively and efficiently wage the War on Terror, the very existence of anti-terror measures and the consequent recessions in the physical and psychological landscape the recessions generate, (re)produces the terror they are trying to combat. Therefore, the rebuilding and redevelopment of the spaces directly affected by the Islamist extremist/terrorist attacks, the broader militarization, citadelization, and use of authoritarian measures in cityscapes/urban landscapes and the U.S. nation-space, as well as the construction and production of anti-terror spaces and landscapes like Camp X-Ray, serve as an extension of the identity and subjectivity of Islamist extremism/terrorism by creating a physical and psychological landscape of terror. The landscape shaped by the consciousness of anti-terrorism recreates and communicates the consciousness of the extremism/terrorism it is attempting to prevent and destroy.

Conclusions

Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to illuminate three interrelated geographical and spatial dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon: the diffuse transnational structure of Islamist extremism/terrorism and the imaginings, forces, and technology that make it possible to maintain and sustain this decentralized and deterritorialized system of behaviour and organization; the liminal cultural thirdspace that Islamist extremist/terrorist groups, cells, and/or individual actors occupy, especially upon penetrating and infiltrating the cultural fabric of nations that are alien to their own; and the function of landscape in extending not only the identity and subjectivity of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, but their goals and objectives as well. Cumulatively, I believe that these geographical and spatial dimensions of the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon provide a composite of the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism. Furthermore, through inductively developing an understanding of the geographical and spatial imaginings of Islamist extremism/terrorism, I believe that greater insight into this phenomenon has been achieved through revealing and explaining some of the complexities and dynamics of how these diffuse transnational actors organize themselves, how they understand themselves, how they understand their actions, and how they understand the world in which they inhabit.

In the first movement, through using Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Canetti's *Crowds and Power* as a theoretical framework and interpretive mechanism, I believe that I was able to penetrate and elucidate some of the complex and dynamic geographical and spatial relationships and forces that make constructing and sustaining a diffuse transnational network and organizational system and its associated imaginings

possible. Furthermore, I believe that generating an understanding of how Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency exist in an internationalized imagined community can also help to explain how these groups function and maintain their sense of unity on a national or regional scale.

Future research into the diffuse transnational network structure of the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency could explore possible links and cooperation between Islamist extremist/terrorist groups and non-Islamist extremist/terrorist groups e.g. Al Qaeda and LTTE, Jemmah Islamiah and the LTTE, Al Qaeda and the FARC, Al Qaeda and the Basques, etc. Additionally, one could explore the possible links and cooperation that may exist between Islamist extremists/terrorists and organized crime syndicates and how these relationships support the diffuse transnational network structure of these Islamist extremist/terrorist groups. Another area of inquiry that is important to understanding how Al Qaeda and other groups organize themselves is understanding which landscapes are ideally suited for or are conducive to supporting these transnational actors. For instance, what is the relationship that exists between groups like Al Qaeda and failed or failing states? With respect to the effects of globalization, one could explore the mass-movement of capital that globalization allows and the use of off-shore banking to move capital and finance various Islamist extremist/terrorist operations. As a more comprehensive understanding of how groups like Al Qaeda organize themselves and imagine themselves is established, policies can be developed that effectively target the imaginings that make Al Qaeda and the Islamist extremist/terrorist constituency possible.

In the second movement, I believe that the theoretical tools provided by Soja's *Thirdspace*, Bhabha's *Location of Culture*, and Butler's *Gender Trouble* enabled an analysis not only of the cultural "space" the Islamist extremist/terrorist group and/or individual actors occupy upon infiltrating a target society, but the versatility, adaptability, and malleability of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject, and their conscious control of their own spatiality. Moreover, these theoretical tools allowed for an analysis of the relationship that exists between the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and violence: violence is the medium through which the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is realized and actualized. In effect, who the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject is, is what the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject does.

How do extremists/terrorists prepare and train for operations in foreign cultures and spaces? Who are the individuals and or groups selected to carry out covert foreign operations? Are their particular demographics that are more suitable to carry out foreign operations than others? As certain operations can take years to execute, how do these individuals that are subject to foreign cultures and related accoutrements able to sustain their level of resolve and conviction over prolonged periods of time? Are liberal democracies more prone to extremist/terrorist attacks because of their pluralistic "open" societies? Investigating these questions in future research could contribute to furthering one's understanding of the Islamist extremist/terrorist subject and could possibly lead to policies that would prevent individuals from infiltrating target societies, provide information that would help various governmental apparatuses identify potential Islamist extremist/terrorist subjects, and potentially prevent individuals from realizing their violent objectives.

In the third and final movement, my examination of the relationship that exists between Islamist extremism/terrorism and landscapes (including cityscapes/urban landscapes) is important as it reveals the short and long-term ramifications of Islamist extremism/terrorism and its consequent impact on the physical and psychological landscape of target societies in general and the United States in particular. Moreover, my examination reveals an insight into the motivational forces behind target selection and the politicization that can result from the construction and development of places and spaces that are designed to prevent and/or mitigate future extremist/terrorist attacks.

As Islamist extremism/terrorism continues to proliferate, which to date has shown few signs of subsiding, the need to demystify and decode this transnational phenomenon has become paramount if international, national, and regional stability, safety, and security are to be maintained in certain areas and achieved in others. Therefore, it is incumbent upon both academics and policy practitioners alike to continue to cast light into the darkness that shrouds this area of inquiry. Although terrorism and political violence have received a substantial amount of academic analysis, large information gaps pervade the corpus of terrorism research: "terrorism, one of the most widely discussed issues of our time, remains one of the least understood" (Laquer, 1987, pg. 1). In the article, "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism," Andrew Silke suggests that "terrorism quite simply is not a topic that is easily researched. Or at least, it does give the impression on first inspection. The central actors involved in this phenomenon are difficult to access—and extremely difficult to access in a systematic manner" (2001, pg. 2). Silke goes on to state, "terrorism itself is an emotive subject and researchers have traditionally not been overly concerned with remaining objective and

neutral in how they view the subject and its perpetrators" (2001, pg. 2). Although it can be argued that absolute objectivity is unattainable and that all forms of analysis and examination are subject to the provenance of the researcher, I believe that geography and by extension geographers are in a unique position to make significant contributions to this subject area.

The importance of Geography as a discipline of study is indispensable to understanding and combating the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon. As a discipline of diversity and integration, under whose rubric geographers study and analyse processes, systems, behaviours, patterns, distributions, diffusions, circulations, interactions, juxtapositions, and other phenomena that have spatial expression, geographers are in a position to transgress disciplinary boundaries and develop modes of analysis that provide unique insight into the interconnectivity and interactivity of the physical and human worlds (Blij, 2005, pg. 8). Therefore, as Islamist extremism/terrorism is as much a geographical and spatial phenomenon, as it is a political phenomenon, geographical and spatial inquiry is a necessary component of deciphering the Islamist extremist/terrorist phenomenon and developing the knowledge necessary to successfully engage these actors in their physical, psychological, and social spaces and environments.

However, especially in the United States, geographical and spatial knowledge and literacy seems to be on the decline: "an American student might go from kindergarten through graduate school without ever taking a course in geography—let alone a fairly complete program" (Blij, 2005, pg. 13). In contemporary America, geography has become underrepresented as an academic discipline and has not been offered at elite

schools like Harvard and Yale for over half a century (Blij, 2005, pg. 15). Although the ramifications of the relative decline of geographical knowledge is difficult to apprehend and measure, the geographical and spatial isolationism and provincialism of the US collective imagination will undoubtedly influence and impact the positionality of the United States in international diplomacy, defence, and development. As the country who is on the forefront of the War on Terror, a comprehensive and robust reservoir of geographical and spatial knowledge, awareness, and understanding would appear to be one of the requisite dimensions for achieving geosecurity for both the United States nation-space and beyond.

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